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A B S T R A C T
The inclusion of women in the public sphere delineates the lastcentury from the previous ones. This thesis investigates three
key aspects of the gender revolution.
At the turn from the 18th to the 19th century, countries began to
grant women equal voting rights to men. Equality in the act of voting,
however, failed to ensue. To address this conundrum, the first essay
argues that elites and organizations had greater incentives to mobi-
lize women to vote under a proportional representation (pr) than a
plurality electoral system. I test the argument empirically by study-
ing a reform which required half of the about 600 Norwegian mu-
nicipalities to replace plurality with pr before the 1919 election. The
difference-in-difference design reveals the reform increased women’s
share of the votes cast by about ten percentage points, thus notably
reducing gender inequities in political participation.
Women’s inclusion in voting did, however, not imply women’s in-
clusion in employment, education, and political offices. Indeed, after
World War II, the social partners and political parties favored policies
aimed at male-breadwinner families. The second essay studies the
puzzle of why unions, employers, and parties nonetheless, from the
1970s and onwards, went from opposing to proposing work-family
policy reforms, such as daycare services and paid parental leave. My
argument is that, as women have become an increasingly important
part of the membership base for unions and source of high-skilled
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labour for employers, the social partners have come to push for the
expansion of work-family policies. Yet, centralised corporatist institu-
tions, which give policy influence, are needed for unions and employ-
ers to succeed with their policy demands. Both a time-series cross-
national quantitative analysis and an in-depth case study of Norway
and shadow case studies of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
and Sweden support the argument.
By the new millennium, women made up half of the labor force
but only one-third of managers, indicating that significant gender in-
equities remain. The third essay therefore examines whether the in-
troduction of full-time daycare services increase mothers’ possibility
and willingness to invest a professional career. Empirically, the essay
exploits a staggered, large-scale expansion of daycare centres across
Norwegian municipalities in the 2000s. Analysing registry data on
the whole Norwegian population, the instrumental variable estimates
indicate that the availability of daycare services made women more
likely to enter into occupations requiring longer hours and leadership
positions.
In sum, the thesis demonstrates that reforms of political and public
policy institutions can impact both the pace and the direction of the
ongoing gender revolution.
8
C O N T E N T S
Declaration 3
Acknowledgments 4
Abstract 7
List of Figures 10
List of Tables 12
1 introduction : the century of the gender revo-
lution 15
2 proportional politics : electoral institutions
and women’s share of the vote in the early
twentieth century 53
3 partnering change : the politics of work-family
policies 94
4 care for career : mothers , toddlers , and the im-
pact of universal daycare on female leader-
ship 157
5 conclusions 194
A appendix to chapter 1 : proportional poli-
tics 211
B appendix to chapter 2 : partnering change 220
C appendix to chapter 3 : care for career 250
bibliography 269
9
L I S T O F F I G U R E S
Figure 2.1 The distribution, mean and interquartile range
of women’s percentage of votes cast across
municipalities for each election. 75
Figure 2.2 Women’s share of total turnout in Norwegian
municipal elections, 1910-1928. 79
Figure 2.3 Leads and lags of the effect of changing to PR
in 1919. 82
Figure 2.4 Percentage of municipalities with at least
one woman in the municipal council, 1910-
1928. 86
Figure 3.1 Gross enrollment rates in tertiary education,
with countries ordered according to when the
female outnumbered the male enrollment rate.
The vertical lines indicate the year of the rever-
sal of the gender gap in enrollment. 103
Figure 3.2 Cross-national variation in total union density
and the percentage of women union members
in the 2000s 108
Figure 3.3 Daycare coverage, average weekly daycare at-
tendance, and the gender gap in higher ed-
ucation across thirteen European countries in
2013. 116
Figure 3.4 The conditional effect of the gender gap
and corporatism on parental leave expan-
sion 120
Figure 3.5 The development of paid maternity, paternity,
and shared leave policies in Norway. 123
Figure 3.6 Children in daycare centers in Norway, 1963-
2014. 123
Figure 3.7 Working women’s participation in trade
unions in Norway. 128
Figure 3.8 Higher education and gender in Norway, 1970-
2015. 129
Figure 3.9 Parties’ seat percentages and the percent-
age female representatives by party in the
Storting for each parliamentary session, 1945-
2017 130
10
List of Figures 11
Figure 4.1 Plots showing the average survey responses to
questions about hours of work, whether work-
ing hours, and gender by occupational groups
(isco-88 2-digit) across European countries in
the 2000s 164
Figure 4.2 Variation in daycare coverage, costs, and aver-
age weekly hours among advanced industrial-
ized democracies in 2013 170
Figure 4.3 The percentage of children in formal daycare,
1963-2014 171
Figure 4.4 Distribution of daycare coverage across mu-
nicipalities in 2002 (grey) and 2008 (black) for
one- and two-year-olds, respectively. 174
Figure 4.5 Density plot of change in the daycare coverage
between 2002 and 2008. 175
Figure 4.6 Daycare coverage in Norwegian municipalities
in 2002 and 2008 and density of yearly changes
in coverage and changes between 2002 and
2008. 176
Figure A.1 Map of type of electoral system used in Nor-
wegian municipalities in 1916. 213
Figure A.2 An example of the signatures collected
for the 1905 independence petition (from
Gildeskål) 219
Figure B.1.1 Daycare coverage in Sweden and Norway,
1963-2014. 222
Figure B.1.2 Women in trade unions and higher education
in Sweden and Norway. 223
Figure B.1.3 Women in trade unions and higher education
in the Netherlands and Norway. 224
Figure B.1.4 Women in trade unions and higher education
in the United Kingdom and Norway. 230
Figure B.1.5 Corporatism in advanced democracies
(2002) 237
Figure B.1.6 Correlation between change in parental leave
generosity and change in the gender gap in
higher education enrollment, 1970-2010. 238
Figure B.1.7 Percentage female among union members in
advanced democracies, 1960-2010. 239
Figure B.1.8 The estimated marginal coefficients of the gen-
der gap in higher education and corporatism
on parental leave generosity. 240
Figure B.1.9 Parties’ seat percentages and Banzhaf power
index score, 1961-2017 247
Figure B.1.10 The percentage female cabinet ministers, 1945-
2016 248
Figure B.1.11 Percentage female and male labor force par-
ticipation in the population aged 15-74, 1972-
2014. 249
Figure C.1.1 Percentage women among managers and
among the employed in advanced democracies
in the 2010s. 250
Figure C.1.2 The development of daycare prices, daycare
financing, and full-time attendance in Nor-
way. 251
Figure C.1.3 The predicted average actual working hours
in three-digit level occupational groups, 1997-
2001. 261
Figure C.1.4 Percentage women and average actual work-
ing hours in three-digit level occupational
groups, 1997-2001. 262
L I S T O F TA B L E S
Table 2.1 Regression results reporting the effect of pr on
women’s share of total turnout in municipal
elections, Norway 1910-1928. 80
Table 2.2 Regression results reporting the differing ef-
fect of suffrage on women’s percentage of
votes cast. 84
Table 2.3 The estimated effect of pr on women’s share of
the votes cast net of turnout using sequential
g-estimation 89
Table 2.4 Regression results reporting the effect of pr on
women’s share of total turnout in municipal
elections, Norway 1910-1928. 92
Table 3.1 Predictions regarding the level of wfps based
on the theoretical discussion 110
Table 3.2 Regression results for the provision of leave
schemes, 18 OECD countries, 1960-2010 119
Table 4.1 Regression results reporting the association
between daycare usage and the outcomes of
interest 183
Table 4.2 Regression results reporting the reduced form
effect of daycare coverage on agreeing with the
statement “women have the same need for a
professional career as men have”. 188
Table A.1 Incentives to cultivate a personal vote in the
plurality and pr electoral systems in Norwe-
gian municipalities. 212
12
List of Tables 13
Table A.2 Regression results reporting the association
between pr and a set of covariates. 214
Table A.3 Regression results reporting the effect of pr on
women’s share of total turnout in municipal
elections, Norway 1910-1928. 215
Table A.4 Regression results reporting the association
between pr on women’s share of total
turnout in municipal elections, Norway 1913-
1916. 216
Table A.5 Regression results reporting the effect of pr on
turnout in municipal elections, Norway, 1910-
1928. 217
Table A.6 Regression results reporting the effect of pr on
women’s share of total turnout in municipal
elections, Norway, 1910-1928. 218
Table B.1.1 Summary statistics for the variables used in
the time-series cross-section regressions in Ta-
ble 3.2 236
Table B.1.2 Full regression results for the provision of
leave schemes, 18 OECD countries, 1960-
2010 244
Table B.1.3 Regression results for the provision of leave
schemes, 18 OECD countries, 1960-2010 245
Table C.1.1 Daycare coverage for one- and two-year-
olds across Norwegian municipalities, 1972-
2001 252
Table C.1.2 Daycare coverage for one- and two-year-
olds across Norwegian municipalities, 2002-
2008 253
Table C.1.3 Descriptive statistics for the individual level
variables. 259
Table C.1.4 Regression results reporting the association
between daycare usage and the outcomes of
interest 260
Table C.1.5 Regression results reporting the association
between daycare usage and the outcomes of
interest 263
Table C.1.6 Regression results reporting the association
between daycare usage and the outcomes of
interest 264
Table C.1.7 Regression results reporting the association
between daycare usage and the outcomes of
interest 265
Table C.1.8 Regression results reporting the association
between daycare usage and the outcomes of
interest 266
Table C.1.9 Regression results reporting the association
between our instruments and the outcomes for
55 year old women. 267
List of Tables 14
Table C.1.10 Regression results reporting the association
between daycare usage and the outcomes of
interest 268
1
I N T R O D U C T I O N : T H E C E N T U RY O F T H E
G E N D E R R E V O L U T I O N
“Let me imagine, since facts are so hard to come by, whatwould have happened had Shakespeare had a wonderfully
gifted sister, called Judith, let us say”, Virginia Woolf writes in A
Room of One’s Own (1928). She continues by unfolding how William
headed to grammar school and then London, where he got involved
in the world of theatre, whereas Judith stayed behind. She was soon
“betrothed to the son of a neighbouring wool-stapler.” Yet, defying
marriage, she made it to London on her own. “Like him, she had a
taste for the theatre. She stood at the stage door; she wanted to act,
she said. Men laughed in her face. The manager a fat, loose-lipped
man guffawed. He bellowed something about poodles dancing and
women acting no woman, he said, could possibly be an actress.”
Unlike her brother, Woolf imagines, Judith ended her life tragically,
and she “lies buried at some cross-roads where the omnibuses now
stop outside the Elephant and Castle.”1 Similar fictions could be told
about the sisters of prominent politicians and magnates, as women
have largely been excluded from positions of power at least since
the Neolithic Revolution.2 The inclusion of half of the Earth’s popu-
lation in public affairs such as in voting, political offices, and man-
1 Woolf 2004 [1928], 54-6.
2 See Engels 1902 [1884]; Whyte 1978; Dahlberg 1981; Blumberg 2004; Ch. 2 Iversen
and Rosenbluth 2010; Pinker 2011; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013.
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agerial positions is the “quiet revolution” of the twentieth century
(Goldin 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). It is still ongoing (Eng-
land 2010; Esping-Andersen 2009).
Through three empirical papers, this dissertation explores some
of the institutional causes and consequences of women’s inclusion in
politics, in education, and in the labor market over the last century. By
inclusion, I refer to the presence of women in public affairs, such as in
voting, in higher education, and in leadership positions (Htun 2016, 4).
As a number of political theorists have pointed out, accepting that
structural barriers, be they legal or social, prevent women (or men)
from exercising their equal rights or accessing powerful positions on
an equal footing with men is normatively indefensible.3 For instance,
also after women got the right to vote, women were less likely both to
vote and to stand for election due to social and political impediments
(see below and Mansbridge 1999, 639). Studying to what extent polit-
ical institutions and public policies can promote women’s presence
at the voting booth or top of the occupational ladder may therefore
pinpoint how we can achieve a fairer distribution of power, positions,
and privileges between the genders. This thesis addresses such issues
by exploring three aspects of the two waves of the last hundred years’
gender revolution.
The first wave of the gender revolution brought the enfranchise-
ment of women, starting at the national level with New Zealand in
1893. Other states followed suit, particularly in the wake of the First
World War. By 1940, 42 countries had granted women the right to vote,
including the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. The revolution was a result of combined pressure from
well-organized suffrage movements and weak incumbents believing
3 For philosophical discussions of the inclusion of women, see notably Mill 2006 [1869];
Phillips 1992, 1995, 53; Mansbridge 1999, 639; Murray 2014, 523; Young 2000, 141-8;
Nussbaum 2000; Sen 2001; Richards 1980, 2014.
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that granting women the right to vote would benefit them electorally
(Teele 2014, 2015, forthcoming; see also Przeworski 2009).
The puzzle, however, is why, despite equal political rights, women
did not turn out to vote to the same extent as men after female en-
franchisement. From the early twentieth century and until at least
the 1960s and 1970s, women’s share of the turnout in elections typi-
cally remained below that of men (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006; Du-
verger 1955; Norris 2002; Tingsten 1937). Contemporary and later
observers documented how social norms discouraged women from
turning out to vote (Andersen 1990, 1996; Baker 1984; Danielsen,
Larsen, and Owesen 2013; Merriam and Gosnell 1924).4 A number of
studies have additionally documented that differences in education,
labor market participation, urbanization, and liberal voting laws can
go some way in explaining why fewer women than men turned out
to vote.5 Nevertheless although Lijphart (1999) and others6 have em-
phasized the importance of electoral institutions for the inclusiveness
of the political system the extent to which proportional representa-
tion (pr) mobilizes women to vote compared to plurality systems has
received scant attention in the comparative politics literature.7
The first paper in this dissertation (Chapter 2) therefore investigates
how the shift from a plurality to a proportional representation (pr)
electoral system increased women’s share of the turnout in the early
twentieth century. To do so, I make use of the fact that about half
of the Norwegian municipalities were required to replace plurality
with pr in 1919, giving me exogenous variation in electoral systems.
4 In their classic study, Merriam and Gosnell (1924) found that more than one in ten
women not registered to vote in Chicago in the 1920s listed “objections of husband
to women voting” and “disbelief in women’s voting” as the main reasons for failing
to register (see also Andersen 1996; Corder and Wolbrecht 2006).
5 See, for example, Andersen 1996; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Corder and
Wolbrecht 2006; Duverger 1954b; Rokkan 1970; Tingsten 1937; Welch 1977.
6 Notable examples include Duverger 1954a; Grofman and Lijphart 1984; Iversen and
Soskice 2006; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Powell 1982, 2000.
7 See Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) for an eminent exception. Their focus, how-
ever, is on the early 2000s, and they rely on cross-sectional survey data.
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I couple this with detailed data on votes cast broken down by gender
for each of the several hundred municipalities over the 1898-1928 pe-
riod. The difference-in-difference results show that the switch from
plurality to pr in 1919 increased women’s share of the votes cast, par-
ticularly where there were pre-existing women’s networks, such as
suffrage and temperance movements. Women’s degree of de facto in-
clusion in politics as voters was, in other words, dependent on the
electoral system. Yet, contrary to the beliefs of women activists at the
time, as well as later arguments by political scientists,8 the reform
did not increase women’s presence in legislative assemblies. Such de-
velopments had to await the second wave of the gender revolution
starting in the 1960s.
The second wave concerns women’s entrance into higher education,
employment, and public positions (Goldin 1990, 2006; Goldin and
Katz 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010).
The Trente Glorieuses of the post-World War II period characterized
by unprecedented growth rates and a massive expansion of social pro-
tection9 reinforced the male-breadwinner family model. With the
growth of the middle class, more families could afford that the wife
stayed fully at home, which was also supported by the growing wel-
fare state.10 The powerful political actors the main political parties
of the left and right, employers, and trade unions all favored such
family arrangements.11
8 Bogdanor 1981; Castles 1981; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Lakeman 1976;
Means 1972; Norris 1985, 2006; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010; Rule 1987;
Salmond 2006, See, e.g.,
9 See Eichengreen 2007; Huber and Stephens 2001; Judt 2005; Lindert 2004.
10 A married woman outside the labor force was thus linked to the social insurance
system for sickness, unemployment, and old-age indirectly through her husband
(Blom 1999, 339). This also meant that, as Blom (1998, 419) notes, “[t]he predomi-
nance of the complementary understanding of gender continued to make the male
full-time wage earner the model for social rights to the detriment of women who
were not taken care of by a male provider.”
11 See, e.g., Blom 1998; Goldin 1990; Gruber and Graves 1998; Hernes 1987; Hinn-
fors 1992; Leira 1992; Morgan 2006; Quataert 2001; Swenson 2002.
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The conundrum is therefore why the very same political actors sub-
sequently came to turn around and start to introduce work-family
policies (wfps) aimed at dual-earner couples generally and working
mothers in particular, such as daycare services and paid parental
leave. Most existing studies agree that this shift has to be understood
as a response to women entering into higher education and labor
markets on an epoch-making scale from the 1960s and onwards.12
Yet, contrary to the assertions of the modernization approach main-
tained by Inglehart and Norris (2000, 2003), these trends cannot on
their own account for the variation in wfps across countries and time
(Fleckenstein and Lee 2012; Morgan 2006, 2013).
To address this puzzle, the second paper, found in Chapter 3, stud-
ies the politics of wfp reforms. Existing research has argued that party
competition over women’s votes and women’s inclusion in parlia-
ment, parties, and government has lead expansion of wfps (e.g., Fleck-
enstein and Lee 2012; Morgan 2013; Wiliarty 2010). Surprisingly, how-
ever, the joint influence of trade unions and employers which, in
countries with centralized corporatist institutions, are integrated in
the making of labor market and social policies has not been system-
atically theorized or empirically studied.
In this chapter, I argue that unions start to favor and push for wfps
as women become an growing share of their membership base. Simi-
larly, employers’ associations turn around and start favoring wfps as
the gender gap in higher education reverses and women become a
increasingly important source of highly skilled labor for firms. Yet,
12 Women’s inclusion in education and in the labor market is itself well understood
in the literature and can be accounted for by the investment in higher education
(Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage 2010; Barro and Lee 2015; Black and Juhn 2000; Goldin
and Katz 2008), the rise of the service sector (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010), the inven-
tion of the Pill (Bailey 2006; Goldin and Katz 2000, 2002), advancement in obstetric
practices and the infant formula (Albanesi and Olivetti 2016), and the spread of home
appliances (de V. Cavalcanti and Tavares 2008; Greenwood et al. 2016; Greenwood,
Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 2005; Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005). For
analyses of the politics of higher education and the service transition, see notably
Ansell and Gingrich (2013) and Ansell (2010).
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I contend that only social partners operating within centralized cor-
poratist institutions have had the policy influence to translate these
changing preferences into policy. Combining (1) a quantitative study
of eighteen advanced democracies from the 1960s and onwards, with
both (2) an in-depth study tracing the political processes leading
to the large expansion of work-family policies in Norway, and (3)
shadow case studies of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
Sweden, I find support for these conjectures. The extent to which a
country has reformed the welfare state to address the needs of dual
earner families and knowledge-intensive businesses thus crucially de-
pends on the presence of social partners operating within centralized
corporatist institutions (cf. Martin and Swank 2012).
The second wave of the inclusion revolution hides another empir-
ical conundrum. Gender convergence in participation in education
and labor markets, as well as in gender egalitarian attitudes, have
not been followed by a corresponding increase of women in leader-
ship positions (Goldin 2014). Occupations characterized by long work
hours and overtime, including managerial positions, have a low fe-
male share (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010; Catalyst 2016; Guvenen,
Kaplan, and Song 2014; OECD 2016) . A key explanation for this gen-
der inequality is that women not only give birth but also do more
of the childrearing and household work than their partners, which
prevents women from investing more in their career and enter into
occupations that are less compatible with childrearing.13 A number
of prominent studies in comparative political economy have argued
that full-time affordable daycare may lessen the care-career tradeoff
for mothers of young children and thus increase their possibility to
fully engage in their career (Esping-Andersen 1999a, 2009; Estévez-
Abe 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010).
13 See, for instance, Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens forthcoming; Cha and Weeden 2014;
Esping-Andersen 2009; Estévez-Abe 2006; Gerson 2011; Goldin 2014; Halrynjo and
Lyng 2009; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015.
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Chapter 4 theoretically develops and empirically evaluates whether
the introduction of full-time, affordable daycare increases women’s
career investment. Exploiting the staggered expansion of daycare ser-
vices across Norwegian municipalities in the 2000s to get exogenous
variation in access to daycare, and using registry data covering the
whole Norwegian population, it shows that the availability of day-
care services induced mothers to enter into occupations with longer
average hours and increased their chances of obtaining a leadership
position in the labor market.
Together, the three chapters take us through aspects of the first cen-
tury of the gender revolution and critical issues of gender equality in
the public sphere: voting, work-family policy reforms, and leadership
positions in the economy. In the remainder of this introductory chap-
ter, Sections 1.1 to 1.3 consider each of the three studies in more detail.
I then discuss the empirical and data contributions of the thesis in
Section 1.4, including why Norway is a fruitful case for investigation.
Thereafter, in Section 1.5, I zoom out to locate the dissertation’s insti-
tutional perspective within the broad literature on gender inclusion.
Lastly, Section 1.6 roadmaps the rest of the thesis.
1.1 electoral systems and women’s inclusion in voting
Central to the inclusion of women in politics is voting behavior. As
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 1) remind us, “[s]ince democracy
implies not only governmental responsiveness to citizen interests but
also equal consideration of the interests of each citizen, democratic
participation must also be equal.” Women’s enfranchisement was a
watershed in democratic history, which meant that on average across
the Western world, the percentage of adult citizens eligible to vote
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increased from 43 percent in 1900 to 80 percent in 1930.14 Notwith-
standing equality in the right to vote, equality in voting did not fol-
low, which Duverger (1955, 10) pointed out early on: “One fact, at
least, seems beyond doubt the existence of great inequality between
both sexes in the actual exercise of political rights. Legally, women are
on an equal footing with men; they are not so in practice.”15 Further
understanding of the institutions that might have affected women’s
inclusion in voting is therefore paramount.
A voluminous literature on gender and politics has argued that
women’s inclusion in parliaments and cabinets is higher under pr
than plurality, first-past-the post systems.16 These studies argue that
the impact of pr works through several mechanisms, including
that under pr parties have more control over the party lists and
can introduce party-specific gender quotas (Kittilson and Schwindt-
Bayer 2012; Thames and Williams 2010), there is a higher district
magnitude and thus more places to fill on a list (Darcy, Welch,
and Clark 1994; Lakeman 1976; Matland 1993; Means 1972), there
is less focus on the candidate and more on the party (Iversen and
Rosenbluth 2008), and a larger number of relevant parties means
a greater incentive to include women on the party list in order
to broaden the electoral appeal (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010;
Reynolds 1999; Rule and Zimmerman 1994; Salmond 2006; Thames
and Williams 2010). The evidence also points out that the association
between pr and women’s representation is dependent on a potential
14 My own calculation based on the VDem database (Coppedge et al. 2016b). In France,
Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland women received the right to vote after the Second
World War. The Western countries comprise Western Europe, Northern America,
Australia, and New Zealand. The measure “does not take into consideration restric-
tions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally
incompetent” (Coppedge et al. 2016a, 76).
15 He also added that: “It is for governments to draw the inferences from this fact; po-
litical scientists can do no more than record it and assess the extent of its influence.”
16 See notably Castles 1981; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Duverger 1955; Iversen and
Rosenbluth 2008; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Lakeman 1976; Means 1972; Paxton,
Hughes, and Painter 2010; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1981, 1987; Salmond 2006; but see
Roberts, Seawright, and Cyr 2013.
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pool of women candidates with the educational and labor market
experience perceived to be required to compete for political office
(Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Means 1972). The pr-female legislators
link has hence been subject to considerable scholarly scrutiny.
The same does not hold for voting behavior. Despite the historical
importance of the gender difference in turning out to vote, remark-
ably few studies investigate to what extent electoral institutions have
influenced voting behavior of women relative to men. An important
exception is Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010, 2012), but their fo-
cus is on the early twentieth century, a time period in which women
turned out to vote to roughly the same extent as men (Norris 2002).
Historically, we have thus little, if any, knowledge about the effects
electoral institutions had on women’s de facto inclusion in the politi-
cal sphere through voting.
Chapter 3 addresses this gap in the literature by theorizing and ex-
amining how the switch from plurality to pr impacts women’s share
of the turnout in the early twentieth century. Drawing on the general
electoral systems literature, I delineate three mechanisms for why we
should expect pr to increase women’s percentage of the votes cast: an
electoral, a representation, and an organizational mechanism.
First, the electoral mechanism runs through the general mobilizing
effects of pr. Under pr, parties generally have an incentive to mobi-
lize a larger share of the electorate than under plurality, as every vote
counts more towards maximizing the party’s number of legislative
seats than in a plurality system (Cox 1999; Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2015;
Fisher et al. 2008; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012).17 As women
after enfranchisement constituted what Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer
(2012) label an “undertapped market” for party elites looking for
17 The exception is close races in a plurality system, where the impetus to mobilize are
higher than under pr (see Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2015; Eggers 2015; Herrera, Morelli,
and Palfrey 2014).
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voters to mobilize, substituting plurality with pr should increase
women’s share of the vote.
Second, the representation mechanism runs through the inclusion of
women as representatives (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). Un-
der pr, the literature demonstrates that it is simpler to achieve a
representation of women, as I discussed above. A series of stud-
ies additionally show that the election of women legislators may
in turn signal inclusion of women and break down social norms
against female political participation.18 Pr might, accordingly, lower
the cost of voting for other women citizens and increase their share of
turnout (Atkeson 2003; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; High-Pippert
and Comer 1998; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Wolbrecht and
Campbell 2007).
Third, an organizational mechanism might be at play. The literature
on voter turnout has uncovered how social networks and organiza-
tions increase both political knowledge and the pressure to vote (for
instance, DellaVigna et al. 2014; Iversen and Soskice 2015b; Pons and
Liegey 2013). Under pr party elites have stronger incentives to mo-
bilize more broadly; nevertheless, their capacity to do so may vary.
Thus, the presence of social organizations such as trade unions,
temperance societies, and suffrage movements may help political
parties and elites to tap in to women’s network that again can mobi-
lize women. These networks may also seek to mobilize women inde-
pendently of requests from party elites (Cox 1999, 2015; Powell 1982;
Radcliff and Davis 2000).
These three mechanisms all predict that replacing plurality with pr
elections should lead to women increasing their share of the vote. To
test this hypothesis and to explore the three mechanisms, the chap-
ter studies the exogenous switch from plurality to pr in the about
18 For notable contributions to the “role model” literature, see, e.g., Atkeson 2003; Bea-
man et al. 2009, 2012; Blumenau 2016; Gilardi 2015; High-Pippert and Comer 1998;
Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007.
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600 Norwegian municipalities before the 1919 election. Whereas half
of the municipalities were already using pr by that time, the other
half were required by the national parliament, the Storting, to ex-
change plurality with pr before the 1919 election. Using a “difference-
in-difference” design, I estimate the causal effect of the pr switch for
the reformed municipalities to be an increase in women’s percentage
of the total turnout of about nine to ten percentage points.
An exploration of the mechanisms behind the result indicates that
both the electoral and the organizational mechanisms are linking the
reform to the mobilization of women. There is no evidence of a repre-
sentation mechanism, as the pr reform did not lead to more women
entering into municipal councils, at least not in the short to medium
term.19 In sum, the chapter indicates that pr contributes to lessen gen-
der inequities in voting during a time period in which women were
less likely to vote than men.
1.2 educational and political inclusion and the poli-
tics of work-family policy reform
In the aftermath of World War II, women’s suffrage was introduced in
the remaining Western countries Belgium, France, and Italy with
the exception of Switzerland, where women gained the right to vote
in 1971. The gender gap in voting continued to narrow (Norris 2002).
Legal barriers to women’s labor market participation were gradu-
ally removed. One example is “marriage bars”, referring to rules
restricting the employment of particularly married women. In Nor-
way, the ban on hiring women as state officials was lifted in 1938
(Schrumpf 1985). In the United States marriage bars in school and
19 This might be due to the fact that the pool of women with the political and labor
market experience to match and compete with male potential candidates was small
(Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Rokkan 1970).
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private firms disappeared more or less completely in the course of
the 1950s (Goldin 1990, 160-79). For public sector workers, the mar-
riage bar was abandoned in 1945 in the United Kingdom, in 1957
in the Netherlands, in the 1960s in Australia, and in 1973 in Ireland
(Wolf 2013, 14-5).
Notwithstanding these trends, when governments sought full em-
ployment and expanded social protection in the post-World War II
period, it was with a male-breadwinner family in mind.20 As Morgan
(2006, 68) phrases it, “[p]olitical parties from across the ideological
spectrum endorsed the notion of men as breadwinners and women
as full-time caregivers.” Though often overlooked, the same held
for union and employers, which were crucial actors in the develop-
ment of the welfare state (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Hinnfors 1992;
Korpi 1983; Mares 2003a; Rasmussen 2016; Stephens 1979; Swen-
son 2002). In the post-war era, in other words, the political aim of
employment for all meant employment for all men, the aim of decent
wages meant decent family wages, and the aim of social security ben-
efits meant benefits tied to the male breadwinner.
From the 1970s and onwards, however, governments bit by bit
redirected the welfare state towards the needs of working women
and dual-earner families (Huber and Stephens 2001; Morgan 2006).
Whereas states cut back on or cost contained other welfare state
programs, such as unemployment insurance,21 work-family policies
(wfps) were expanded, also during times of fiscal pressure. Some stud-
ies have argued that structural drivers, such as the rise of female em-
ployment and education, alone can account for the introduction of
wfps and other gender equality measures (see, notably Inglehart and
Norris 2003). Without doubt, these secular changes matter, as they cre-
20 See, for example, Blom 1998, 1999; Goldin 1990; Gruber and Graves 1998;
Hernes 1987; Hinnfors 1992; Leira 1992; Morgan 2006; Quataert 2001; Ruggie 1984;
Swenson 2002.
21 Allan and Scruggs 2004; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003.
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ate the need for work-family policies (Bonoli 2005; Fleckenstein and
Lee 2012; Häusermann 2006, 2010; Leira 1992; Togeby 1994). Yet this
structural approach leaves the puzzle of explaining the significant
variation in both timing and magnitude of wfp reforms across coun-
tries unresolved. The questions that remain are thus: How did this sea
change in welfare state policy come about? Why did unions, employ-
ers, and parties come to change their policy preferences at different
points in time? And why did they manage to translate their prefer-
ences into policy in some countries and not others? Chapter 3 seeks to
investigate these questions by studying the expansion of work-family
policies across advanced democracies from the 1960s and onwards.
To explain the connection between the rise in need for wfps and
the political response in the form of reforms, the existing litera-
ture on the politics of wfps has argued that women’s entrance into
parties combined with party competition over an increasing elec-
torate of working women spurred expansion of wfps (Fleckenstein
and Lee 2012; Morgan 2013). Such an account, however, does not ad-
dress the puzzle of uneven political response across countries with
the same levels of female labor market participation, such as Norway
and the United States. Others have pointed to the combined role of in-
creased female labor force participation and the strength of left-wing
parties (Huber and Stephens 2000), but these studies cannot explain
why conservative and Christian Democratic parties have embraced
and instigated wfps. The existing studies can thus only partially ex-
plain the rise of wfps.
Chapter 3 turns to the involvement of organized employers and
trade unions in the making of social policy, to attempt to further
account for the over-time and cross-national variation in the provi-
sion of wfps. The importance of trade unions and organized em-
ployers for the making of other social policies has been thoroughly
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documented (Mares 2003a; Martin and Swank 2012; Rasmussen 2016;
Stephens 1979; Swenson 2002).22 Yet these accounts generally see the
social partners’ policy stances as fixed across time.23 As I will doc-
ument in Chapter 3, however, the social partners have, in many in-
stances, gone from opposing to proposing wfp reforms. The accounts
focusing on unions and employers thus point to the powerful influ-
ence of unions and employers on social policy legislation but leaves
the explanation for the shift in wfp preferences unsettled. Focusing on
wfps, as I do in Chapter 3, may therefore contribute to both the litera-
ture on wfps and on the role of unions and employers in the making
of the welfare state more generally.
In order to provide a dynamic theoretical argument for the social
partners’ preferences and influence on wfps expansion, Chapter 3
takes the shift from Fordist to knowledge-based economies as the
point of departure. Knowledge economies refer to the “production
and services based on knowledge-intensive activities that contribute
to an accelerated pace of technological and scientific advance as well
as equally rapid obsolescence” (Powell and Snellman 2004, 201; see
also Ansell and Gingrich 2013; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Sos-
kice 2014). The shift was not gender neutral. The massive expansion
of higher education from the 1960s and onwards brought with it a nar-
rowing and then a reversal of the gender gap in higher education. By
1989, women’s average gross enrollment in higher education was on
a par with men’s enrollment across advanced democracies. By 2010,
women’s enrollment was about fifteen percentage points above that
of men, though with the coordinated market economies of Continen-
tal Europe exposing smaller gaps in favor of women than the liberal,
22 These studies generally agree that unions favor welfare state expansion (see Ras-
mussen 2016, for a more nuanced view). The extent to which employers are antag-
onists, unwilling consenters, or protagonists of social policy development is still
subject to debate in the literature (see Hacker and Pierson 2002, 2004; Iversen
and Soskice 2009; Korpi 2006; Mares 2003a; Martin and Swank 2012; Nelson and
Stephens 2013a; Paster 2013; Swenson 2004 Spr; Swenson 2002).
23 Notable exceptions are Mares 2003a; Paster 2013.
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Anglo-Saxon and the coordinated, Nordic economies (cf. Iversen and
Stephens 2008; Ansell 2010). Women, and particularly these skilled
women, entered into full-time employment and trade unions.
Next, the chapter contends that the inclusion of women in higher
education and trade unions are the sources of the shift in unions and
employers’ preferences for wfps. For employers, wfps are costly but not
of much use to them when the skilled labor force is predominantly
male. As women start to outnumber men in higher education, em-
ployers are predicted to become increasingly interested in supporting
social policies that may help to improve high-skilled women’s attach-
ment to the labor market. Likewise, as trade unions’ membership base
become progressively feminized, and the prospect for membership
growth lies in the women-dominated service sectors, unions are hy-
pothesized to come to favor and push for wfps.
Still, these changes in the social partners’ policy preferences do not
inevitably translate into policy reforms. It is the presence of central-
ized corporatist institutions, which give the social partners a direct in-
volvement in policymaking, that furnish unions and employers with
the power to successfully push for and drive through wfp reforms.
An explanation for both the timing and the cross-national differences
in wfp provision thus lies in the interplay between women’s increas-
ing skill levels and entrance into unions and corporatist institutions.
To test this argument, Chapter 3 takes a multi-method approach
and combines an econometric analysis of time-series cross-section
data for 18 countries from 1960 to 2010 with an in-depth case study of
Norway and shadow case studies of the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands, and Sweden. Together, these different pieces of associational
evidence support the contention that unions and employers are key
actors in the expansion of wfps.
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1.3 daycare services and women’s inclusion in leader-
ship positions
Women’s inclusion in education and employment has today reached
that of men to the extent that England (2010) labels it the “gender
revolution.” Goldin (2014) equivalently employs the term “the grand
gender convergence.” Women now make up 48 percent of the labor
force across advanced economies (ILO 2016). Despite the progress,
both scholars argue that the “last chapter” of the revolution has yet
to be written. Occupational gender segregation is one of the key is-
sues that remain (England 2010; Goldin 2014). Even though women
enter into professional degrees in business, medicine, and law on
par with men, and express an equal interest in a career, women are
still less likely to end up in occupations requiring long hours and in
leadership positions (Catalyst 2016; Ely, Stone, and Ammerman 2014;
Estévez-Abe 2006; Gjerberg 2002; Goldin 2014; OECD 2016; Pettit and
Hook 2009).24 Women’s percentage of managerial positions, for in-
stance, remains at 30 percent (ILO 2016). Indeed, if the average yearly
increase in women’s share of managerial positions continues at the
same pace as it did between 1991 and 2014, gender parity in these
powerful positions will not be reached until 2050.25
There is a voluminous literature aiming to explain occupational
gender segregation and the accompanying wage gap. Sociological
theories have turned their attention to culture and values. Among
these scholars, Charles and Bradley (2009, 925) influentially argue that
“the enduring cultural force of gender-essentialist ideology (i.e., cul-
tural beliefs in fundamental and innate gender differences),” com-
bined with “a strong Western cultural emphasis on individual self-
24 These are also positions that are typically paid more per hour, contributing to the
gender wage gap (Goldin 2014; Petersen and Morgan 1995; Petersen et al. 1997).
25 My calculations based on data from ILO (2016).
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expression and self-realization,” lead women to choose the humani-
ties and health-related subjects, and men to choose engineering and
the natural sciences. Sex segregation is thus caused by the broader
culture and values in a given society.26 Available evidence, however,
suggests that norms about women’s position in the labor market and
in education shift according to changes in educational and economic
opportunities for women rather than the other way around.27
Another strand of literature on gender segregation focuses on (in-
nate) psychological differences between the genders. Early studies in
this tradition explained differential human capital investment among
women and men, which again lead to segregation, as being due to
women having an innate comparative advantage in and preference
for caring activities (Parsons and Bales 1955; Mincer 1974; Heck-
man 1979). With women outnumbering and outperforming men in
higher education, however, this explanation has become outdated
(Bettio and Verashchagina 2009, 38). Later theories have therefore in-
stead turned their attention to other possible psychological gender
differences, such as women’s higher aversion to competition, bargain-
ing, and risk (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003; Kray, Thomp-
son, and Galinsky 2001; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Stuhlmacher
and Walters 1999). In a major review of this literature, Bertrand
(2011, 11) nevertheless finds that “only a very limited amount of re-
search is able to establish the relevance of these factors for [actual]
labor market outcomes” (see also Azmat and Petrongolo 2014). The
psychological factors can, for example, only explain substantively
small parts of the gender gap in early-career wage growth and why
there are few women in highly competitive jobs with performance
pay (Manning and Petrongolo 2008; Manning and Saidi 2010).
26 See also Charles and Bradley (2002), Pfau-Effinger (1998, 2004), Pfau-Effinger (2005),
and Barone (2011).
27 Cunningham (2007), Ross (2008), Berrington et al. (2008), Jensen (2010, 2012), Iversen
and Rosenbluth (2010), Banerjee and Duflo (2011), and Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn
(2013).
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One problem with both the cultural and the psychological expla-
nations is that they lump together all women and look at gender
differences at large. As a result, these accounts cannot address why
the career and wage trajectories of men and women are more or
less identical until the arrival of children and then diverge, with hus-
bands’ careers racing ahead (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010; Cools
and Strøm 2014; Goldin 2014; Lacey and Perrons 2015). An impor-
tant reason for this pattern is that employed women still do signifi-
cantly more of the childrearing and household work than men all
of which comes in addition to childbearing itself (Bertrand, Goldin,
and Katz 2010; Hochschild 1989; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Evi-
dence from the United States indicate that the gender differences in
non-paid work even holds when women out-earn their male partners
(Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 2015).
A set of studies convincingly focuses on workplace organization
and operation as a key source of occupational segregation. One clas-
sic approach has been to look at discrimination in hiring and pro-
motion. Though difficult to identify empirically (see Guryan and
Charles 2013), there are some indications of labor market discrim-
ination of women (Claudia and Rouse 2000; Correll, Benard, and
Paik 2007; Finseraas et al. forthcoming; Riach and Rich 2006). An-
other emerging approach shows the importance of working-time flex-
ibility (Cha and Weeden 2014; Gerson 2011; Goldin 2014; Skorge 2015;
Slaughter 2015). With more flexible working-time arrangements, it is
simpler to combine full-time work with care responsibilities. As il-
lustrated in Chapter 4, there is a strong negative correlation between
the average hours worked in an occupation and the female share in
that occupation (see also Skorge 2015). This also holds for leadership
positions, which typically require long hours.
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These explanations, however, ignore the institutional and public
policy context within which employers and employees make their
labor market decisions (cf. Estévez-Abe 2006). Goldin, for instance,
strikingly contends that “[w]ell-intentioned policies backfire 98 per-
cent of the time. . . . We are thinking about policy when we should be
thinking about the workplace. That’s the cause of all of this” (quoted
in Kliff 2016). Such an assertion, however, fails to acknowledge that
public policies may reduce the need for flexibility in the first place.
Working-time flexibility should, for instance, be less important to
dual-earner families and mothers’ opportunities for career invest-
ment if full-time affordable daycare is available, as several seminal
comparative political economy studies have remarked (see notably
Esping-Andersen 1999b, 2000, 2009; Estévez-Abe 2006; Iversen and
Rosenbluth 2006, 2010; Morgan and Zippel 2003; Morgan 2013; Rosen-
bluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006). Despite being proposed as a poten-
tial way to address the gender inequities in career investment, the im-
pact of affordable, full-time daycare remains largely uncharted. The
few existing studies that have looked at women’s inclusion in leader-
ship positions have had to rely on patchy cross-national data, which
makes it difficult to isolate the daycare effect from policies and insti-
tutions (see, e.g., Pettit and Hook 2009). The within-country studies
using causal inference techniques have been limited to investigating
employment and wage effects. We therefore lack systematic theoriz-
ing and evidence regarding the effect of daycare services on women’s
entrance into occupations requiring longer hours and into leadership
positions in the economy.
Chapter 4, coauthored with Henning Finseraas, zeroes in on deal-
ing with these shortcomings in the literature. The chapter contends
that the availability of daycare services can make it possible to both re-
turn to work earlier after childbirth and to work full-time also when
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the children are under school age (Esping-Andersen 2009; Estévez-
Abe 2005, 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Moreover, the availabil-
ity of daycare might also enhance mothers’ desire to invest in a career.
Career investment and entering into leadership positions typically
require more presence at work and longer hours. Without reliable full-
time care options for the children, taking on more responsibility at
work entails higher risk for mothers than other employees. The devel-
opment of full-time daycare may hence increase mothers’ willingness
to enter into occupations with long hours, as well as accepting leader-
ship responsibility, as a reliable and full-time care option is available.
The chapter therefore hypothesizes that full-time, affordable daycare
services increases mothers’ propensity to enter into occupations re-
quiring longer hours and leadership positions.
Empirically, the chapter improves on existing analyses by making
use of Norwegian population-wide registry data with information
about the individual-level uptake of daycare among all mothers of two-
year-olds between 2002 and 2010. To attempt to estimate the causal
effect of daycare services the chapter exploits that the massive daycare
reform in Norway in the 2000s which increased daycare enrollment
by about 35 percentage points, reduced parental fees, and made day-
care available full-time for all children between the age of one and
school-starting age lead to an uneven expansion of daycare across
the more than 400 Norwegian municipalities. The instrumental vari-
able estimates indicate that the use of daycare allowed mothers of
two-year-olds to enter into occupations with longer hours and hav-
ing a higher probability of entering into leadership positions. In a
supplementary analysis, the chapter also shows that the availability
of full-time daycare made mothers value their career more equally
compared to the careers of men.28 These results consequently docu-
28 In line with Gingrich and Ansell (2012), we thus show that individuals’ preferences
are shaped by the the presence of welfare state institutions,
1.4 discussion 35
ment that public policies may help to break the glass ceiling, change
norms regarding careers, and help to finalize the last chapter of the
gender revolution.
1.4 discussion : causation, research design, and data
1.4.1 Causal inference
All the three empirical chapters put forth and test causal hypotheses,
as we saw the previous sections. The chapters use different research
designs and methods to test the hypotheses including difference-in-
difference (Chapter 2), process tracing (Chapter 3), cross-national re-
gression (Chapter 3), and instrumental variables (Chapter 4) but all
adhere to the same logic of inference, namely the potential outcomes
framework of causation.29 Some social scientists have contrasted the
potential outcomes framework with mechanistic explanations such as
process tracing (e.g., Mahoney 2010; Mahoney and Larkin 2008). As
pointed out by Gerring (2010, 2012) and Bennett and Checkel (2013),
however, also process tracing aiming to test causal hypotheses either
uses other units, other time points, or hypothetical counterfactuals to
attempt to identify what would have happened to the outcome of inter-
est if the event or process had not taken place (see also Fearon 1991).
The underlying logic of causation is therefore the same in all the em-
pirical chapters.
The point of departure in the counterfactual model is to compare
a given outcome in two possible worlds, in which the only difference
between these two worlds is a change in a given event, i.e., the cause
29 Also called the counterfactual method or the Neyman-Rubin-Holland model; see
Cox (1958), Holland (1986), King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), Neyman (1990 [1923]),
and Rubin (1974, 1978). For a discussion of different notions of causality in social
science research, see King and Powell (2008) and Reiss (2009).
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(Gerring 2012, 199).30 More specifically, define D as the “treatment”
population-level random variable, which takes the value 1 if the indi-
vidual is in the treatment group and 0 if in the control group.31 We
want to know the causal impact of this variable on an outcome Y. Let
Y1 and Y0 be the potential outcome random variables, with y1i and y
0
i
being the realized values of these variables, respectively, for individ-
ual i. The superscripts, in other words, denote the potential outcome
under treatment (1) and control (0). The causal effect of D for i, δi, is
then defined as: δi = y1i − y0i .
In practice, we only observe one of these potential outcomes that
is, the potential outcome under treatment, Y1, for individuals in the
treatment group and the potential outcome under control, Y0, for
those in the control group. The observable outcome variable Y is ac-
cordingly: Y = D ·Y1 + (1−D) ·Y0. This is what Holland (1986) calls
“the fundamental problem of causal inference.” It leaves direct iden-
tification of δi impossible, since we only observe the outcome under
either treatment or control for each individual i.
To nonetheless be able to identify causal effects, we need to cre-
ate control groups by making assumptions about the control group
being, on average, identical in all relevant aspects to the treatment
group, apart from the treatment itself. To get a causal estimate, we
can thereafter estimate the average effect of the treatment, i.e., the
difference between the expected outcome for the treatment and the
control group: E[δ] = E[Y1−Y0] and thus E[δ] = E[Y1]− E[Y0]. Here
E[Y1] denotes the expected value of Y for the treated group and E[Y0]
the equivalent for the control group. In a randomized experiment this
estimate remains unbiased due to due the fact that treatment assign-
ment is independent of potential outcomes: (Y1, Y0) ⊥ D, with ⊥
30 The following exposition draws on and follows the notation of Morgan and Win-
ship 2007, ch. 2.
31 It must also precede the outcome.
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signifying independence. It can consequently be interpreted as an es-
timate of the average causal effect, E[δ].32
The empirical chapters in this thesis, however, consist of observa-
tional studies of the effects of treatments on a set of outcomes: pr on
women’s share of the votes cast in Chapter 2, the interplay between
respectively the reversal of the gender gap and women’s entrance into
unions and corporatist social partners on wfp provision in Chapter 3,
and the use of daycare services on career investment in Chapter 4. In
observational studies treatment assignment cannot be controlled by
the researcher, which makes the identification of a causal effect more
complicated because the selection into treatment is seldom random
(Rosenbaum 2009, ix). A key issue is therefore the “selection prob-
lem”, meaning that those in the control group have systematically
different untreated potential outcomes than those in the treatment
group if they had been untreated (Angrist and Pischke 2009a, 12-24).
One example is that the effect of pr on women’s share of the votes cast
might be due to the fact that countries adopting pr also experience
strong industrialization33, and thus increasing turnout by working-
class women. The correlation between pr and women’s voting partic-
ipation might therefore have an upward bias. To deal with the selec-
tion problem, one of the contributions of this thesis is to leverage the
case of Norway, which offers especially two advantages: ample (ex-
ogenous) within-case variation and detailed data. I will discuss these
in more detail in the next two subsections.
32 Note that the potential outcomes framework here makes the stable unit treatment
value assumption (sutva), meaning that “the potential outcomes of individuals
[must] be unaffected by potential changes in the treatment exposures of other in-
dividual” (Morgan and Winship 2007, 37).
33 See Boix 1999; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007.
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1.4.2 Leveraging within-case variation in Norway
Testing the chapters’ causal hypotheses requires different types of
data and institutional variation. In Chapter 2, a key issue is to be
able to separate the impact of pr from other factors, such as years
since suffrage and industrialization. Across countries, pr institutions
seldom change and when they change they are often part of a larger
set of reforms (Ahmed 2012; Colomer 2005). In the case of women’s
share of the turnout, this problem is severe, as countries introduced
pr and universal suffrage either simultaneously or pr before women’s
suffrage.34 In Norway, however, the Storting introduced women’s suf-
frage for women with a household income above a certain level in
1901 for municipal elections and 1907 for national elections. The par-
liament enacted universal suffrage in 1910 for municipal elections and
1913 for national elections. The pr reform came in 1919. There was
thus a time lag between the introduction of pr and women’s suffrage.
Importantly, as I discussed in Section 1.1 above, about half of the
municipalities were already using pr before the 1919 election and the
remaining ones where required by the Storting to shift to pr in 1919.
I use a difference-in-difference (did) design to compare the difference
in the change in women’s share of the votes between the municipali-
ties that had to switch to pr in 1919 and those that did not. As the did
compares differences in changes over time, which removes all time-
invariant differences between the “treatment” and “control” group,
the key assumption is that the trends between the two groups would
have been parallel if the pr reform in 1919 had not taken place. Al-
though this assumption is untestable, I muster indirect evidence in
34 Finland: 1906 (suffrage) and 1907 (pr); Denmark: 1915 (pr and suffrage); Austria:
1918 (suffrage) and 1919 (pr); Germany: 1918 (suffrage) 1919 (pr); Sweden: 1908
/(pr) and 1919 (suffrage); the Netherlands: 1917 (pr) and 1919 (suffrage); Spain: 1931
(pr and suffrage); France: 1919 (pr) and 1944 (suffrage); Italy: 1919 (pr) and 1945
(suffrage); Belgium: 1899 (pr) and 1948 (1948); and Switzerland: 1919 (pr) and 1971
(suffrage).
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favor of it, which means that we can regard the pr effect as a causal
estimate. The case of Norway is thus a unique opportunity to explore
the consequences of electoral systems for women’s mobilization at
the voting booth.
Also with regard to the investigation of daycare services on
women’s career investment in Chapter 4 does the subnational level
in Norway provide an unparalleled opportunity for investigating the
effects of the availability of daycare services on mothers’ career oppor-
tunities. The 2002-2008 reforms established affordable, full-time day-
care places for all children between the age of one and five. Whereas
Sweden and Denmark have similar daycare regimes, these were ex-
panded gradually over an extended period of time, making it harder
to detect the causal effects of these reforms. The pace and scope of
the Norwegian reforms makes it a suitable case for investigating how
daycare impacts mothers’ careers.
Variation at the municipal level in Norway again provides us with
the opportunity to disentangle daycare from other reforms and so-
cioeconomic factors. To attempt to account for the concern that the
mothers who make use of daycare are also the ones who are more
likely to enter into occupations with long hours and leadership posi-
tions in the first place, the chapter uses an instrumental variable strat-
egy. During the 2002-2008 period, the Norwegian parliament passed
daycare reforms that aimed at achieving full daycare coverage across
all municipalities. The study then uses the yearly change in munici-
palities’ daycare coverage during the reform period as an instrument
for individual mothers’ uptake of daycare, as the changes in the cov-
erage rates are plausibly exogenous to the outcomes we look at. The
existing studies, such as Pettit and Hook (2009), have had to rely
on variation across a limited number of countries observed during
a limited number of years, which makes the possibility of a spuri-
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ous relationship ubiquitous. The examination of the Norwegian case
thus contributes with a more detailed test of the relationship between
daycare and mothers’ careers.
In Chapter 3 on the development of wfps, the argument requires
investigation at the national level and there is no quasi-experiment
and exogenous variation available to assess the main hypotheses.
This means that, for the cross-national regressions in the chapter, bi-
ased estimates as a result of endogeneity and omitted variable bias
are more serious worries. Country and year fixed effects which
control for time-invariant unobservable confounders and common
shocks and the inclusion of potential observable cofounders such
as economic development, women in politics, government color, and
demography should reduce these concerns but cannot fully remove
them. Moreover, the cross-national regressions, which uses parental
leave benefits as the dependent variable, cannot detect whether the
predictions regarding the shift in preferences for wfps among the so-
cial partners, as well as their involvement in the the making of wfps,
find empirical support.
The strategy here is therefore to triangulate several methods and
data types to establish the veracity of the theoretical causal claims.35
Lieberman (2005) specifically recommends combining the large-N
analysis with process tracing of one or more cases that are well-
predicted by the theory, which is the case with the Norwegian case.36
In the investigation of the Norwegian case, I furnish over-time vari-
ation in the gender gap in higher education and women’s presence
in trade unions to gauge the social partners’ influence on, and pref-
35 For fruitfulness of multi-method research, see notably Collier, Brady, and Sea-
wright 2010; Dunning 2010; Freedman 1991, 2010; Hall 2003, 2008; Humphreys and
Jacobs 2015; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Lieberman 2005.
36 Process tracing can be defined as “the examination of ‘diagnostic’ pieces of evidence
within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory
hypotheses . . . [where a] central concern is with sequences and mechanisms in the
unfolding of hypothesized causal processes” (Bennett 2010, 207; see also Bennett and
Checkel 2013; Collier 2011; and see Beck 2010, for a critical assessment).
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erence for, the expansion of wfps. What is more, by adding shadow
case studies of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden,
the study can assess whether the development in the politics of wfp
provision in countries with different levels of corporatism is as hy-
pothesized (cf. Gerring and McDermott 2007).
The empirical results in this chapter, nonetheless, call for more cau-
tion concerning causation, as the research design neither gives ex-
ogenous variation in the independent variables, nor allows for a for-
mal estimate of the counterfactual outcomes.37 At the same time, the
triangulation of a qualitative within-case analysis of Norway, cross-
national time-series regressions, and shadow case studies should re-
duce the weaknesses of each of the methods when employed on its
own, and increase the likelihood that the relationships are causal
(Bennett and Checkel 2013; Bennett 2010).
1.4.3 Bringing more data to bear on the hypotheses
Another related advantage of examining the Norwegian case is to be
able to use novel and uniquely detailed data to analyze the theoretical
arguments. Beyond providing quasi-experiments and a high-leverage
case for process-tracing, a key reason for focusing on the Norwegian
case is hence the unique data availability.
In Chapter 2 on pr, I collect and make use of data on the number of
voters for each municipality for each gender using the original Statistics
Norway electoral reports for the municipality elections between 1898
and 1928.38 Few countries have national or subnational voting data
broken down by gender, and, to my knowledge, Norway is the only
37 As King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 32) point out, “perhaps the single most seri-
ous problem with qualitative research . . . is the pervasive failure to provide rea-
sonable estimates of the uncertainty of the investigator’s inferences” (see also Ger-
ring 2012, 82-4).
38 These reports have been digitized by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.
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country with such data for a prolonged period of time for a large
panel of subnational units. Combined with data on the municipalities’
electoral system, as well as large number of covariates from census
data and other historical statistical reports, I can carry out the first
direct test of the prediction that pr increases women’s share of the
votes cast.
To explore the mechanisms behind the result that pr increases
women’s share of the turnout, I additionally collect novel data on
women’s movements and network in the early twentieth century. In
1905, the parliament decided that the secession from Sweden should
be subject to a nationwide Norwegian referendum. Against loud
protests, women were not allowed to vote (Agerholt 1937; Danielsen,
Larsen, and Owesen 2013). Spontaneously, women’s suffrage orga-
nizations started to collect women’s signatures in support of inde-
pendence.39 Making use of local networks and activists, the petition
campaign spearheaded by the suffragists collected around 280,000
signatures from across the country that is, more than 50 percent of
adult women. The 9,081 original petition sheets with the handwrit-
ten signatures are available and have been digitized by the Norwe-
gian Parliamentary Archives. To create a measure of the strength of a
women’s network in each municipality, I have counted and predicted
the number of signatures per municipality and divided it by the adult
female population in the municipality obtained from census data. I
also create two alternative measures of local networks based on the
size of the temperance movement, which was dominated by women,
and the presence of local trade union chapters.40 Chapter 2 conse-
quently draws on a range of newly collected and systematized data
39 99.9 percent of the men who voted, voted yes and the turnout rate was 84 percent
(Danielsen, Larsen, and Owesen 2013).
40 I collected data for the former measure from original Statistics Norway reports from
the early twentieth century; for the latter measure, the data came from the trade
union federation’s annual reports, which have been digitized by the Norwegian Cen-
tre for Research Data.
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to provide a premier test of the main pr argument, as well as the
mechanisms behind this effect.
Similarly, a key challenge to inference about the effect of daycare
services is the lack of data, even at the national level. Chapter 4 uti-
lizes Norwegian administrative registry data for the whole Norwegian
population between 2002 and 2010. These data ensure that the sample
is representative and the panel dimension makes it possible to follow
individuals over time. The registry data are, moreover, unrivaled for
their quality (Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995). A particular
contribution is that we have been able to use social security (case-for-
care) records to calculate whether each individual mother made use
of daycare for her children. We thus have an individual-level measure
of daycare uptake. Likewise, through information about each individ-
ual’s detailed occupational category, we can code whether individual
mothers are in leadership positions. As such, the efforts to compile a
data set that contains daycare and labor market information for the
whole Norwegian population, as well as for municipalities, means
that the chapter can provide empirical results on the individual level
that go beyond the existing empirical investigations, which have been
forced to use aggregate and survey data.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I use a multitude of data and sources to eval-
uate the argument. First, to create a time-series cross-section measure
of parental leave generosity, I use a range of sources to update the
parental leave variables provided by Gauthier (2011), which gives me
data for eighteen advanced democracies from 1960 to 2010. Second, in
the case-study analysis, I combine national and trade union statistics,
archival correspondence between key actors, official reports, archival
sources and interviews, parliamentary records, white papers, party
manifestoes, newspaper articles, and secondary historical sources
to pinpoint when and why the social partners turned around and
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started pushing for wfps and to what extent they were successful in
these endeavors. Coupling these sources together results in a detailed
narrative of all the major wfp reforms in Norway since the 1970s.
1.4.4 Trading off external for internal validity
Across the empirical chapters, conducting within-case analyses of
Norway enhances the internal validity of the study, referring the find-
ings’ veracity for the investigated sample (Gerring 2012, 84-6). The
research designs aim to enhance precision and decrease bias through
the use of exogenous variation and samples covering the whole Nor-
wegian population of municipalities in Chapter 2 and of mothers of
two-year-olds in Chapter 4. In Chapter 3, the use of a wide variety
of sources and variation across time and countries in the social part-
ners’ preferences and influence on wfps aims to more accurately cap-
ture the reform processes when combined with the quantitative time-
series cross-national analysis. The detailed study of the Norwegian
case in all three chapters are, in other words, devised to have high
internal validity.
Yet the research simultaneously pays a price in terms of the gen-
eralizability of the findings, or external validity. Chapter 3 addresses
this by combining the Norwegian process-tracing study with both a
time-series cross-national regression analysis and three shadow case
studies. The regression analysis aims to ensure that the association be-
tween the gender gap, corporatism, and wfps can be identified when
examining the whole sample for the whole period, whereas the goal
of the shadow case studies is to lend credibility to the generalizabil-
ity of the mechanisms of the theoretical argument. These additional
analyses increase the plausibility that the results are applicable across
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advanced democracies, the population to which the theoretical argu-
ment applies (Geddes 2003; Korpi 1989).
In the two other chapters, however, we should be more careful
about directly generalizing the findings to other democracies and
time periods. Concerning Chapter 2 on pr, I only expect that the
results would hold for other countries in the early twentieth century
with universal suffrage. Introducing pr in countries in which for in-
stance electoral intimidation is widespread, or where women were
not marginalized in terms of voting, would not necessarily lead to the
same results. First, widespread electoral intimidation means that local
political elites can use their power to prevent that new groups of vot-
ers turn out to vote in response to changes in the electoral system (cf.
Mares 2015; Nichter 2008). Changing from plurality to pr would thus
not necessarily increase women’s share of the vote in countries where
clientelistic networks permeate electoral politics. Second, if women
are not marginalized in the public sphere and are at the ballot box,
then women are no longer an “undertapped market” of potential vot-
ers that can be mobilized after a switch to pr. A switch to pr in for
instance the United Kingdom today should accordingly not necessar-
ily lead to a boost in women’s share of the votes cast. The results
might nevertheless be applicable to the current situation in countries
where women have the right to vote but play a more limited role in
voting.
What is more, the analysis of the mechanisms suggests that the
effect of pr should be strongest where there are well-organized
women’s networks and organizations. Since women’s suffrage mo-
bilization coincided with the nationalist movement to separate Nor-
way from its union with Sweden, women’s networks may have been
unusually strong, indicating that the effect of pr might be smaller
in otherwise similar contexts. In sum, the findings are foremost ex-
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pected to travel to the introduction of pr in democracies in which
women play a limited role in public affairs but have the right to vote,
and where there are organized women’s social networks and orga-
nizations. Within this domain, however, my findings illuminate how
electoral institutions potentially can enhance women’s inclusion in
politics.
Chapter 4 explores the effect of full-time, affordable daycare ser-
vices to all children under school age. The reform was particularly
aimed at expanding coverage for one- and two-year-olds. Investigat-
ing daycare reforms with similar aims and of similar magnitude
in other countries should be expected to produce comparable re-
sults. Reforms with more modest aims such as small increases in
tax breaks, expanding part-time daycare, or being limited to older
children should, on the other hand, be of lesser significance for
women’s career investment, as such reforms do not give mothers ac-
cess to the reliable full-time daycare for their children that allows for
continuous presence in full-time work.
The effects of daycare are also likely to be conditional on the struc-
ture of the economy. In countries with high income inequality, where
well-off parents can buy childcare relatively cheaply off the market,
the reform may foremost impact the labor market opportunities of
low-income mothers. In contexts where many women have high edu-
cation but fewer participate fully or partly in the labor market than in
Norway which is the case in for instance Italy, the United Kingdom,
and the Antipodes reforms with an equivalent scope may have
larger effects than in the Norwegian case. Consequently, although
the results need to be replicated elsewhere to ensure that they are
not idiosyncratic to the Norwegian context, the findings do indicate
that daycare service reforms in other advanced democracies can pro-
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mote women’s inclusion in occupations requiring longer hours and
in leadership positions.
1.5 place in the broad gender inclusion literature
Although the three chapters are self-contained and include free-
standing theoretical arguments, they all take an institutional ap-
proach to the study of gender equality and inclusion.41 Chapter 2
investigates the link between electoral institutions and gender differ-
ences in voting, Chapter 3 argues that corporatist institutions are key
to understanding whether the inclusion of women in education and
unions leads to wfp expansions, and Chapter 4 studies the effect of
daycare policies on women’s inclusion in managerial positions and oc-
cupations requiring long hours.
By institutions, I refer to formal rules regulating social interac-
tion (Pierson 2004, 34-5; Streeck and Thelen 2005, 9-16). As Pierson
(2004, 34) points out, ”in politics, institutional constraints are ubiq-
uitous . . . [b]oth formal institutions (such as constitutional arrange-
ments) and public policies place extensive, legally binding constraints
on behavior” (emphasis in original). A key feature of institutions is
that they distribute power and influence to some political actors and
not others (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 7-10). Thus, in line with insti-
tutionalist approaches, I emphasize the interplay between institutions
and social actors: in Chapter 2, the shift to pr increases the role of po-
litical parties and has the largest effect on women’s share of the vote
where there are women’s networks; and, in Chapter 3, the social part-
ners gain influence over work-family policymaking through corpo-
ratist institutions. The thesis thus contributes to the literature demon-
41 See, for instance, Dahlerup 2013; Htun 2016; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Kittil-
son and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Means 1972; O’Brien and Rickne 2016; Pettit and
Hook 2009; Rule 1987.
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strating that that political institutions, including public policies, have
an important impact on women’s inclusion in politics and the labor
market, which is being underplayed in other dominant approaches.
Various structural approaches focusing either on economic changes,
culture, or historical roots and political accounts all overlook how
these factors are embedded in institutions and thereby provide a too
crude picture of the gender revolution.
First, in the modernization approach, culture defined as the
“social norms, beliefs, and values existing in any society”42 is
seen as the driving factor.43 In Inglehart and Norris’s (2003)
influential application of the theory to gender issues, soci-
etal modernization including rising education levels, female la-
bor force participation, deindustrialization, and intergenerational
replacement leads to a more gender egalitarian culture. The change
in culture and attitudes more or less automatically produces politi-
cal change and support for public policies furthering gender equality
(Inglehart and Norris 2003). In short, “culture matters, and indeed
it matters a lot” (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 8). Work within this ap-
proach has looked at a number of outcomes, including turnout, party
membership, interest in politics, representation in parliament, social
policies, female labor market participation, the absence of women in
leadership positions (see, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Charles
and Grusky 2004; Fernández 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Leslie
et al. 2015; Pfau-Effinger 2005; Pfau-Effinger 2004).
Undeniably, there have been large shifts in attitudes toward
women’s role in society. By ignoring institutions and politics, how-
ever, the approach leaves unanswered the large degree of variation
in women’s inclusion in voting and positions of power, as well as
the public policies supporting dual-earner families, across countries
42 Inglehart and Norris 2003, 8.
43 See, e.g., Fernández 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Pfau-Effinger 2004; for the mod-
ernization approach in general, see Bell 1973; Lipset 1959.
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with similar gender norms, as I also discussed above (Iversen and
Rosenbluth 2008, 2010). The approach furthermore disregards how
institutions and political actors may also activate, alter, and shape
cultural attitudes, which is what recent evidence suggests (Acharya,
Blackwell, and Sen 2016; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Jensen 2012;
Pinker 2011; Ross 2008). For instance, Chapter 4 documents that the
expansion of daycare coverage lead mothers to deem women’s careers
as equally important as men’s careers. The modernization approach
thus paints a too simplistic picture of the development of the gender
revolution.
Second, a related set of critiques holds for accounts focusing on the
historical roots of women’s contemporary inclusion in politics and the
labor market (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; Bertocchi and Boz-
zano 2015; Carranza 2014; Dilli, Rijpma, and Carmichael 2015; Mor-
gan 2006; Voigtländer and Voth 2013). Morgan (2006), for instance,
highlights that the variation in work-family policies and state inter-
vention in family affairs today has its roots in the political cleav-
ages established around the eve of the twentieth century. Where reli-
gious forces where subordinated to secular politics, as in Sweden and
France, active state involvement in the politics of the family became
possible. In religious pluralist countries such as the Netherlands and
the United States, on the other hand, religion-based ideological resis-
tance to state intervention “led to the emergence of a reticent state
tradition in education and family policy” (Morgan 2006, 27).
Others go even further back in history. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn
(2013) demonstrate that the role of women in society such as gen-
der egalitarian norms and women’s inclusion in the labor market and
in parliament is linked with plough use in preindustrial periods,
as it rewards upper-body strength and thus gender divisions more
than other forms of preindustrial agriculture (see also Boserup 1970).
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Others have focused on other aspects of agriculture (Carranza 2014;
Hansen, Jensen, and Skovsgaard 2015; Voigtländer and Voth 2013),
inheritance rules (Bertocchi and Bozzano 2015), and an historically
high male-to-female ratio (Grosjean and Khattar 2015). This historical
roots approach musters important evidence to explain broad, cross-
sectional variation in gender inequality. It nevertheless leaves a large
black box concerning how historical differences “travel” through gen-
erations. On its own, it is also unable to explain the varying pace of
the grand gender convergence over the last decades. It thus needs to
be coupled with other explanatory factors to provide a convincing ex-
planation for the inclusion of women in politics, education, and the
labor market (see also Banerjee and Duflo 2014).
Third, also a purely political account does not take us far. Follow-
ing the power-resource theory to the welfare state, where left-wing
parties are seen as the main protagonist of welfare state expansion,44
one political approach has argued that social democratic and other
left-wing parties are the main driving force behind gender equality
legislation and labor market opportunities for women (Ferrarini 2006).
Such an approach, however, fails to explain why social democratic
and other left-wing parties previously favored the male-breadwinner
model. Huber and Stephens (2000) therefore argue that it is in the face
of increasing female labor market participation that left parties start
addressing the concerns of working women. Overall, however, the
power-resource theory has found mixed empirical support.45 From
this perspective it is also puzzling that conservative and Christian
democratic parties have also come to support wfps and other gender
equality measures (see Chatper 3 and Borchorst 2004; Fleckenstein
and Lee 2012; Häusermann 2006; Wiliarty 2010). Recent studies have
44 See, notably, Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 2006; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979.
45 See, for example, Bolzendahl 2011; Dahlström, Lindvall, and Rothstein 2012; Flecken-
stein and Lee 2012; Hieda 2013; Htun and Weldon 2012; Jensen 2009; Kittilson 2008;
Morgan 2013.
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therefore sought to go beyond the left-right dichotomy by arguing in
favor of a political competition approach in which mainstream par-
ties to the left and right compete for the votes of working women
by instigating wfps and other gender equality policies (Fleckenstein
and Lee 2012; Morgan 2013). In this approach, however, political par-
ties simply respond to structural changes, which means that it leaves
little room for varying political responses to the same structural pres-
sures. The accounts focusing solely on political parties are thus poorly
equipped to explain key facets of the gender revolution, such as the
introduction of gender equality measures.
In sum, all these reviewed approaches touch on key aspects of the
gender revolution. Nevertheless, what they have in common is that
they do not take into account the institutional context in which the
structural factors and political parties operate. As such, these the-
ories are unable to explain key variation in, for instance, the gen-
der gap in voting, work-family policy development, and gender seg-
regation in the labor market. An institutional approach, where the
impact of structural changes and political movements depends on
the institutional context in which these forces operate, may be bet-
ter equipped to account for the varying pace of the gender revolu-
tion across advanced democracies (Esping-Andersen 2009; Estévez-
Abe 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Krook and Mackay 2011;
O’Brien and Rickne 2016).
1.6 road map
The remainder of the thesis proceeds in the following way. Chapters
2 through 4 each include a complete and independent study on an
aspect of the century of the gender revolution. Chapter 2 analyzes
the impact of pr on women’s share of the votes cast in Norwegian
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municipalities in the early twentieth century; Chapter 3 investigates
the politics of work-family policies in advanced democracies from
the 1960s and onwards; and Chapter 4 examines the impact of intro-
ducing affordable, full-time daycare services for toddlers on women’s
possibilities of entering into occupations requiring long hours, and in
particular leadership positions. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by sum-
marizing the main findings from the three preceding chapters and
discussing their limitations. The conclusion also considers the wider
significance of the findings for future research and for policymaking.
2
P R O P O RT I O N A L P O L I T I C S : E L E C T O R A L
I N S T I T U T I O N S A N D W O M E N ’ S S H A R E O F T H E
V O T E I N T H E E A R LY T W E N T I E T H C E N T U RY
abstract : Did proportional representation (PR) systems enhance women’s
inclusion in voting after the introduction of women’s suffrage? Focusing
exclusively on women’s representation in parliaments and cabinets, the ex-
isting research has overlooked how electoral rules affect women’s share of
the votes cast. I argue that PR gives party elites greater incentives to mobi-
lize women to vote. Empirically, I study the effect of the imposed shift from
plurality to PR in Norwegian municipalities in the early twentieth century.
About half of the around 600 municipalities were already using PR, whereas
the remaining municipalities were forced to replace plurality with PR before
the 1919 election. Using a difference-in-difference design, I estimate that the
move from plurality to PR increased women’s share of the votes cast by about
nine to ten percentage points. My study suggests that the design of elec-
toral institutions plays a key role in promoting gender equality in political
participation.
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Can changes in electoral institutions lessen gender inequali-ties in political participation? Women first gained the full right
to vote in national elections at the Isle of Man in 1881, in New Zealand
in 1893, Australia in 1902, Finland in 1906, and Norway in 1913. Oth-
ers, such as Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom,
soon followed.1 De jure political rights did not, however, result in de
facto political inclusion. Across Europe, Northern America, and Ocea-
nia, women were still significantly less likely to vote than men and in
legislatures women held at maximum three percent of the seats dur-
ing the pre-World War II period (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006, 2016;
Teele 2014; Tingsten 1937).
Early twentieth century observers saw electoral institutions as an
important tool for facilitating women’s mobilization at the voting
booth. The Norwegian Association for Women’s Rights, for instance,
wrote to the Parliament in 1919 to voice its support for propor-
tional representation (pr), saying that “[i]f the proposal about single-
member districts goes through, women will in the foreseeable fu-
ture be excluded [from Parliament]” (Stortingstidende 1919, 2350; see
also Tingsten 1937). The existing research on gender differences in
turnout which compellingly shows how individual resources, vot-
ing laws, electoral competition, and urbanization increased women’s
propensity to turnout after enfranchisement has, nevertheless, yet
to incorporate the role of electoral institutions.2 The same holds for
the incisive research documenting an important positive relationship
between pr and women’s parliamentary representation,3 as well as
1 See Teele (2014, 2015) for excellent analyses of the enfranchisement of women in the
United States, France, and the United Kingdom.
2 For instance: Corder and Wolbrecht 2006; Rokkan and Valen 1962; Schlozman, Burns,
and Verba 1994, 1999; Tingsten 1937; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997.
3 See Castles 1981; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Engstrom 1987; Hughes 2011;
Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008, 2010; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Kittilson 2006;
Matland 1993; Matland and Brown 1992; Matland and Studlar 1996; Means 1972;
Norris 1985; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1981, 1987; Rule
and Zimmerman 1994; Salmond 2006; Thames and Williams 2010.
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between pr and overall turnout.4 Yet neither of these strands of lit-
erature deals with uneven political participation among women and
men.5
By theorizing and investigating the impact of pr on women’s share
of the votes cast, the study makes two important contributions. The-
oretically, I draw on the literature on turnout and on women’s rep-
resentation to spell out three mechanisms through which pr may in-
crease women’s inclusion in voting, compared to a plurality electoral
system. The electoral mechanism delineates that pr increases women’s
participation at the ballot box thorough its positive effects on turnout
overall. Since every vote counts towards a party’s share of the legisla-
tive seats, elites have incentives to mobilize further under pr than
under plurality rules. Women, making up half of the eligible vot-
ers but voting to a lesser extent than men constituted an “under-
tapped market” of potential voters for elites to mobilize (Kittilson
and Schwindt-Bayer 2012, 18-19; Cox 1999). The representation mech-
anism operates through pr increasing women’s representation in the
legislature, which again has a “role model effect” on women’s propen-
sity to vote by raising political interest and aspirations among women
voters.6 Finally, the organizational mechanism leads to the expectation
that pr particularly affects female participation in voting where there
are pre-existing women’s networks and organizations, as these can
help elites to translate the greater incentives to mobilize into actual
mobilization.7 Elites may tap into these networks or they may mobi-
4 For reviews, see Blais (2006), Cancela and Geys (2016), Cox (2015), and Geys (2006).
Cox, Fiva, and Smith (2015) and Eggers (2015), for instance, show that, compared to
plurality, pr increases turnout in districts with lopsided races and decreased turnout
in districts with tight races, as elites have more incentives to mobilize outside close
districts under pr.
5 For important exceptions, see Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010, 2012.
6 See Atkeson 2003; Beaman et al. 2012; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Desposato
and Norrander 2009; Gilardi 2015; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007.
7 See Abrams, Iversen, and Soskice 2011; Cox 2015; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1998;
DellaVigna et al. 2014; Pons and Liegey 2013; Powell 1982, 1986; Radcliff and
Davis 2000.
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lize on their own initiative. Based on these mechanisms, the overall
expectation is that pr increases women’s share of the votes cast.
Empirically, I investigate the causal effect of switching to pr by
examining electoral returns in municipal elections in early twentieth-
century Norway. In 1913, Norway was one of the first countries to
grant women the right to vote. Still, men continued to dominate in
politics. Prior to World War II, women held 0.7 percent of the seats
in the Norwegian parliament, and 1.4 percent in municipal councils.
Compared to men, women’s turnout was on average 13 and 16 per-
centage points lower in national and municipal elections, respectively
(Statistics Norway 1938).8 The case also furnish us with a natural ex-
periment to test the theoretical argument.9 In 1919, the Storting re-
quired about half of the about 600 municipalities to change their elec-
toral system from plurality to pr. The other part of the municipalities
were already employing pr in elections. As such, it is an ideal set-
ting for understanding how electoral institutions affect the political
inclusion of women. I use the exogenous shift to pr and a difference-
in-difference design to estimate the effect of pr on women’s voting
inclusion. The results reveal that substituting plurality with pr pro-
duces a nine to ten percentage point rise in women’s share of the
votes cast for the reformed municipalities a result which is stable
across various specifications of the empirical model. Before the re-
form, about every fifth voter was a woman; after the reform, about
every third.
Moving beyond the main effect (or the average treatment effect for
the treated), I explore the mechanisms behind the findings. These ad-
ditional analyses indicate that the electoral and organizational mech-
anisms contribute to explaining the impact of pr. There is no support
for the representational mechanism, as the reform left women’s rep-
8 Men’s turnout averaged 78 percent in national and 65 percent in municipal elections.
9 On natural experiments, see Dunning 2012.
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resentation in local legislatures unaffected. In sum, the research con-
tributes with a first causal test of the relationship between pr and the
inclusion of women at the ballot box in the early twentieth century.
The study should thus be particularly relevant for learning about how
electoral reforms can further the democratic ideal of equal participa-
tion.10
The study proceeds as follows. In section 2.1, I discuss the relevant
literature and the theory. I then introduce the case of Norway in sec-
tion 2.2. Thereafter, in section 2.3, I show the results of the empirical
tests of the effect of electoral institutions on women’s share of total
turnout. The section also explores the mechanisms behind this result.
Section 2.4 concludes.
2.1 electoral systems , gender , and voting
2.1.1 Women and the vote
Achieving equality in the right to vote did not imply achieving
equality in voting. Across Europe and Oceania, women’s turnout
in the early twentieth century consistently lagged that of men, typ-
ically by more than ten percentage points, as Tingsten (1937) and
Duverger (1955) document. Corder and Wolbrecht (2006, 2016) show
that the same holds for the ten American states they investigate after
1920. These differences persisted into the post-World War II period
(Duverger 1955). For those countries that record turnout by gender
since 1945 Finland, Germany, Japan, Iceland, New Zealand, and
Norway we can observe that the gender gap in turnout did not
close until the 1970s and 1980s (Norris 2002, 98; Campbell et al. 1960;
Pharr 1982, 25). In other words, for a significant portion of the twenti-
10 See Mansbridge 1999; Mansbridge 1980; Pateman 1970; Rawls 1971; Verba, Schloz-
man, and Brady 1995; see Beitz 1989; Dahl 1989, for discussions and nuances.
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eth century, even after women had the right to vote, the act of voting
was a male-dominated activity.
There is a rich and long-standing literature aiming to explain these
differences in women and men’s voting participation. Contemporary
activists and later observers particularly highlighted socialization and
gender norms hostile to participation (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006;
Welch 1977). Reflecting the opinions voiced against giving women
the right to vote, a prominent attitude communicated to women was
that political participation was, by nature, a male activity (Ander-
sen 1996; Corder and Wolbrecht 2006). Exemplifying this misogynistic
attitude, Ole Malm, a Conservative Norwegian mp, argued in oppo-
sition to women’s suffrage that “heavy brain activity does not in it-
self cause an indisposition but it does make women directly unwell”
(cited in Danielsen, Larsen, and Owesen 2013, 183). Similar attitudes
were not uncommon also in other Western countries. After enfran-
chisement in the United States, for instance, nearly one in ten female
nonvoters in Chicago cited disbelief in voting or the husband’s op-
position as grounds for why they did not vote (Merriam and Gos-
nell 1924; Corder and Wolbrecht 2006, 35). Thus, according to this
view, women’s lower rates of participation was due to gender norms
of the time, and women having been socialized into believing that
politics is a man’s game (see Campbell et al. 1960; Lane 1959).
Although attitudes hostile to women’s inclusion in politics lingered
on, participation nonetheless varied substantially among individual
women. Later research has therefore instead emphasized the impact
of women and men’s different positions and roles in society on politi-
cal participation generally and voting particularly (Welch 1977). First,
this perspective has paid attention to the time-dimension of the house-
hold division of labor, arguing that women’s disproportionate house-
hold work and childcare responsibilities have left little time for po-
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litical participation, in particular when combined with paid work.11
Second and relatedly, a number of studies document the importance
of gender differences in educational resources and occupational expe-
riences for political participation.12 For instance, with more absence
from paid work and the public sphere, this approach has convinc-
ingly contended that women are less likely to be exposed to political
discussions and gain interest in politics, which also affect participa-
tion levels (Almond and Verba 1963; Welch 1977). Having less profes-
sional experience than otherwise comparable men moreover implies
a disadvantage in running for office (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006).
This perspective consequently highlights the lack of exposure to and
experience with politics as the a key reason for gender inequality in
voting.
As the classic studies by Tingsten (1937), Duverger (1955), and
Rokkan (1970) remind us, however, women’s voting rates were not
only a function of individual-level factors and social norms, but also
of the socio-political context. These pioneering scholars particularly
emphasized the difference between urban and rural areas, with the
gender gap in voting tending to be wider for the latter.13 They at-
tributed this difference to the greater economic development and
commercialization in industrial areas, with the population in rural
areas having less access to education and lower income. More re-
cently, research has highlighted different contextual factors such as
voting laws and the mobilization efforts of the suffrage, labor, and
temperance movements as a key to increasing women’s share of
11 See, e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Lipset 1960; Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006;
Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994; Welch 1977; see Fox and Lawless 2014a, for a
recent assessment.
12 ]Almond and Verba 1963; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999; Verba, Burns, and
Schlozman 1997.
13 See also Dahlerup (1978). In the United States, however, Corder and Wolbrecht (2006)
note the opposite pattern, arguing that it was a result of more anti-suffrage norms
among new immigrants from Europe, who were clustered in cities. Rural areas in the
us, moreover, tended to vote in favor of women’s suffrage in state-specific referenda
in the pre-1920 era.
2.1 electoral systems , gender , and voting 60
the votes cast.14 In their recent study of women and men’s turnout in
1920s’ Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York,
Corder and Wolbrecht (2006) find that both previous pro-suffrage
activity as well as more liberal electoral laws reducing poll taxes,
literacy test and residence requirements has a greater effect on
women than men’s propensity to vote. In other words, these stud-
ies indicate that women’s voting behavior was more responsive to
changes in the surrounding political and socioeconomic context.
None of these studies, however, look at the effect of electoral institu-
tions on women’s inclusion in voting. Tingsten (1937, 15) comes clos-
est, noting that after the introduction of pr in Norway “electoral par-
ticipation [in national elections] increases both for men and women,
somewhat more for the latter, particularly in the country.”15
2.1.2 Electoral systems
Among the many studies investigating the effects of having a pr
compared to a plurality electoral system, research on how pr im-
pacts women’s share of the vote is conspicuous by its absence. This
oversight comes despite the fact that in the early twentieth century,
women’s right to vote and pr where often reformed simultaneously
or within few years from each other.16 A voluminous literature has
14 See, notably, Andersen 1990, 1996; Butler 1924; Corder and Wolbrecht 2006; Hal-
lum 2003; Nilson 1977; Schuyler 2008.
15 One reason for this omission is perhaps the lack of data, as election statistics broken
down by sex are only available for a handfull of countries. Changes in electoral
institutions is also a rare phenomenon (Benoit 2007; Colomer 2005).
16 Specifically suffrage for women and pr was introduced in the following years: Fin-
land: 1906 (suffrage) and 1907 (pr); Denmark: 1915 (pr and suffrage); Austria: 1918
(suffrage) and 1919 (pr); Germany: 1918 (suffrage) 1919 (pr); Sweden: 1908 (pr) and
1919 (suffrage); the Netherlands: 1917 (pr) and 1919 (suffrage); Spain: 1931 (pr and
suffrage); France: 1919 (pr) and 1944 (suffrage); Italy: 1919 (pr) and 1945 (suffrage);
Belgium: 1899 (pr) and 1948 (1948); and Switzerland: 1919 (pr) and 1971 (suffrage)
(Ahmed 2012; Coppedge et al. 2016b).
On the subject of pr adoption, competing explanations point to the impact of party
competition (Calvo 2009), industrial structure (Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007;
Iversen and Soskice 2009), and the rise of Social Democracy and the votes-seats dis-
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examined the consequences of pr on overall turnout17 and women’s
descriptive representation in parliament,18 typically finding that both
are higher under pr than under forms of plurality systems. The im-
pact of electoral institutions on other forms of political participation,
most notably the act of voting, has, nevertheless, received far less at-
tention.19 Given the importance of the socio-economic composition of
the voters for parties’ and politicians’ electoral strategies and policy
reforms,20 this is a surprising omission. As Duverger (1955, 13) notes
“once they have to reckon with them [women], and need their votes,
the political parties will try to make their propaganda appeal to them
and will take their problems into account, at any rate to some extent.”
Women’s share of the vote, and the extent to which electoral systems
contributes to it, therefore forms an important object of inquiry. In the
next subsection, I therefore discuss why pr is likely to have positive
impact on women’s share of the votes cast.
2.1.3 PR and women at the ballot box
Going from a plurality to a PR system might increase women’s partic-
ipation and share of the vote thorough several complementary mech-
anisms. Building on both the turnout and the women’s representation
literature, we can distinguish between an electoral logic, a represen-
tational logic, and an organizational logic.
proportionality (Boix 1999; Leemann and Mares 2014; Rokkan 1970) for conservative
and liberal elites’ strategies and willingness to adopt pr (Ahmed 2012).
17 Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2015; Eggers 2015; for extensive reviews, see Cancela and
Geys 2016; Cox 2015.
18 See, e.g., Castles 1981; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Means 1972; Norris 2006; Pax-
ton, Hughes, and Painter 2010; Rule 1987; Salmond 2006.
19 I refer to the next subsection for exceptions.
20 See, e.g., Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2015; Lax and Phillips 2009; Pontusson
and Rueda 2010.
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The electoral mechanism
The first mechanism builds on the insight that parties typically have
an incentive to mobilize more broadly in pr systems, as every vote
contributes more to the party’s seat share in the legislature (Cox 1999;
Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). In plurality systems, however,
the incentives are different. In single-member districts using plural-
ity rule, a candidate who knows that her or his seat is safe will not
have incentives to mobilize further, as it will not provide any addi-
tional benefits, only costs (Cox 1999, 395). If the race is close, however,
both candidates will have reasons for continuing the mobilization
race, with a resulting high level of turnout. The result is that un-
competitive districts will have lower, and competitive districts higher,
turnout in plurality systems than under pr (Cox 1999, 2015; Cox, Fiva,
and Smith 2015; Eggers 2015).
The hypothesis concerning women’s share of the turnout is thus
that women will be mobilized to a larger extent as a district goes
from plurality to pr rule. After the establishment of universal suf-
frage, women made up approximately half of the electorate, yet
they were not mobilized to the same extent as men, as I discussed
above. Women were accordingly what Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer
(2012) call an “undertapped market” of voters. The result is that the
higher turnout under pr is predicted to entail a larger mobilization of
women than men to vote, as this was a newly enfranchised and large
share of the electorate that is not already mobilized (Tingsten 1937).
The representation mechanism
A second logic runs through the election of female representatives.
This mechanism proceeds in two steps. First, in first-past-the-post
systems, where individual candidates compete for votes, parties are
less able to balance their electoral lists than in pr systems, where
2.1 electoral systems , gender , and voting 63
parties generally play a larger role and control the nomination pro-
cedures (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Thames and Williams 2010).
As voters mainly vote for party lists, parties can also more easily put
underrepresented groups on the ballot.21 Second, a growing number
of studies find that the presence of female candidates, elected rep-
resentatives, and government ministers subsequently increases politi-
cal aspirations, interest, and participation among women.22 Women’s
representation signals a logic of inclusiveness and inspires women
to participate in politics to a greater extent. Consequently, pr is pre-
dicted to induce mobilization of women to vote indirectly through
the presence of women on ballots and in elected positions (Kittilson
and Schwindt-Bayer 2012).23
This second mechanism, however, is perhaps less applicable in the
early twentieth century setting, as very few women held elected office
prior to the Second World War. It is perhaps more likely that women
first get mobilized to vote, and only later get activated into politics by
standing for election. As Rokkan (1970, 216) succinctly writes: “[the]
contrast between [women’s] rates of mobilization and rates of activa-
tion into politics reflects basic differences in the cost of the alternatives
in the two cases. Electoral turnout is a matter of co-operation, an act
of compliance: the participation of one citizen does not exclude that of
another. Nominations and elections are competitive and it took a long
time before women could be motivated to break with established cul-
tural norms and face such public ordeals.” The representation mecha-
nism is thus less likely to have an impact in the early than in the late
twentieth century.
21 See Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Duverger 1955; Kittilson 2006; Kittilson and
Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Norris 1985.
22 Atkeson 2003; Beaman et al. 2012; Blumenau 2016; Burns, Schlozman, and
Verba 2001; Desposato and Norrander 2009; Gilardi 2015; High-Pippert and
Comer 1998; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007; but
see Clayton 2015; Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004.
23 We could also think of this as a feedback mechanism, whereby women are first
mobilized to vote and then vote for women candidates, which again boosts women’s
participation.
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The organizational mechanism
A third mechanism may be more relevant to the historical setting, as it
focuses on organizational differences across political units. Although
every vote counts to a larger extent under pr than under plurality,
effort and resources are needed to mobilize new voters. Both the-
ory and evidence suggest that social networks and pressure to vote
are effective tools for increasing turnout (Abrams, Iversen, and Sos-
kice 2011; DellaVigna et al. 2014; Pons and Liegey 2013). Mobilization
is accordingly less costly where there are pre-existing, organized net-
works, such as trade unions (Radcliff and Davis 2000), or, in the case
of women’s turnout, suffrage and temperance movements (see, e.g.,
Andersen 1996; Danielsen, Larsen, and Owesen 2013; Nilson 1977;
Tilly and Gurin 1990). Thus, as one moves from a plurality to a pr
system, in which the returns to mobilization are greater, social net-
works and organizations may be crucial vehicles for inducing more
women to vote (see Carpenter and Moore 2014). The movements may
do so on their own initiative, independent of parties’ requests. But
social movements may also help political elites to “get out the vote”
in ways that sparks what Cox (2015, 51-2) calls “secondary mobiliza-
tion”, where elites mobilize some voters directly, who again mobilize
others in their (organizational) networks.
Moreover, parties under pr are generally more ideologically cohe-
sive and are therefore more likely to have close ties to social groups,
such as women’s, farmers’, workers’, and religious’s movements
(Cox 1999; Powell 1982, 1986; Radcliff and Davis 2000). Parties may
use these linkages to more easily reach women. In a race with several
parties, such mobilization is likely to be aimed at those in the parties’
pre-existing social network, since they otherwise risk mobilizing
other candidates’ supporters (e.g., Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1998).
With the electoral system shifting from plurality to pr, political elites
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consequently make use of existing social organizations to mobilize
women not formerly participating in political activity.
In sum, these different mechanisms lead to the main hypothesis that
an exogenous change in electoral institutions, from plurality to pr,
will cause an increase in women’s percentage of the total number of
votes cast. This mobilization to persuade more women to visit the
voting booth may be driven by several mechanisms simultaneously,
including the electoral, representational, and organizational mecha-
nisms.
2.2 electoral reform in early twentieth-century nor-
way
To test the general hypothesis about the impact of pr on women’s
share of the electoral turnout, I turn to the case of Norway in the
early twentieth century. I examine the 1919 pr reform, in which about
half of the more than 600 Norwegian municipalities were required by
the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, to switch from plurality to
pr. As we shall see, this change of electoral system was plausibly ex-
ogenous to local politics, making the Norwegian case a natural exper-
iment to test the argument. Another important reason for examining
the Norwegian case is that the move from plurality to pr, and from
male to universal suffrage, happened more or less simultaneously in
all countries but Norway and Sweden, as detailed in Section 2.1.2
above.24 The co-occurrence of the two reforms makes it difficult to
separate the effects of the two. Moreover, Sweden and later France,
Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland introduced pr before they enfran-
24 Later, also France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland had a significant time lag between
pr and women’s suffrage reforms but, as in Sweden, the pr reform occurred before
the suffrage reform.
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chised women, which implies that we also cannot use these cases
to investigate the switch from plurality to pr on women’s inclusion
in voting. A key advantage of the within-case analysis of Norway
is thus that it allows us to separate the impact of pr from suffrage
reforms, while at the same time holding cross-country differences
constant (Gerring 2007). Still, as women were significantly underrep-
resented at the ballot box across the Western democracies during this
time period, the findings from Norway should be applicable beyond
the Norwegian case. This section first provides details on the histori-
cal context and then on the 1919 reform.
2.2.1 Secession and suffrage
As a result of the Kiel Treaty after the Napoleonic Wars, the King-
dom of Norway changed hands in 1814, from Denmark to Sweden.
In 1814, the Norwegian elite, inspired by French and American ideas,
adopted a liberal constitution for its time, granting the franchise to
state officials and landowners, as well as holders of merchant and
artisan licenses in the cities and free- and lease-holders in the coun-
tryside (Rokkan and Valen 1962, 113). From 1814 until 1884, about ten
percent of the male population were thus eligible to vote. Driven for-
ward by a coalition of workers, smallholders, teachers, and the urban
bourgeoisie, the Storting expanded the right to vote in 1884 and fully
introduced suffrage for men over the age of 24 in 1898.25
Like so many of the democratizing measures during this era, one
reform set in motion another (E.g., Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010; Pier-
son 2004). The 1898 enfranchisement of propertyless men brought
fear of expansion of municipalities’ spending and taxation, and threat-
ened the Conservatives’ position in local politics (Flo and Aars 2010).
25 See, e.g., Belu, Bronner, and Skorge 2015; Collier 1999; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens 1992; Stråth 2005.
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When women with a household income above a certain threshold,26
or about 40 percent of voting age women, were made eligible to vote
for the first time in 1901, it was a result of the Conservatives’ need
to counterweight the full enfranchisement of men. The 1901 munici-
pal election shored up support for the Conservatives and lead to the
entrance of the first 100 female representatives in municipal councils,
of which only seven percent represented the Labor Party and other
socialist lists (Danielsen, Larsen, and Owesen 2013, ch. 5).27
Among the first countries to grant equal voting rights to women
and men, the struggles for independence and suffrage rights were
often two sides of the same coin. Norway was no exception. In a dra-
matic move on June 7, 1905, the Storting unilaterally declared Nor-
way’s secession from Sweden, leading the two countries to the brink
of a civil war. Only after prolonged and heated negotiations did the
Swedish and Norwegian representatives agree that Norway should
be allowed to decide its future through a popular independence ref-
erendum.
Despite calls for their inclusion, the Storting decided to restrict
voting in the referendum to men. In response, suffragists spon-
taneously started to collect signatures, or unofficial “votes”, from
women to make up for their exclusion from the referendum itself
(Hagemann 2008). The National Association for Women’s Suffrage
(Landskvinnestemmerettsforeningen, naws), which had grown in size
since its establishment in 1898, soon took the lead in organizing a na-
tionwide petition campaign in favor of independence. With the help
of local organizations and volunteers, the signature campaign spread
across the country (Agerholt 1937).
26 NOK 400 in urban and NOK 300 in rural areas. NOK 400 in 1901 is equivalent to
about NOK 33,000, or $5,400, in 2014.
27 Following the same logic as in other Western countries enfranchisement of women
thus came as a result of ordinary instrumental strategies from the established parties
to maximize their influence (E.g., Teele 2015).
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In the referendum on August 13, 99.9 percent of the 84 percent
of men who turned out to vote voted in favor of the secession from
Sweden. On August 22, the naws leadership presented the Storting
with 244,765 signatures from Norwegian women in support for in-
dependence. In October, another 35,113 signatures, which had been
delayed in the mail, were added. In total, more than half of the fe-
male adult population signed the petition (Danielsen, Larsen, and
Owesen 2013). Nation-building and the mobilization of women thus
went hand in hand.
The mobilization soon led to further expansions of the right to vote
(Hagemann 2008). In 1907, women who satisfied the income restric-
tion were now also allowed to vote in parliamentary elections, again
to the great benefit of the Conservatives, which thereby secured a
majority in the 1909 election. The naws continued its quest for uni-
versal suffrage. Attempting to counter the Conservatives electoral ad-
vantage, the Liberal government tried, without success, to introduce
universal suffrage in 1908. Still, as the inclusion of wealthy women
had proven to be no threat to the existing political order, the Liberals
managed to convince the more liberal wing of the Conservatives to
accept full female suffrage in municipal elections, starting with the
election in 1910 (Agerholt 1937).
When it came to full suffrage in parliamentary elections, however,
the Conservatives continued to resist, though not for long. By 1912,
pro-suffrage representatives were in a majority within all parties, and
in 1913 the Storting passed the bill on universal suffrage unanimously
and without debate (Ytre-Arne 2013). The first national election with
universal suffrage was held in 1915.
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2.2.2 Plurality and PR: Norwegian political institutions
Until 1896, representatives to the approximately 600 Norwegian mu-
nicipal councils were elected in multimember districts with plural-
ity voting.28 That is, in an election to a council with M seats, the
voters wrote the names of the M candidates they wanted elected to
the council on the ballot. The M candidates receiving the most votes
were elected. “The election was thus primarily an election between
persons,” notes Hjellum (1967, 11), where “‘[t]he best of men’ should
lead local politics.” Individual candidates were at the center of the
electoral competition in the municipalities; parties seldom played a
role in these elections (Rokkan 1970).
In 1896, however, the Storting opened up the possibility for mu-
nicipalities to change their electoral system to pr if a certain number
of voters signed a petition requesting the change.29 In the form of pr
system that the municipalities were allowed to switch to, voters voted
for lists of candidates,30 and the law required the use of Hagenbach-
Bishof’s system, a largest remainder method, to transform votes into
seats.31 In these pr elections, both parties and voters were allowed
to express their preference for certain candidates (Hjellum 1967, 14).
First, the party could decide to enter a candidate’s name up to three
times on the party list. Second, the voter could enter a candidate’s
name either once or twice.32 In total, a candidate could thus receive
28 The grand majority of municipalities consisted of one district (sogn) (Lind-
støl 1903, 7).
29 From 1901, the number required was one fifth of eligible voters for municipalities
with fewer than 5,000 voters in rural areas and 8,000 in towns. With 5,000 or more
eligible voters, the petition had to be signed by at least 1,000 in rural areas and 1,600
in towns.
30 If a list was proposed by 10 eligible voters, and 20 in towns, then the list could stand
for elections.
31 The quota of votes, Q, required to get a seat in this system is Q = V/(M+1), where
V is the number of votes and M is the number seats. If some seats are unallocated
after the quota rule is applied, these seats are allocated to those lists with the largest
remainders, with the list with the largest remainder remaining the first remaining
seat, the second largest remainder the second remaining seat, etc. (Cox 1997, 57).
32 If entered twice, then the voter had to cross out another candidate.
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five votes on a list, three from the party and two from the voter.33
In other words, although seats were distributed according to the to-
tal number of votes received by each list, voters could to some ex-
tent influence which candidates who got elected. The electoral system
available to municipalities was thus a typical open-list pr system.
Whereas the plurality elections induced a competition between indi-
vidual candidates, the pr elections fostered a contest between collective
lists (Carey and Shugart 1995; Hjellum 1967). The incentives to culti-
vate a personal vote that is, the value of personal reputation for get-
ting elected varied greatly between these two electoral systems. Us-
ing Carey and Shugart’s (1995) schema for analyzing the strength of
the incentives to cultivate a personal vote, I show in Appendix A.1.1
that the plurality system in Norwegian municipalities was decisively
candidate-centered and the pr system was clearly party-centered. In
pr municipalities, political, as well as apolitical, often geographical,
lists were competing with each other. After the 1916 election, for in-
stance, the share of municipal representatives elected from political
lists was about 40 percent, from apolitical lists about 15, and from
plurality elections about 45 (Hjellum 1967, 31). Although we unfortu-
nately do not have data on the vote and seat shares for more than
the major towns, historical accounts suggest that the Labor Party was
typically the first party to present lists in municipal elections (Hjel-
lum 1967; Rokkan 1970).34
After the Storting in 1898 permitted municipalities to switch to pr,
a rising share of the municipalities seized this opportunity. In the first
election allowing municipalities to replace plurality with pr, held in
1898, 21 percent of the municipalities used pr, increasing to 22 per-
33 Preference voting was not restricted to a particular list.
34 The election reports from Statistics Norway were written on the basis of election
forms that the municipalities mailed Statistics Norway after the elections. These
original forms did contain party vote and seat shares but the information was not
reported in the final reports from Statistics Norway. Sadly, when there was a fire at
Statistics Norway a few decades later, the original forms were turned to ash.
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cent in 1901. 33 percent in 1907, and 38 percent in 1913. By the 1916
election, which was the last before the Storting required all munici-
pal elections to be held by using pr, 54 percent of the municipalities
employed the proportional system. The map in Figure A.1 shows the
distribution of pr and plurality municipalities across the country in
1916. Regressing an indicator variable for pr on a set of covariates
for a cross section of municipalities in 1916 reveals that municipali-
ties with pr typically had a larger population size, more employment
in industry and less employment in shipping (compared to agricul-
ture), and a larger percentage of the population on poor relief (see
Model 1 in Table A.2 in the Appendix). Municipalities with a larger
percentage of the female population signing the 1905 petition were
also more likely to have pr. Next, a regression with a set of covariates
and municipality and election year fixed effects for the 1898 to 1916
period indicates that municipalities where the percentage of employ-
ment in industry and in services increased, and where the share of
the population that were non-religious was growing, were more likely
to also introduce pr (see Models 2 and 3 in Table A.2). In short, more
populous municipalities, typically cities, and more industrial munici-
palities were more likely to adopt pr than smaller, more agricultural
municipalities.
2.2.3 From plurality to PR: the 1919 reform
Two pr reforms were passed in 1919, one for parliamentary elec-
tions and one for municipal elections. The adoption of pr in elec-
tions to the Storting, replacing a two-round runoff system in single-
member districts, came after intense debate in late 1919.35 The plu-
rality system had produced an underrepresentation of the rising La-
35 See Aardal 2002, for an overview of the Norwegian electoral reforms, and; Cox, Fiva,
and Smith 2015, for an incisive analysis of the effects of the reform on overall turnout.
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bor Party in the 1918 national election it received 31.6 percent of
the votes but merely 14.3 percent of the seats. The party threatened
to withdraw its mps and with electoral boycott (Stortinget, Dokument
no. 24, 1919). Also the bourgeois Norwegian Association for Women’s
Rights were in favor of a pr reform, hoping to increase the representa-
tion of women in parliament (Stortingstidende 1919, 2350). The non-
socialist parties initially opposed the introduction of pr, yet ended
up securing the two-thirds majority to pass the constitutional amend-
ment. Rokkan (1970) and others have explained the turnaround as
a strategic move to prevent the swiftly radicalizing Labor Party, a
member of Comintern from June 1919, from securing a parliamen-
tary majority in the longer run.36. That said, though various sources
support such an interpretation, political historians have not found
direct evidence of such reasoning among Conservative and Liberal
party strategists (Danielsen 1984, 19). Among the Liberals, who were
deeply split on the issue, there are also indications that occupational
and geographical interests impacted on their preferred type of elec-
toral system (Worm-Müller, Bergsgård, and Nissen 1933, 348; see also
Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007).
The same fierce debate and position shifting, however, did not arise
with the reform which made it compulsory to use pr in munici-
pal elections, which passed unanimously almost half-a-year earlier,
in July 1919 (Stortingstidende 1919). Having seen the consequences
of pr at the municipal level since 1898, chairs of all parliamentary
party groups had agreed to the proposal already in 1916 (Stortingsti-
dende 1916, 367-8).37 The reasons for forcing municipalities to employ
36 See also Ahmed 2012; Blais, Dobrzynska, and Indridason 2005; Boix 1999; Leemann
and Mares 2014; and, for the Norwegian case, Worm-Müller, Bergsgård, and Nis-
sen 1933, 346-9; Danielsen 1984, 18-19.
37 As a constitutional amendment, the proposal had to be passed with a two-thirds
majority in two subsequent Storting. In the empirical analysis below, I show that
there were no “anticipation” effects present for the 1916 election.
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the pr system were eloquently summed up by Johan Castberg, the
head of the Constitutional Committee, in the proposal:
In favor of this electoral system [i.e. pr], it has, for instance,
been alleged that it, in difference from the old plurality sys-
tem, give all entitled opinion or interest groups access to co-
operate for the best of the municipality; [. . . ] that the pr elec-
tion has contributed to harmonizing disagreements and to a
strengthening of a fruitful cooperation for solving of more diffi-
cult tasks, not at least through the representation of the different
opinion groups in municipal committees (Stortinget, Dokument
no. 4, 1916, 1).
Both the parliamentary debates and other sources thus suggest that
the rationale behind the municipal reform was not the socialist threat
but rather to secure broader interest representation in local govern-
ment (Hjellum 1967; Stortingstidende 1919).
Starting with the municipal election held in October 1919 in the
countryside and December in the cities, the Storting consequently
legislated that the 46 percent of municipalities still using the plural-
ity rule were required by law to switch to the same pr system as the
rest of the municipalities. For the pr elections, party lists had to be
handed to the electoral committee by September 7 in the countryside
and October 15 in cities. The only exception to the use of pr was if
none or only one list stood for election. The election would in these
instances be held using the plurality rule. It was only the case in a
small minority of sparsely populated municipalities in the country-
side (Hjellum 1967). The shift from plurality to pr did not affect the
size of the municipal councils or district magnitude. The total number
of electoral districts remained more or less the same in the 1913-1922
period (Statistics Norway 1920, 1923),38 and the number of council
38 For instance, the number rural of municipalities was 612, 628, 637, and 646 in 1913,
1916, 1919, and 1922, respectively. The total number of electoral districts across these
municipalities was 916, 918, 918, and 921 during the same period (Statistics Nor-
way 1923).
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representatives in the municipalities that had to switch to pr in 1919
did not change significantly (Hjellum 1967).
In sum, the 1919 pr reform, which was forced on the municipalities
that still used the plurality system, provide me with a natural exper-
iment to assess the impact of a shift from a multimember plurality
system to open-list pr system on women’s share of the votes cast.
2.3 the effect of pr on women’s inclusion in voting
Beyond offering a natural experiment in the period right after women
gained the right to vote, the Norwegian case is also suitable due to the
detailed electoral data. Official election reports compiled by Statistics
Norway after the election provide voting statistics broken down by
sex for each of the more more than 600 municipalities starting in 1898.
These accurate and unparalleled data makes it possible to investigate
the role of electoral institutions on gender inequalities in turnout in
a more comprehensive way than previous studies, which has had to
rely on surveys, data for national elections, or a limited number of
subnational regions (see Corder and Wolbrecht 2006; Kittilson and
Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Tingsten 1937).
The outcome of interest is women’s percentage of the total num-
ber of votes cast in a given election. Dividing the number of women
voting by the total number of votes cast instead of, for instance,
by the number of eligible female voters ensures that we can look
at whether there is an unequal number of women and men among
the citizens who turn out to vote. Several studies argue and show that
elected politicians are responsive to the composition of the voting pop-
ulation, not the population as a whole (see Bechtel, Hangartner, and
Schmid 2015; Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Powell 1982). To give an
overview of the dependent variable, Figure 2.1 plots women’s per-
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figure 2.1. The distribution, mean and interquartile range of women’s
percentage of votes cast across municipalities for each election.
Notes: The black point gives the mean, the black horizontal ticks give
the interquartile range, and the grey points give women’s percentage of
votes cast for each municipality. Sources: Statistics Norway (1911, 1914,
1917, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929).
centage of votes cast for each municipality (grey points), along with
the mean (black points) and the interquartile range (black, horizontal
ticks) across all municipalities, for each municipal election between
1910 and 1928. 1910 is the first municipal election with universal suf-
frage. The figure illustrates that gender inequality in voting persisted
even after the women were given equal voting rights as men. In the
large majority of these elections, fewer than 50 percent of the votes
were cast by women.39 Between 1910 and 1916, less than one in three
voters were on average women. From 1919 and onwards, however,
women’s share of the turnout increased to about 40. The distribu-
tion of the grey points and the interquartile range indicate that the
variance also decreases notably if we compare the 1919-1928 to the
1910-1916 period. In other words, and although the figure does not
39 Indeed, even the maximum share across the period was 64.5, which occurred in the
municipality of Lillesand in 1925.
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disaggregate the statistics by the type of electoral system, we can see
the contours of the 1919 pr reform.
2.3.1 Research Design
To examine whether the shift from plurality to pr had a positive
impact on women’s percentage of the vote, I use a difference-in-
difference (did) design. In this study, the crux of the design is to
compare (1) the change in women’s percentage of the vote before
and after the 1919 reform in the reformed municipalities with (2) the
equivalent change in the municipalities that did not alter their elec-
toral system (i.e., the municipalities that had previously introduced
pr). To identify a causal effect of the reform, the key assumption is
that, in the absence of the reform, the trends in women’s percentage
of the vote would have been similar in the reformed and the unre-
formed municipalities. Given this assumption, the did will estimate
the average causal impact of the pr reform on women’s share of over-
all votes for the treated units (Angrist and Pischke 2009a, ch. 5).40
I use a municipality- and election years-fixed effects regression
model to estimate the did:41
wvmt = ηm + δt + γ · prmt + ε it. (2.1)
Subscripts m and t denote municipality and election year, respec-
tively. The dependent variable, wvmt, is women’s percentage of the
total number of votes cast. At right hand side of the equation, δt
is the election-fixed effects, which accounts for election-period com-
mon shocks, and ηi is the municipality-fixed effects. The fixed effects
40 In addition, we assume that there is not an issue of selective migration between
municipalities. Since the comparison group already had the reform, this is less of an
issue in this application.
41 See, Angrist and Pischke 2009a, 229 for details.
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means that I estimate within-municipality effects and control for time-
invariant, unobserved variables.
The treatment, prmt, is an indicator variable. It takes the value of
1 for elections held using pr and the value of 0 for those held us-
ing plurality. In other words, for the municipalities in which pr was
in place during the 1910-1916 pre-reform period, as well as during
the post-reform period, it takes the value of 1 for all election years.
For the municipalities that were forced to switch to pr in the 1919
election, it takes the value of 0 for the 1910, 1913, and 1916 elections
and the value of 1 for the 1919, 1922, and 1928 elections.42 The γ co-
efficient will thus give the estimated average treatment effect for the
treated municipalities of introducing pr on women’s share of the total
turnout in municipal elections. The model is estimated by ols with
robust standard errors clustered by municipality to account for serial
correlation within clusters (Angrist and Pischke 2009a, 318-9).
In some of the model specifications, I also include a vector of time-
varying covariates to account for possible confounding trends across
municipalities, as these are not picked up by the year fixed effects. In
particular, we might worry that changes in the female or male popula-
tion, such as variation in the number of female or male eligible voters,
correlates with both the 1919 reform and the outcome. As covariates,
I therefore include eligible voters (log), women’s percentage of the
eligible voters, population size (log), women’s percentage of the pop-
ulation, and the number of representatives in the municipal council
(log).43 Similarly, changes in the municipalities’ industrial structure
may also act as a a confounder, as this was a period of industrial-
ization and the rise of the working class (Collier 1999). Using census
data, I compute the percent of the working-age population in four
exclusive and exhaustive occupational categories industry, agricul-
42 The municipalities that moved from plurality to pr between 1913 and 1916 are ex-
cluded from the analysis.
43 See the note to Figure 2.2 for the data source.
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ture, services, and shipping and include all but one (agriculture) in
the analysis. In October 1919 there was also a national referendum on
whether to uphold the prohibition of alcoholic beverages in Norway,
which had been in place since 1916. As some research, such as Nil-
son (1977), has suggested that women were mobilized more where
Nonconformist (Dissenting) religion and the temperance campaign
was on the rise, which again could be correlated with the pr reform
and women’s votes, I include the percentage of the population be-
longing to Nonconformist religious societies and the percentage of
the population that was a member of the temperance movement.44
Finally, to account for unobserved local trends in confounders, some
model specifications also include either linear or quadratic municipal-
specific time trends.45
2.3.2 The Effect of PR on Women’s Share of the Votes Cast
Figure 2.2 plots the mean level of women’s percentage of the the votes
cast separately for the municipalities that held pr election throughout
the period (triangular points) and the municipalities that held plural-
ity elections prior to the 1919 reform and pr elections thereafter (cir-
cular points). In 1910, the first election in which women could vote
on equal footing with men, women cast about one in five votes in
municipalities using plurality elections and more than one in three
in municipalities using pr. Between the 1910, the 1913, and the 1916
elections, the trends are slightly positive, but similar for both plural-
ity and pr municipalities, which provides indirect evidence in favor
of the parallel trends assumption.
44 The latter variable is only available at the county level for 1913, 1919, and 1923 and
has been linearly imputed for the 1916 and 1922 election.
45 Hence, the full model is: wvmt = η0m + δt + γ · prmt + X′mtβ+ η1m · t + η2m · t2 + εit,
where X′mtβ denotes the time-varying covariates and η1m · t + η2m · t2 the quadratic
time trends.
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figure 2.2. Women’s share of total turnout in Norwegian municipal elec-
tions, 1910-1928.
Notes: The circular points shows the mean level of women’s percentage
of votes cast for the municipalities that held plurality elections until
1916 (grey) and pr elections from 1919 (black). The triangular points
shows the mean level of women’s share of overall votes for the munic-
ipalities that introduced pr before the 1913 election. Sources: Statistics
Norway (1911, 1914, 1917, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929).
Turning to the main result, the effect of the pr reform is clearly
visible in the figure. In 1919, as the pr reform takes effect, there is an
eleven percentage-point shift, from 22 to 33, in women’s share of the
votes cast for the municipalities that were affected by the reform (cir-
cular points). For the municipalities which used pr throughout the
1910-1928 period, the previous trend continues uninterruptedly, with
a one percentage-point increase between 1916 and 1919, from 42 to
43. The did estimate suggested by this graph is thus ten percentage
points.46 After the reform, the trends for both sets of municipalities
again continue more or less in parallel.47 In sum, the graphical evi-
46 (33 - 22) - (43 - 42) = 10 percentage points.
47 Given the similarity of the trends, the remaining difference between these two sets
of municipalities after 1919 are likely to be a result of time-invariant differences
between them.
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table 2.1. Regression results reporting the effect of pr on women’s share of
total turnout in municipal elections, Norway 1910-1928.
Women’s percentage of votes cast
(mean among reformed in 1919: 33%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PR 9.7 9.0 9.0 10.1 9.3
(.7) (.7) (.9) (1.1) (1.1)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X
Covariates X X
Trends X X X
Trends2 X X
Observations 4,127 4,127 4,127 4,127 4,127
Municipalities 593 593 593 593 593
Effect size (% ∆) 42 38 38 44 39
95% CI [36,47] [32,44] [30,45] [35,54] [30,49]
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by municipality in
parentheses and p-values in italics. Trends are municipality specific. The covariates
are: eligible voters (log), women’s percentage of eligible voters, representatives in
the municipal council (log), population (log), women’s percentage of the population,
percentage of the population in nonconformist (dissenting) religious societies, and
variables for the percentage of the population in each of the employment categories
industry, shipping, services, agriculture, home services, and non-employed (with
agriculture as the omitted category). The effect size is calculated by dividing the es-
timated pr coefficient by the sum of the mean for the treated units minus the to pr
coefficient and then multiplying this number by 100.
dence points to a substantial impact of the change in electoral institu-
tions on women’s inclusion in voting.
To subject the hypothesis to a more rigorous analysis, Table 2.1
displays the results from estimating the did regression model in
Equation 3.1. Echoing the graphical analysis, Model 1 indicates that
the passage from plurality to pr in 1919 is estimated to have in-
creased women’s share of overall votes by an average of 9.7 percent-
age points for the reformed municipalities, compared to the counter-
factual where the reform did not occur. With small standard errors,
the effect is precisely estimated. If we think of this effect in terms of
the percent increase from the counterfactual, then this amounts to a
42 percent increase in women’s share of the votes cast (see the last
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two rows of Table 2.1).48 Including the rich set of covariates in Model
2 does not alter these conclusions, as it only slightly decreases the
size of the pr coefficient. The same holds for the linear municipality-
specific trends (Model 3), whereas the quadratic time trends slightly
increases the size of the estimated pr effect (Model 4). Model 5, which
includes both the covariates and the quadratic time trends, is similar
in size to the baseline estimate in Model 1, though with slightly larger
standard errors. These robust findings provide evidence that the pr
reform had a noteworthy impact on women’s share of overall votes
among the municipalities subject to the 1919 reform.
The reform was thus instrumental in starting to translate the re-
cently achieved gender equality in the right to vote into de facto gen-
der equality at the ballot box. Indeed, instead of one in every fifth
voter being a woman before the reform, one in every third voter was
a woman after the reform in the reformed municipalities (see Figure
2.2).
For these estimates to be treated as causal, we need to assume par-
allel trends in the mean of women’s percentage of votes cast absent
of the reform. As we cannot observe what the outcome would have
been without the reform in the municipalities subject to the 1919 re-
form, the assumption is directly untestable. Indirect evidence, how-
ever, lends credence to the plausibility of the assumption in this study.
The two lines in Figure 2.2 are parallel prior to the reform and also
continue along the same path after the reform, which suggests that
the trends are parallel. Further evidence of parallel trends is provided
in Figure 2.3. The figure plots the estimated coefficients and 95 per-
cent confidence intervals from a re-run of Equation 3.1 with leads
and lags of the 1919 pr treatment. The leads give a placebo test of
the pr reform: if the estimate is causal, then the 1919 reform should
48 The percent increase from the counterfactual is calculated by dividing the estimated
pr coefficient by the sum of the mean for the treated units minus the to pr coefficient
and then multiplying this number by 100.
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figure 2.3. Leads and lags of the effect of changing to PR in 1919.
Notes: The estimated coefficients are from a regression model similar to
the one in Equation 3.1 but with two leads and three lags. The 95 percent
confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered by
municipality.
have no impact in 1913 or 1916. The confidence intervals for the 1913
and 1916 leads overlap with zero and the coefficients are small in
size, thus supporting the parallel trends assumption. The lags show
that the reform had an immediate impact that did not increase over
time, apart from a small positive effect in 1928. Given that this effect
appears nine years after the reform, it probably reflects other changes
that affected the municipalities differently. Overall, the pr coefficient
and its lags suggest that the effect was immediate and remained over
time, which is similar to what Figure 2.2 displayed.
In the analysis I have treated municipalities as the unit of inter-
est and given all units equal weight, regardless of the size of the
electorate in the municipality. Reassuringly, re-running models 1 to
5 weighted relative to the eligible voters in each municipality, the re-
sults are about one percentage points stronger (see Table A.3 in the
Appendix).
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2.3.3 Additional evidence from female suffrage expansions
If the results are driven by the changes in the electoral system, an im-
plication would be that the expansion of women’s right to vote first
the introduction of suffrage in municipal elections for women with
income in 1901 and then the introduction of universal suffrage in
municipal elections in 1910 would result in a larger expansion of
women’s share of the votes cast in pr than in plurality municipalities.
To investigate this implication, I look at the change in women’s share
of overall votes between the last election before the given suffrage ex-
pansion and the first election after it i.e., the change between 1898
and 1901 and between 1907 and 1910, respectively.
Obviously, as pr and plurality municipalities are different in ways
that plausibly are correlated with both the type of electoral system
employed and the size of the change in women’s percentage of the
vote these estimates cannot be given a causal interpretation. To miti-
gate the omitted variable bias concern, I include both the levels and
the changes for an extensive set of covariates, notably changes in
women’s percentage of eligible voters, previous turnout levels, popu-
lation size and changes, and fixed effects for counties.49 For the 1910
expansion, I also control for women’s share of overall votes in 1907.
The results for the two suffrage expansions are presented in Table
2.2. With the 1901 suffrage reform, women’s share of overall votes
increased 3.4 percentage points more among pr than plurality munic-
ipalities, holding women’s percentage of eligible voters and other co-
49 The full set of covariates include: the change in the percentage eligible women voters,
the change and the number of eligible voters (log), the lag of turnout, the number
of representatives in the municipal council (log), the change in and the size of the
population (log), the change in and level of women’s percentage of the population,
the change in and the level of the percent of the employed in industry, agriculture,
shipping, and services (with agriculture as the omitted category), whether the munic-
ipality is urban or rural, the change and the level of the percentage of the population
belonging to a Nonconformist religious society, and fixed effects for counties. Munic-
ipalities that use pr for the first time in the election that suffrage was also expanded
are excluded from the analysis.
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table 2.2. Regression results reporting the differing effect of suffrage on
women’s percentage of votes cast.
∆ women’s % of votes cast
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suffrage 1901 Suffrage 1901 Suffrage 1910 Suffrage 1910
PR 3.5 3.4 9.1 10.3
(.9) (1.0) (1.6) (1.9)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Covariates X X X X
County FE X X
Observations 512 512 400 400
Note: OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses and p-values in italics.
See the text for details.
variates constant (see Models 1 and 2). Whereas the 1901 reform gave
voting rights to the minority of women with a certain level of house-
hold income, the 1910 reform granted all women over the age 25 the
right to vote.50 The change in women’s percentage of the vote votes
cast between the 1907 and 1910 election was 10.3 percentage points
higher among pr than among plurality municipalities (see Models 3
and 4). Finally, in Table A.4, I additionally show that if we look at the
municipalities that (endogenously) chose to switch to pr before 1919,
a similar association, albeit smaller in size, between pr and women’s
share of overall votes emerges also there.
Together, the pieces of evidence from both the 1919 electoral reform
and the 1901 and 1910 suffrage expansions give precise evidence in
favor of the hypothesis that going from a multimember plurality to
an open-list pr system resulted in an increase in women’s share of
the votes cast. It is important to note that the causal effect of pr that I
have estimated for the 1919 reform is the average treatment effect for
the treated. For instance, since the municipalities that were forced to
switch to pr were mostly rural municipalities, we cannot necessarily
generalize the finding to the urban municipalities that did not change
50 Women and men on poor relief did not have the right to vote.
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to pr in 1919. Still, the associational findings from the suffrage expan-
sions (see Table 2.2) and the pre-1919 switches (see Table A.4), which
I discussed above, give indicative evidence of a pr effect also beyond
those municipalities that were treated in 1919.
2.3.4 Potential mechanisms
What are the mechanisms driving the noteworthy impact of pr on
women’s share of the votes cast? The theoretical discussion in Sec-
tion 2.1 specified three potential mechanisms for the impact of pr on
women’s inclusion in voting, with one mechanism running through
general electoral mobilization, another running through pr’s positive
effect on women’s representation in legislatures, and a third running
through women’s networks and organizations. In this section, I will
explore each of these mechanisms, starting with the representation
mechanism.
The representation mechanism
To investigate the role of the representation mechanism where pr
increases the number of female legislators, which again increases
women’s propensity to vote through a role model effect we can ex-
amine whether the reform affected women’s presence in local gov-
ernment, which would be a requirement for this mechanism to ap-
ply. The official election reports provide data on the number of fe-
male and male representatives elected to the municipal councils.51
Across the 1901 to 1928 period, only 1.4 percent of the representatives
elected to serve in municipal councils were women. The Norwegian
women’s movement argued that the introduction of pr would im-
prove women’s access to political positions (Stortingstidende 1919).
51 But unfortunately not on the number of women candidates.
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figure 2.4. Percentage of municipalities with at least one woman in the
municipal council, 1910-1928.
Notes: The circular points shows percentage of the municipalities with
at least one woman in the municipal council in municipalities that held
plurality elections until 1916 (grey) and pr elections from 1919 (black).
The triangular points shows statistic for the municipalities that intro-
duced pr before the 1913 election. Sources: Statistics Norway (1911, 1914,
1917, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929).
Later research based on cross-national evidence from the post-World
War II period indicates that pr is associated with a higher representa-
tion of women than plurality systems (see, e.g., Paxton, Hughes, and
Painter 2010).
To see whether the reform had any effect on female representation,
we can calculate the proportion of municipalities that had at least
one female representative in the municipal legislature separately for
the municipalities that changed to pr in 1919 and for the comparison
group of municipalities that had pr throughout the 1910-1928 period.
In the comparison group, 17 percent of the municipalities had female
presence in the legislature in both 1916 and 1919. In the 1919 reform
group, 3 percent of the municipalities had female presence in the
council in 1916 and 2 percent in 1919, which is illustrated in Figure
2.4. Given the results in the figure, it is clear that the pr reform did not
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have a short or medium term impact on women’s representation in
municipal legislatures. Consequently, it is unlikely that the reform in-
fluenced women’s mobilization to vote through its effect on women’s
representation.
This evidence also suggests that pr alone is insufficient to in-
crease women’s descriptive representation. As convincingly argued
by Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008), it is only in conjunction with
supply-side mechanisms, such as women’s large-scale entrance into
higher education and full-time employment, that pr is likely to pro-
duce higher legislative representation of women than plurality sys-
tems (see Rokkan 1970).
The electoral mechanism
The existing literature documents that pr has a positive effect on the
average level of turnout, at least apart from very competitive districts
(Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2015; Eggers 2015). The generally greater incen-
tive for political elites to mobilize voters under pr than under plural-
ity rules may have lead them to particularly try to get women to vote,
as women made up about half of the eligible voters but were an “un-
dertapped market” in terms of participation in elections. This mecha-
nism would make particular sense in a context where turnout among
men was already very high. Party elites would then be required to
look to women for new voters to mobilize. Among Norwegian mu-
nicipalities using the plurality system, however, the turnout rate was
only 44 percent in 1916, indicating that mobilizing new voters did not
necessarily imply to mobilize women.
We can first look at whether the pr reform had an impact on over-
all turnout. The results from re-estimating Equation 3.1 above with
overall turnout as the dependent variable shows a substantive effect
of pr (see Table A.5), which echoes previous findings (Cox, Fiva, and
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Smith 2015; Eggers 2015). If this is the mechanism producing the ef-
fect of pr on women’s share of votes cast, we should perhaps see that
the effect evaporates once we control for the impact on turnout in
Equation 3.1. The problem with including turnout as a regressor in
Equation 3.1, however, is that it may induce post-treatment bias in
the estimate of pr on women’s share of the votes cast. Moreover, as
Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (forthcoming) demonstrate, we cannot
know the direction of the bias. To nonetheless enable the estimation
of the effect of the treatment on the outcome net of a mediating vari-
able, in this case overall turnout, they develop the what they call the
“sequential g-estimation.” It allows us to include mediating variables
without post-treatment bias. It involves a two-step estimation proce-
dure. I first regress the women’s share of overall votes on turnout (the
mediator), pr (the treatment), the fixed effects, and the set of covari-
ates discussed above. This model is thus similar to Model 2 in Table
2.1 Second, I “demediate” the outcome using the first stage, which,
in this case means subtracting the coefficient on turnout multiplied
by the observed level of turnout from the observed level of women’s
share of overall votes for each observation. I then use this demedi-
ated version of the women’s share of overall votes and regress it on
the pr variable.52 Following Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (forthcom-
ing), I use a bootstrap procedure to obtain standard errors that take
into both stages of the estimation.53
The results are shown in Table 2.3. For reference, the first row
shows the estimated pr effect from Model 2 in Table 2.1. The next
row shows the estimated pr effect after taking out the effect that runs
through pr’s impact on overall turnout. More precisely, it is the av-
52 Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (For details on the estimation procedure, see forthcom-
ing). I thus assume that all the covariates are intermediate variables; that is, that they
can be affected by the treatment. Alternatively, I could assume that some or all of the
covariates were pretreatment covariates. This would not notably change the results
presented below.
53 As observations are clustered in municipalities, I use the block bootstrap with sam-
pling of municipalities (with replacement).
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table 2.3. The estimated effect of pr on women’s share of the votes cast net
of turnout using sequential g-estimation
Women’s % of the votes cast
Pr 95% CI
Model
Baseline (Model 2, Table 2.1) 9.0 [7.7, 10.4]
Effect net of turnout (seq. g-estimation) 6.3 [5.4, 7.2]
Effect net of turnout (naive estimation) 5.8 [4.9, 6.7]
Note: Rows 1 and 3 display confidence intervals based on robust standard errors
clustered by municipality; row 2 displays confidence intervals based on block boot-
strapped standard errors with 1,000 replications. The pr column is the coefficient
from regressions including municipality and year fixed effects and the set of covari-
ates described in Section 2.3. See the text for details on the estimation procedures.
erage effect of pr on the treated municipalities if we hold turnout
constant at its mean value. The third row gives the “naive” estimated
effect of pr net of turnout; that is, if we re-estimate Model 2 in Ta-
ble 2.1 but control for turnout. Both of these methods indicate that
about a third of the overall effect of pr comes from increased elec-
toral mobilization, which gives an indication that the electoral mech-
anism is partially at play. Yet, it is notable that the impact of pr on
women’s share of votes is still highly significant and substantive in
size. The general turnout mechanism accordingly does not seem to
be the whole story.
The organizational mechanism
Finally, I explore the organizational mechanism, where the expecta-
tion is that the impact of pr will be larger where there are existing
networks of women. The elites, which have greater incentives to mo-
bilize under pr, will more easily be able to get out the vote if they can
tap into pre-existing organizations that can help out with the mobi-
lization. There were three particularly large women’s movements in
Norway at the time: the bourgeoise suffrage movement, the working
class women’s movement, and the temperance movement (Danielsen,
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Larsen, and Owesen 2013, ch. 5; Agerholt 1937). I create separate mea-
sures for all three movements.
First, in 1905, the suffrage movement mobilized more than 280,000
women across the country to sign the independence petition, as I dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.1 above. To collect the signatures, they relied on
local chapters of the women’s movement and other similar networks
(Agerholt 1937). The share of women in a municipality who signed
the 1905 petition can therefore serve as a measure of the strength
of the women’s movement in a given municipality. Since the orig-
inal sheets with the petition signatures still exist, it is possible to
create such a measure. More specifically, in 2013, the Parliamentary
Archives scanned the 9,081 sheets of original signatures and catego-
rized the sheets by municipality. To count the signatures, I proceeded
in the following steps. First, as the signatures were grouped by mu-
nicipality, I selected a random sample consisting of a fourth of the
municipalities. In each of these sampled municipalities, I counted the
number of signatures per sheet. In total I counted 67,885 signatures,
or about a fourth of the total number of signatures, across 2,086 pages.
Second, using these data, I created an estimate of the average num-
ber of signatures per sheet. Since I had the total number of signature
sheets for all the municipalities that I had not hand counted, I could
use the hand counted data to predict the number of signatures in
the “uncounted” municipalities. Finally, to create a measure of the
percentage of the female adult population who signed the petition
in each municipality, I divided the number of signatures by census
data on the adult female population and multiplied this number by
100. As the collection of petitions depended on local organizational
capacity, it should serve as a proxy for the presence and the strength
of the women’s movement in a given municipality. An example of the
signature sheets is shown in Figure A.2 in the appendix.
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Second, for the working class movement, I have no direct measure
for women. Still, between 1909 and 1915, the Norwegian Trade Union
Federation’s Annual Report contained information on the number of
trade union members in each municipality.54 I use trade union mem-
bers as a percentage of the population as a proxy for the presence of
a working class women’s organization.
Third, to measure the strength of the temperance movement, I use
data from the report on alcohol usage from Statistics Norway in 1924,
which contains time series data on membership in temperance orga-
nizations between 1913 and 1923 for all 19 out of the 20 counties (amt)
(Statistics Norway 1924). Unfortunately, the measure is not available
at the municipality level, so I will need to use the percentage of the
county population that is a member of a temperance organization as
a proxy.
To explore whether the impact of pr varies with the presence of
women’s organized networks, Table 2.4 shows estimates of the im-
pact of pr for subsets of municipalities. As the g-estimation and the
naïve estimation of the mediating effect of the electoral mechanism
show very similar results, I here use the naive version and simply
control for turnout. First, Models 1 and 2 show the impact of pr for
sets of municipalities that score above the median value for the 1905
petition variable (Model 1), or equal to or below the median value
(Model 2). Models 5 and 6 do the same for the temperance move-
ment variable. As 400 out of the 593 municipalities in the sample
do not have any trade union members, these estimates are subset by
whether there are trade union members present (Model 3) or not in
the municipality (Model 4). For all three indicators the pr estimate
is notably higher for the subset with higher presence of a women’s
network. For the 1905 variable, the pr coefficient is 45 percent larger
54 The Norwegian Center for Research Data have digitized these data. There is missing
data for some municipalities.
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table 2.4. Regression results reporting the effect of pr on women’s share of
total turnout in municipal elections, Norway 1910-1928.
1905 mobilization Trade unions Temperance mov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
> median ≤ median > 0 = 0 > median ≤ median
PR 7.0 4.8 8.9 4.4 5.4 3.8
(.8) (.6) (1.5) (.5) (.6) (.7)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Municipality FEs X X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X X
Covariates X X X X X X
Turnout covariate X X X X X X
Observations 1,966 1,949 1,145 2,388 1,998 2,127
Municipalities 283 280 193 400 287 306
Effect size (% ∆) 27 17 37 15 20 13
95% CI [21,33] [13,21] [25,49] [12,19] [15,24] [8,18]
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by municipality in
parentheses and p-values in italics. Trends are municipality specific. The covariates
are: eligible voters (log), women’s percentage of eligible voters, representatives in
the municipal council (log), population (log), women’s percentage of the population,
percentage of the population in nonconformist (dissenting) religious societies, and
variables for the percentage of the population in each of the employment categories
industry, shipping, services, agriculture, home services, and non-employed (with
agriculture as the omitted category). The effect size is calculated by dividing the
estimated pr coefficient by the sum of the mean for the treated units minus the pr
coefficient and then multiplying this number by 100.
for the above-median subset; for the trade union variable, the pr co-
efficient is about twice the size where trade unions are present; and
for the temperance movement variable, the pr coefficient is 42 per-
cent larger for the above-median subset. These consistent results lend
support to the organizational mechanism.
Together, these pieces of evidence give tentative support to the elec-
toral as well as the organizational mechanism. The results suggest
that the move from a plurality- to a pr -based electoral system in Nor-
wegian municipalities in 1919 increased overall turnout, which also
meant an increasing mobilization of women to vote. They also indi-
cate that the impact of pr was larger where pre-existing organized
networks of women such as the suffrage, the workers’, and the tem-
perance movements stood stronger.
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2.4 conclusions
In this paper, I have shown that replacing a plurality with a pr elec-
toral system can increase women’s share of the votes cast. I did so
through an empirical investigation of the switch from plurality to pr
in Norwegian municipalities before the election in 1919. About half of
the municipalities already used pr, whereas the national parliament
forced the remaining half to go from plurality to pr elections between
the 1916 and 1919 election. Using a difference-in-difference design, I
compared the change in women’s share of the total turnout in munic-
ipalities that did not change electoral system between 1916 and 1919
with those that were forced to switch. My estimates indicate that the
change from plurality to pr significantly increased women’s share of
the votes cast. Exploring the mechanisms behind this result suggests
that the general incentive to mobilize a larger share of the population
under pr, as well as the presence of organized women’s networks, are
important mechanisms for the effect of pr.
Even after women were granted the right to vote, they were not
included in the in the act of voting to the same extent as men. The
results in from this study suggest that substituting plurality with pr
significantly contributed to reducing gender inequality in political
participation.
3
PA RT N E R I N G C H A N G E : T H E P O L I T I C S O F
W O R K - FA M I LY P O L I C I E S
abstract : Under what conditions do employers, unions, and political par-
ties go from opposing to proposing and pushing for work-family policies?
Work-family policies (WFPs), such parental leave and daycare services, have
surged over the last decades, even despite fiscal pressures. Despite their cen-
tral position in the making of labor market policies, the role of organized em-
ployers and trade unions in WFP reforms have largely been overlooked. In my
argument, the shift from Fordist to knowledge economies, with the associated
reversal of the gender gap in higher education, is the impetus for social part-
ners’ and parties’ changing policy stances. If women make up an increasing
share of high-skilled employees, employers’ associations start favoring WFPs
in order to increase these workers’ labor supply. Similarly, unions favor WFPs
if women constitute a significant part of their current and prospective mem-
bership base. The translation of these preferences into policy depends on the
presence of national-level corporatist institutions, which give unions and em-
ployers policy influence. I support these claims with time-series cross-section
analyses of WFPs in eighteen advanced democracies from the 1960s and on-
wards, as well a detailed case study of the legislative processes in Norway
over the last five decades and shadow case studies of Sweden, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom.
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The massive transition from a Fordist to a knowledge-basedeconomy has entailed an unprecedented surge in higher ed-
ucation enrollment and labor market participation among women
(Goldin and Katz 2008). Yet, due to childbearing, establishing a family
entails higher labor market risks including job and wage loss, skill
depreciation, and lost promotion opportunities for women than
men in paid employment (Estévez-Abe 2006). Work-family policies
(wfps), including daycare services and parental leave, are policies that
aim to reduce these risks and financially enable both spouses to re-
turn to and participate in the labor market while they have young
children. During the period of Fordism, lasting into the 1970s, unions,
employers, and political parties almost without exception defended
the male-breadwinner welfare state (Leira 1992; Morgan 2006). De-
spite this initial opposition, however, advanced democracies have,
with ample variation in both timing and magnitude, implemented
wfps. By 2010, advanced democracies spent on average five percent
of their total social spending on wfps that is, a 65 percent increase
since 1980 (OECD 2010).
A series of incisive studies document the importance of left-wing
parties, increasing political competition between blocs over work-
ing women’s votes as well as women’s entrance into parties, par-
liaments, and cabinets for the introduction and expansion of wfps
(see, e.g., Fleckenstein and Lee 2012; Huber and Stephens 2000; Mor-
gan 2006, 2013). While the focus on party politics provides convincing
insights into the expansion of wfps, these factors can only partially ex-
plain to what degree states choose to mitigate the risks facing work-
ing women, as I will show below. Indeed, even though women’s inte-
gration into education and the labor market are seen as the driving
forces behind the changing political dynamics, it is commonly and
perhaps paradoxically assumed that policies aimed at women in
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the labor market fall outside the realm of labor organizations’ inter-
est and influence (see, e.g., Huber and Stephens 2000; Morgan 2013).
As such, we lack a systematic analysis of organized employers and
unions’ changing attitudes toward, and role in, wfp reforms.
To this end, this study makes a theoretical and an empirical con-
tribution to the literature. Theoretically, the article provides an argu-
ment about the condition under which both unions and employers
change from opposing to proposing wfps, and to what extent they
can be expected to influence policy. I contend that the rise of knowl-
edge economies1 characterized by skill-biased technological change,
increases in education levels2, and the reversal of the gender gap in
higher education3 is the source of the changing coalitions under-
pinning the new welfare state (Iversen and Soskice 2015a; Martin and
Thelen 2007; Hall and Thelen 2009; Thelen 2014). With women start-
ing to outnumber men in higher education, organized employers will
call for expansion of wfps in order to secure that these high-skilled,
potential employees remain attached to the labor market in case of
childbirth. For trade unions, as democratic membership-based organi-
zations, pushing or not pushing for wfps is a question of their mem-
bership base. Only unions in which women make up a significant
share of the members, or constitute a promising future avenue for
recruitment, will promote wfps (Berger and Piore 1980; Rueda 2007;
Häusermann 2010). A majority of female members of trade unions
have tertiary education, and increases in tertiary education is a key
source of growing female labor force participation.4 The gender gap
reversal is, in other words, the source of emerging cross-class coalition
between capital and labor in favor of wfps. Unions and employers thus
1 Powell 2004; Soskice 2014.
2 Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Goos and Manning 2007; Ansell 2010; Reenen 2011;
Oesch 2013; Ansell and Gingrich 2013.
3 Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006; Goldin and Katz 2008.
4 Evidenced in Section 3.1 below.
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try to sway both left- and right-dominated cabinets and parliaments
to expand wfps.
Still, the social partners must be able to influence policy to see
their new preference for wfps realized. Corporatist institutions orga-
nized at the national level what Martin and Swank (2012) have la-
beled “macro-corporatism” facilitate cooperation and coordination
between social partners, as well as providing them with influence
over policy (Katzenstein 1985; Traxler 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001;
Rueda 2008; Martin and Swank 2012; Nelson and Stephens 2013a).
The result is that both unions and employers use their central posi-
tion in policymaking to ensure that wfps are enacted.
By spelling out the mechanisms for employers and unions’ chang-
ing preferences for wfps, this study also illustrates that analyses em-
phasizing5 and questioning6 employers’ proactive role in welfare state
development can be complementary rather than competing explana-
tions. Among the skeptics, Korpi (2006, 202) asserts that “employer-
centered research has not yet presented empirical evidence indicating
that employers have been protagonists with first-order preferences for
major reforms extending social citizenship rights.” The advocates, on
the other hand, document how employers, and particularly their in-
terest associations, have had an active hand in the extension of key
social policies, such as unemployment insurance and active labor
market policies (Mares 2003a; Martin and Swank 2012; Nelson and
Stephens 2013a). In this analysis, I show that these two approaches
can be squared by allowing employer associations’ (and trade unions’)
preferences to vary over time according to the composition of the la-
bor force (see also Mares 2003a). As women have become a key source
of skilled labor, employers have gone from “antagonists” to “protag-
onists” of wfps, to borrow Korpi’s (2006) terminology. This study, in
5 Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 2003b; Martin and Swank 2012; Swenson 2002.
6 Hacker and Pierson 2002; Korpi 2006; Nijhuis 2009; Paster 2013.
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other words, documents how the rise of knowledge economies is the
source of the shifts in preferences for welfare policies geared toward
working women among the key political actors in advanced democra-
cies. This emphasis is related to recent work by Thelen with Hall and
Martin7, Häusermann8, and Iversen and Soskice9, who all provide
insightful arguments about how the collapse of Fordism has created
new policy coalitions. Yet they analyze active labor market policies
and pensions and do not deal with wfps or the consequences of the
reversal of the gender gap in higher education.
In order to examine wfps in the wake of the knowledge-economy
transition, the study combines an econometric analysis of the expan-
sion of parental leave across advanced democracies from the 1960s
until today with a detailed case study that traces the political dynam-
ics behind all major wfp reforms in Norway. Corporatist Norway is
particularly suited for a case-study analysis because it has gone from
having less than three percent daycare coverage and 12 weeks of low
paid parental leave in the 1960s to over 80 percent daycare coverage
and 49 weeks of fully paid leave in 2016. In the appendix, I also in-
clude brief case studies of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom to document that the argument’s mechanisms are at play
also beyond the Norwegian case.
In the large-n analysis, I show that the reversal of the gender gap in
higher education is clearly associated with the expansion of wfps in
countries with centralized and influential employers’ associations and
trade unions but not in countries with weaker and more fragmented
social partners. In the case study analysis, I use archival resources and
interviews, historical statistics, newspaper articles, party manifestoes,
and secondary sources to show that women have gone from having
a marginal to a prominent role within unions, and that this shift lead
7 Hall and Thelen 2009; Martin and Thelen 2007; Thelen 2014.
8 Häusermann 2010.
9 Iversen and Soskice 2015a.
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the labor organizations to go from opposing to proposing reforms.
Later on, employers underwent the same shift. Up to the 1980s the
employers’ associations were clearly hostile to wfp expansions; yet,
as women’s share in key higher education fields such as business,
stem, and law started to surge, they gradually came to favor wfps.
Specifically, I show that the massive parental leave expansion in the
1980s was initiated by the social partners through wage negotiations.
Later, employers and unions have, in a unison and coordinated fash-
ion, called for expansion of both daycare and the fathers’ quota. I
also show that the social partners collaborated closely with women
within parties both to the left and right. The analysis is consequently
able to not only demonstrate that the argument is generalizable to
the full set of advanced democracies, but also that both unions and
employers made a u-turn on wfps.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, I present the the-
oretical argument and discuss the relevant literature. I first deal with
the role of corporatism and the rise of knowledge economies. I then
specify when and why we should expect to see employers, unions,
and parties to be in favor of and introduce wfp reforms. I the two
subsequent sections, I test the argument in two ways. First, in Section
3.2, I carry out a time-series cross-section analysis of data on wfps for
18 OECD countries from 1960 to 2010, which allows me to show the
general applicability of the theoretical model. Second, in Section 3.3, I
conduct an in-depth case study of Norway to provide evidence of the
mechanisms leading to expansion of wfps.10 Section 3.4 concludes.
10 Appendix B.1.1 includes the short studies of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom.
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3.1 social partners and the politics of work-family
policies : theory and literature
The existing literature on employers and unions’ preferences toward
social policy legislation shows that higher centralization and coordi-
nation of employers’ associations and trade unions increase their sup-
port for policies and outcomes such as unemployment insurance,
active labor market policies, wage compression, and redistribution.11
First, centralization forces employers and unions with initially diverse
preferences to reach common ground and enables them to solve col-
lective action and coordination problems (Hall and Soskice 2001; Nel-
son and Stephens 2013a). Second, instead of fragmented groups of
firms and employees bargaining for the advancement of their individ-
ual benefits, centralized social partners take into account the produc-
tivity and sustainability of the national economy, as well as aggregate
labor supply, in their bargaining policies (Martin and Swank 2012).
With its implications for economic growth, the issue of national wel-
fare policy legislation will therefore be more central to unions and
employers organized at the central level than in countries with de-
centralized wage bargaining. Third, through regular participation in
policy commissions, corporatist institutions allow the social partners
to have their say in the formulation of social policy, which reduces
concerns that social policy legislation will be insensitive to the their
preferences (Katzenstein 1985; Rokkan 1987; Traxler 1997; Molina and
Rhodes 2002; Martin and Swank 2012; Martin 2012). This contrasts
with pluralist countries, where both organized capital and labor are
decentralized and fragmented, and thus less involved in policymak-
ing and unable to voice collective interests. In short, social partners
11 See, e.g., Hicks and Swank 1984, 1992; Western 1989; Wallerstein 1986; Waller-
stein 1999; Swenson 2002; Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Rueda 2008; Hall
and Gingerich 2009; Martin and Swank 2012.
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operating within a corporatist industrial relations system have con-
siderable policy influence.
These arguments about the role of corporatism, however, are static
in the sense that the they implicitly assume that the social partners’
preferences do not change over time: in highly corporatist countries,
the social partners have always been positive to various social policy
legislation.12 This is problematic when trying to explain wfps because
neither unions nor employers have at all times been supporters of
these policies, but rather opposed them. The aim of this study is therefore
to understand the sources of these shifts in the social partners’ preferences
for and influence on this emerging part of the welfare state.
I contend that two aspects of the rise of knowledge economies are
central to understanding the shift in capital and labor’s preferences
for wfps. The first aspect is that skill-biased technological change
has, as forcefully demonstrated by Iversen and Soskice (2015a), de-
coupled the complementarities that existed between skilled and
semi-skilled workers in Fordist “assembly line” economies (see also
Wallerstein 1990; Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante 2001). In Fordist
economies, strong unions were a result of a coalition between the
skilled and semi-skilled. Technological change, however, automates
away routine manual tasks, leading to a decline in the number of
semi-skilled jobs and the bargaining power of these workers (Autor,
Levy, and Murnane 2003). Decentralization of wage bargaining, as
well as a decline unionization rates, has therefore ensued, as it is no
longer necessary for skilled workers and their employers to coordi-
nate with semi-skilled workers. The ability of unions and employers
in different sectors to coordinate and cohesively influence policy has
12 Mares (2003a), who highlights risk exposure as a determinant of employers’ and
unions’ attitudes towards social policies, comes closer to providing a dynamic argu-
ment. Changes in exposure to risks, such as increasing unemployment or interna-
tional competition in a given sector, can cause shifts in preferences for social policy.
Yet, she deals only with the “old” welfare policies, such as unemployment and work-
accident insurance and early retirement policies.
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consequently started to decline. The exceptions are the Nordic coun-
tries, and to some extent Belgium, where unionization rates and cen-
tralization of wage bargaining have declined less due to high union-
ization rates among particularly highly educated women in the pub-
lic sector (Iversen and Soskice 2014, 15-6; Martin and Thelen 2007;
Dølvik, Andersen, and Vartiainen 2014; Pontusson 2011). I return to
this aspect below. The second aspect is that the rise of knowledge
economies is also characterized by a revolution in enrollment rates
and the closing, and later reversal, of the gender gap in higher edu-
cation, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The liberal market economies and
the Nordic countries have the highest gross enrollment rates.13 By the
1990s, women had higher enrollment rates in tertiary education than
men, particularly in these countries. What we can infer from these
trends is that women with higher education make up a more and
more significant group of employees.
In the following I spell out how these two aspects of knowledge
economies the reversal of the gender gap and the changing role
of corporatism affect employers and unions policy preferences for
wfps, as well as the social partners’ opportunities to influence legisla-
tion, and finally the role of political parties.
3.1.1 The rise of a cross-class coalition for work-family policies
Employers
The preferences of employers toward wfps depend on the gender gap
in higher education as well as the level of corporatism. As other social
policies, wfps have significant costs to firms. Unless there are clear-cut
13 For excellent analyses of the development of higher education, see, e.g., Ansell (2010),
Ansell and Gingrich (2013), and Iversen and Soskice (2008). In particular, Ansell and
Gingrich (2013) theorize and document the close relationship between the expansion
of higher education and knowledge-intensive service sectors.
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figure 3.1. Gross enrollment rates in tertiary education, with countries
ordered according to when the female outnumbered the male
enrollment rate. The vertical lines indicate the year of the
reversal of the gender gap in enrollment.
Notes: The gross enrollment rate “is defined as the number of pupils
enrolled at a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a
percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for the same
level of education. For the tertiary level, the population used is the five-
year age group following on from the secondary school leaving age.
Gross enrollment rate can be over 100% due to the inclusion of over-
aged and under-aged pupils/students because of early or late entrants,
and grade repetition” (Svensson et al. 2012, 148). Source: UNESCO (2012)
in Svensson et al. (2012).
benefits of having wfps, they will oppose their introductions. Parental
leave implies significant non-wage costs for firms in terms of finding
temporary replacement of staff who are on leave, either by employing
a replacement worker, by making internal reshuffles of staff, or by al-
locating the work to other employees (Estévez-Abe 2006; Ruhm 1998).
With few employees, the option of staff reshuffles is more difficult for
small firms, and they will need to find temporary replacements in the
external labor market. Even with fully publicly-financed leaves, there
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are therefore extra search costs for such companies, also entailing the
risk of not finding suitable replacements.14 The introduction of paid
leave also have direct negative consequences for firms’ bottom line,
as the leave has to be financed by firms or through increased taxa-
tion. Although financing through general taxation lessens the burden
imposed on firms, it still affects their overall labor costs. An expan-
sion of daycare services does not entail the same non-wage cost as
parental leaves, as daycare services reduce the time away from work
in relation to childbirth and childrearing. Nevertheless, as affordable,
full-time daycare services are much more costly and requires an en-
largement of the publicly-funded service sector, they involve higher
taxation, higher government spending, and possibly higher payroll
taxes. Overall, wfps are consequently costly to firms. In the absence
of a tangible advantages, which was the case in a male-breadwinner
economy, the default position of firms should therefore be to oppose
wfps.
With the closing and then reversal of the gender gap in higher ed-
ucation, however, I argue that firms in sectors relying on high skills
become more interested in both making sure that high-skilled women
enter the labor market and return to full-time work after childbirth.
These firms therefore shift from opposing to favoring wfps. With re-
gard to daycare services, they will favor high-quality full-time ser-
vices that suits dual-earner couples. In addition to childbearing and
birth, women still do a larger share of the household work and chil-
drearing than men (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Firms perceive
that daycare services decrease the risk that women employees per-
manently leave the workforce to care for children, and also enables
a faster return to employment after childbirth. Moreover, the service
makes it possible to combine full-time work with having small chil-
14 Small firms will therefore generally oppose job-protected parental leave to a larger
extent than larger firms.
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dren, particularly for women, which again results in increased skill
investment and job experience.15 With regard to leaves, firms will
prefer short and well-paid parental leaves with high wage ceilings
to prevent high-skilled women from leaving the labor market alto-
gether. They will also start favoring fathers’ quotas, where one part
of the leave is reserved for fathers, since it will increase the chance
that high-skilled women return faster and do not permanently drop
out of the labor market.
Employers in countries with highly centralized peak employers’ as-
sociations will on average be more favorable to wfps. With skill in-
creases among women, centralized employers’ associations are more
likely to focus on the benefits of wfps for the nationwide economy
than fragmented associations. In economies increasingly reliant on
high skills to innovate and grow,16 wfps becomes a vehicle for ensur-
ing high employment and skill investment (Gingrich and Ansell 2015;
Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012). As the Confederation of Norwegian
Enterprise, for instance, argued in favor of the fathers’ quota: “[t]here
are so many well-educated women, and it is a large problem that they
have difficulties with entering the labor market on the same level as
men” (Klassekampen 2010). Centralized employer federations thus
take into account outcomes and the provision of collective goods
beyond the bottom line of individual companies to a larger extent
than fragmented employers (Martin 2005; Martin and Swank 2012, 23;
Crouch 1993; Katzenstein 1985; Nelson and Stephens 2013a; Roth-
stein 1998, 2005). This also makes them more likely to favor state-
funded and -administered wfps because such policies ensure that col-
lective goals are achieved and that daycare services and parental leave
become available to all employed women.
15 See also Chapter 4 of this thesis.
16 See Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Acemoglu 2008; Aghion and Howitt 2009.
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Summarized, we should expect to see employers becoming increas-
ingly favorable towards wfps as women outnumber men in higher
education. This should especially be the case in corporatist countries,
where employers’ associations are more likely to participate in poli-
cymaking and be concerned with the overall health of the economy.
This is also where their policy influence is the largest. Employers in
male-dominated sectors may still oppose parental leave and other
wfps because they increase government spending without being of
direct use to them. As I will also emphasize when I discuss trade
unions’ preferences below, employers’ federations will thus only be-
come favorable to wfps when firms and sectors in need of the labor
supply from women with high general skills acquire a dominant po-
sition within the associations.
Trade unions
Trade unions have been regarded as the representatives of the work-
ing class as a whole, and as organizations that strive to introduce
social and labor market policies benefiting the broad class of depen-
dent employees (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001;
Korpi 2006; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). Instead, I argue that trade
unions and their confederations are best seen as democratic interest
organizations, with internal, democratic decision-making procedures
(Wallerstein 1999). The policy positions of a trade union will there-
fore crucial depend on the distribution of preferences among their
individual members (see also Rasmussen 2016; Mares 2003a; Häuser-
mann 2010). A trade union’s policy positions will additionally de-
pend on whether the policies can contribute to membership retention
and expansion. Accordingly, the stance of a trade union confederation
will be a function of the distribution of policy preferences among the
affiliated unions.
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Thus, if the female share of union members increases either as
a result of rising female employment or declining male membership
rates the issue of wfps will become an issue of contention within
the movement, since these policies are more beneficial to employed
women than men. There is particularly a conflict between highly ed-
ucated women and male industrial workers (and their home-staying
spouses) (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Häusermann 2010; Rueda 2007).
As trade unions affiliated with a confederation typically organize em-
ployees in different sectors and occupations, and as women’s entrance
into paid work is predominantly segregated into service sectors,17 the
increase in female education and employment rates will often pit affil-
iated unions’ interests and policy preferences against each other. Yet,
as the share of women within trade union confederations increase,
the organization will be more and more likely to come out in favor of
wfps and to use its influence to push for such social policies.
Figure 3.2 displays that, when plotting women’s percentage of
union members (x-axis) against the percentage of unionized wage
earners (y-axis) across countries for the 2000s, three clear clusters of
countries emerge. The coordinated market economies of Continental
Europe, in the bottom left corner of the figure, have a low share of
women members compared to the two other clusters. One reason is
that, in these countries, unions are organized along industrial lines
with sectoral coordination. They thus to a lesser extent organize the
public service sector, which is also smaller in these countries (see
Iversen and Stephens 2008; Iversen and Wren 1998). About half of the
union members are women in both the liberal market economies and
the Nordic coordinated market economies. What distinguishes them
is overall union density, which is 50 to 70 percent in the latter and
10 to 30 percent in the former, as also illustrated in the figure. Addi-
17 See, e.g., Bettio and Verashchagina 2009; Charles and Grusky 2004; Iversen and
Rosenbluth 2010.
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figure 3.2. Cross-national variation in total union density and the percent-
age of women union members in the 2000s
Notes: Union density is defined as the percentage union members
among employed wage and salary earners. The clusters are identified
using cluster analysis with Ward’s method and a four cluster solution (a
three-cluster solution would cluster Belgium together with the Nordic
countries). Intuitively, the Ward’s method takes each pair of clusters
and computes how much information that would be lost, in the form
of sum of squares about the mean, with that given clustering. It selects
the clustering that would minimize information lost (see Bartholomew
et al. 2008). Sources: Visser (2011) (female membership share); Brady,
Huber, and Stephens (2014) (union density).
tionally, it can be noted that the (new) female members are typically
highly educated and work in the public sector. For instance, using sur-
vey data from the International Survey Programme’s 2012 wave for
advanced economies, more than two-thirds of female union members
have post-secondary education, more than half have a tertiary degree,
and about one-third have a master’s degree or more. The reversal of
the gender gap in higher education, women’s employment rates, and
the entrance of women into unions are thus tightly interlinked.
In my argument, I expect unions in the Nordic and the liberal clus-
ters of countries to particularly favor wfps but only the Nordic unions
to be powerful enough to succeed with their demands. In labor mar-
kets where female workers are struggling to get access such as in
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the coordinated market economies of Continental Europe, which are
dominated by workers with specific skills and small public service
sectors (Estévez-Abe 2006) unions should not be expected to pro-
mote wfps. In these instances unions might actually work against
such policies, as they reduce their male members’ advantages in the
labor market by, for example, increasing the supply of labor (Bonoli
and Reber 2010, 98; see also Gingrich and Ansell 2015).
Cross-class coalitions
Summarized, employers become increasingly likely to favor wfps as
the gender gap in higher education reverses in favor of women, and
unions are increasingly likely to favor wfps as the female share of
union members grows. As employers due to increased tax burdens,
and temporary absences of staff in terms of leave pay a higher cost
for wfps than trade unions and their members, the expectation is that
unions will start pushing for wfps earlier than organized employers.18
Cross-class alliances in favor of wfps that is, instances where unions
and employers have a common interest in favoring wfps become vi-
able when women outnumber men in higher education and female
employees have a dominant position in organized labor. Crucially,
the probability for, and the effect of, these cross-class coalitions on
wfps will depend on the presence of corporatist institutions. Where
such institutions are present, employers and labor will be more in-
terested in public policies that benefit the economy as a whole, they
will more easily coordinate their preferences, and they will have the
power to influence policy. These predictions are summed up in Table
3.1. When men outnumber women in higher education, there should
be little expansion of wfps. As the gender gap narrows and reverses,
wfps should increasingly be enacted in countries with centralized so-
18 Moreover, as not only highly educated women but also low-skilled women may
unionize, unions may experience an additional pressure for advocating wfps.
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table 3.1. Predictions regarding the level of wfps based on the theoretical
discussion
Gender gap in higher education
Men > women Women > men
Corporatism High Limited ExtensiveLow Limited Limited/intermediate
cial partners, and to a lesser extent in countries with less influential
unions and employers.
A corollary of the argument is that the social partners have a larger
influence on the expansion of parental leave and the introduction of
the fathers’ quota than on daycare services. The reason is that paid
leave expansions can often be directly agreed upon in wage negotia-
tions between unions and employers, whereas development of pub-
licly funded daycare services requires the active participation of the
government from the very beginning, as is also the case with other
welfare state services such as health and old-age (Mares 2003a,b). This
means that regarding daycare, social partners can influence the policy
only indirectly, for example through participation in policy commis-
sions and lobbying.
The role of political parties
Even though the social partners are theorized to play a key role in
the introduction of wfp reforms, we need to understand their influ-
ence in relation to political parties, as well as the parties’ independent
incentives to expand wfps. The power-resource approach has argued
for the importance of social democratic parties for the development
of wfps (Huber and Stephens 2000, 335).19 Yet, recent studies which
19 Although some of the early formulations of the approach, such as Stephens (1979)
and to some extent Korpi (1983), focused on both trade unions and social demo-
cratic parties, later work in this vein has predominantly focused solely on social
democratic parties, also when it comes to explaining the development of wfps (see,
e.g., Ferrarini 2006; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 2006).
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show that social democratic and other left-wing parties have not been
the only or even the main protagonist of wfps have raised doubts
about the approach’s explanatory power (Borchorst 2002; Flecken-
stein and Lee 2012; Häusermann 2006; Hieda 2013; Morgan 2006,
2013; Wiliarty 2010). In their insightful studies, Morgan (2013) and
Fleckenstein and Lee (2012) instead underscore issue entrepreneur-
ship party competition over employed women’s votes as a key ex-
planatory factor across different types of political and labor mar-
ket regimes.20 Whereas Fleckenstein and Lee (2012) remain vague
as to which mechanisms produce party competition, Morgan (2013)
lucidly shows that as parties were faced with declining traditional
constituencies, such as male industrial workers in the case of left-
wing parties, they started to appeal to women by increasing women’s
representation within parties and modifying their policy stances. A
pr electoral system here makes it simpler for parties to increase
women’s representation than in plurality systems (Morgan 2013, 85;
Wangnerud 2009). Women within the parties are then again crucial for
pushing parties to instigate wfp reforms, often against strong internal
opposition from the traditional party elite (see also Wiliarty 2010; Hin-
nfors 1992). This persuasive argument can be seen as complementary
to this study’s emphasis on social partners in that it highlights how
women pushed for wfps also within parties.
Neither Morgan (2013) nor Fleckenstein and Lee (2012), however,
discuss the differences between wfps. Yet I expect that daycare ser-
vices bring out a stronger left-right divide, as well as internal party
opposition, than paid parental leave. Paid parental leave implies that
parents can spend more time at home with their newborn before they
return to work. Although paid leave, which depends on employment
prior to birth, is directed toward working mothers, it is simpler to
square with conservative and Christian Democratic parties’ accentu-
20 On issue entrepreneurship, see, e.g., De Vries and Hobolt 2012.
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ation of mothers as main caregivers and the family as the core unit
of society than daycare.21 As paid parental leave additionally does
not require an expansion of the publicly-funded or -provided service
sector, it is more straightforward for the right-wing constituencies
to accept the expansion of leave. Turning to daycare, highly edu-
cated women demand daycare services more than those with low
education (Skorge 2016). As many highly educated women are low-
and medium- income earners and can only to a limited extent af-
ford to buy daycare off the private market, the expansion of afford-
able, full-time daycare will have a redistributive effect (Havnes and
Mogstad 2011b). If governments moreover expand daycare to cover
most of children under school age, then it may become increasingly
redistributive, as children with parents from all backgrounds will at-
tend daycare. Taking these aspects into account, I expect to see less of
a left-right divide over paid parental leave than over daycare reforms
and the fathers’ quota.
3.2 expansion of work-family policies over the past
five decades
3.2.1 A multi-method empirical strategy
To test the hypotheses set forth in the previous section in par-
ticular, whether the reversal of the gender gap is associated with
wfp expansion foremost in the countries with the highest levels of
corporatism I will use several pieces of evidence.
First, in this section, I use data on daycare services, paid parental
leave, the gender gap in higher education, and corporatism for 18 ad-
21 Note that this does not hold for the fathers’ quota policy, which reserves a part of
the leave for fathers, thus reducing working mothers’ time at home with the child.
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vanced economies from 1960 to 2010.22 I use time-series cross-section
regression techniques to analyze these data, with the aim to uncover
whether the aforementioned association is present for the whole time
period and all countries of interest. The analysis will allow me to cap-
ture the broad, structural changes in education, as well as being able
to control for competing explanations.
Second, in Section 3.3, I conduct a detailed case study of Norway
to investigate the mechanisms of the argument that the cross-national
analysis cannot address. To support the argument, the case study
should reveal (i) that the social partners come to favor wfps as women
outnumber men in higher education and as women rise within the
unions; (ii) that the organizations used their policy influence to push
for reforms; and (iii) that also women within the parties played an
important part in wfp reforms (Bennett and Checkel 2013).
In research combining a large-n analysis with a case study, Lieber-
man (2005) recommends choosing a case that is well-explained by the
theory (see also Gerring 2007, 58-60). Norway is therefore particularly
suitable for an in-depth study, since it (1) went from having limited
to having generous wfps, which gives me copious temporal variation,
and (2) has a centralized corporatist system, which makes it possible
see whether the social partners have exerted influence on the wfp de-
velopment. Using a range of sources, the case study traces the role of
the social partners and political parties in all major parental leave and
daycare reforms since the 1960s. Finally, in Appendix B.1.1, I also con-
duct brief case studies of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom to show that evidence from other countries with different
levels of corporatism are also consistent with my argument. The case
studies hence seeks to demonstrate that cross-country statistical re-
sults match up with process-tracing evidence (Lieberman 2005).
22 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom United States.
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3.2.2 Measurement and initial evidence
The main independent variables are the gender gap in higher educa-
tion and corporatism. To measure the gender gap in higher education, I
use the same data as in Figure 3.123 and take the gross enrollment of
men in tertiary education and subtract the enrollment of women.24 I
use enrollment data instead of, for instance, female labor force par-
ticipation data as the former better captures the changing incentives
of both employers and unions. Next, I have argued that the level of
corporatism i.e., institutionalized bargaining and participation in pol-
icymaking among highly centralized and encompassing trade union
and employer federations determine to what extent employers and
unions are able to push for expansion of wfps in the face of a rever-
sal of the gender gap in higher education. I use Martin and Swank’s
(2012) measure of corporatism, as it accurately matches my concep-
tualization spelled out in Section 3.1. It is a standard-score index of
the combination of employers’ organization, trade unions’ organiza-
tion, and the level of collective bargaining. Employers’ organization
is an index of the existence of a national employers’ federation, its
conflict funds and appointment and veto power, and the integration
of employers in policymaking. Trade unions’ organization is an index
of the peak organizations’ association power, as for employers’ asso-
ciations, their integration into policymaking, and union density. The
variable thus captures both the centralization and the integration into
23 To get a complete time-series that stretches back to 1960, I have complemented the
data with an equal measure from Barro and Lee (2015). To avoid gaps in the time
series, I have linearly interpolated between the few missing values that existed in
the combined data set. The results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar
if I do not interpolate.
24 Although this measure does not directly capture the share of the population or the
cohort that attends higher education, the gender gap is highly correlated with the
expansion of higher education, with r = .8 (p < .001, N = 18) for a 2010 cross section
and r = .84 (p < .001, N = 779) across the whole sample. In Appendix B.1.7, I show
that the results hold if I replace the gender gap in enrollment measure with women’s
enrollment in higher education.
3.2 expansion of work-family policies 115
policymaking of employers and unions, and it varies over time (for
further details, see Martin and Swank 2012, 132-4, 140).25
I analyze both daycare services and parental leave. Unfortunately,
for daycare, there are no reliable time-series cross-section data avail-
able to measure to what extent full-time daycare services are avail-
able.26 The oecd, however, has data for thirteen European countries in
2013, and these data provide both the daycare coverage i.e., the per-
centage of the population aged 0-2 that attend formal daycare and
the average hours of attendance per week. Together, these two vari-
ables capture the extent to which daycare services are available as
a care option for parents in full-time work. Figure 3.3 plots the av-
erage hours attended (x-axis) against the coverage rate (y-axis). The
upper-right quadrant shows the countries that have high coverage
and full-time care. The size of the points in the figure shows that
the gender gap in higher education in favor of women typically is
higher in this quadrant than in the other ones. The countries in the
upper-right quadrant also have high levels of corporatism, with the
exception of France (Martin and Swank 2012). Moreover, if we col-
lapse these two dimensions of daycare services into one summary
measure by creating the full-time equivalent (fte) coverage rate,27 the
correlation between the gender gap in higher education and the fte
coverage rate is notable and statistically significant.28 Although these
25 Figure B.1.5 in the appendix plots the corporatism scores for the eighteen countries
in the 2000s. The measure has been extended from 2002 to 2010.
26 The oecd’s data on daycare spending from 1980 to 2014 changes definition in 1998
and thus has a clear break (personal correspondence with the oecd). Moreover, for
a number of countries the data before 1998 is also missing. The spending data can
therefore not be used. Daycare coverage data are unavailable before the 2000s, with
the exception of the Nordic countries, and even after 2000 we do not know the
average hours attended per week, which is crucial for gauging the generosity of the
daycare service regime.
27 This is defined as the coverage rate weighted by the average share of a full-time
week attended. Full time is defined as attendance for 30 hours or more per week. In
other words, the fte rate is calculated as fte = c · (h¯/30), with c being the coverage
rate and h¯ being the average weekly hours in formal childcare.
28 r = .56 (p = .047, N = 13)
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figure 3.3. Daycare coverage, average weekly daycare attendance, and
the gender gap in higher education across thirteen European
countries in 2013.
Notes: See the text for definitions of the daycare variables. See
Figure 3.1 for the definition of enrollment in higher education.
Sources: OECD (2012a); UNESCO (2012); Svensson et al. (2012).
results are suggestive, it is the pattern that the theoretical framework
would lead us to expect.
For parental leave, however, I can analyze the full 50-year period
for all 18 countries, which enables a more rigorous analysis. Parental
leave generosity is measured as number of weeks leave weighted by
the wage replacement rate.29 For instance, if parental leave is available
for 20 weeks with a benefit equal to 75 percent of the average wage,
then parental leave generosity is 15 that is, the equivalent number
of weeks with a 100 percent replacement rate, or “the full-pay equiv-
alent” (fpe) number of weeks of leave. The data comes from a variety
29 For a similar operationalization, see Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012), Ferragina,
Seeleib-Kaiser, and Tomlinson (2012), Nelson and Stephens (2013b), Ruhm (1998),
and Tanaka (2005). Leave is, in other words, calculated as: leave = n · r), where n is
the number of weeks leave and r is the replacement rate calculated as the benefit’s
share of average gross female wages in manufacturing.
3.2 expansion of work-family policies 117
of sources and are detailed in Appendix B.1.2.30 I expect that there is
a positive association between the gender gap and parental at high
but not low levels of corporatism.
To test this hypothesis, I turn to a series of time-series cross-section
regressions. To account for commons shocks, country-specific factors,
and alternative explanations, and thereby give a more precise esti-
mate of the size of the association between leave and the gender gap
for different levels of corporatism, I use the following country- and
year-fixed effects model:
leavei,t = γ1 ggi,t−1 + γ2 corpi,t−1 + γ3(ggi,t−1 · corpi,t−1)
+ X′i,t−1β+ ηi + δt + ε it.
(3.1)
I am interested in how the association between leave and the gender
gap (denoted as gg) depends on the level of corporatism (corp). The
model therefore includes a multiplicative interaction term, gg · corp,
between these two variables.31 To enhance the interpretation of the in-
teraction, I center both the gender gap and the corporatism variables
at one standard deviation above their respective means. The advan-
tage of this strategy is that it permits the direct interpretation of γ1
and γ2 and their standard errors, of course without altering the esti-
mated associations. γ1 can thus be interpreted as the estimated partial
association between the gender gap and paid leave when corporatism
is held constant at one standard deviation above the mean.
To account for year-specific common shocks and time-invariant, un-
observed country factors that may influence the relationship between
the gender gap and leave, I include year and country fixed effects,
30 Figure B.1.6 in Appendix B.1.2 shows the correlation between the change in leave
generosity and in the gender gap in higher education between 1960 and 2010 for
countries with a high and low corporatism score, respectively.
31 The associated increase in paid leave of a unit increase in the gender gap is then
given by γ1 + (γ3 · corp), which means that the effect is conditional on the level
of corporatism. The association between corporatism and paid leave is, correspond-
ingly, dependent on the gender gap: γ2 + (γ3 · gap).
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denoted δt and ηi, respectively. The model is estimated by ols with
robust standard errors clustered by country to account for serial cor-
relation within clusters (Angrist and Pischke 2009a, 318-9).
X′it is a vector of covariates that vary over time and that could po-
tentially confound the association between the gender gap and leave.
First and as I discussed above, convincing research by Morgan (2013)
and others show that women within parties have played a key role
in expanding wfps. To test this explanation and to control for the
explanation that the effect of the gender gap runs through highly
educated women entering parliament I include the percentage of
seats in the parliament held by women. Further details, summary
statistics, and sources for these and the other covariates are given
in Appendix B.1.2. Second, I include variables capturing the govern-
ment’s partisanship. To capture the difference between having a right
and a center or left government, I include two variables: left cabinet
and center cabinet. By including these two variables, I compare them
to right governments, as the left, right, and center variables together
sum up to 100 percent. Third, the unemployment rate and the log of gdp
per capita are added to account for the fact that economic crises may
constrain the possibilities of governments to expand wfps. As gdp
per capita is seen as the key source of post-materialistic values, it also
controls for such values (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003). Likewise,
the unemployment variable additionally controls for the fact that low
unemployment and labor shortages may give an incentive to try to
increase female labor force participation by expanding wfps (Huber
and Stephens 2000). Fourth, I add a measure of the share of the pop-
ulation over 65 years. The older the population, the more dire it may
be to increase fertility rates by way of providing more generous wfps
(Pierson 2001a,b).
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table 3.2. Regression results for the provision of leave schemes, 18 OECD
countries, 1960-2010
Dependent variable: parental leave
Basic Basic Covars. Covars.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender gap (gg) 0.15 0.41∗∗ 0.16 0.38∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Corporatism 2.02 4.08∗ 1.31 2.96
(2.79) (2.3) (2.07) (1.95)
gg × corp. 0.24∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
F(γ1=γ2=γ3=0) 0.3 3.89
∗∗∗ 0.88 3.11∗∗
Observations 890 890 890 890
Countries 18 18 18 18
Country FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Covariates X X X X
Adj. R2 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.86
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). OLS fixed effects regres-
sions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All indepen-
dent variables are lagged by one year. See the text and Appendix B.1.2 for details on
the variables.
3.2.3 Evidence from eighteen advanced democracies, 1960-2010
The estimated regression coefficients for Equation 3.1 are presented
in Table 3.2. Model 1 gives the results without the interaction and
covariates, Model 2 adds the interaction between corporatism and
the gender gap, Model 3 includes the covariates but not the inter-
action, and Model 4 gives the results with the interaction and the
covariates.32 In Models 1 and 3, without the interaction, there is no
statistically significant relationship between respectively the gender
gap and corporatism, and leave expansion. In Models 2 and 4, where
I include the interaction term, the F-test shows that the three terms
are jointly significant.33 In line with my argument, this result indi-
32 The results for the covariates and from testing alternative specifications are given in
Table B.1.3 in Appendix B.1.7.
33 For the interaction to be significant, I need to reject the null of the F-test (Kam
and Franzese 2007). It tests whether the null hypothesis that the three terms for the
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figure 3.4. The conditional effect of the gender gap and corporatism on
parental leave expansion
Notes: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). The pre-
dicted change in parental leave from a two standard deviations change
in the gender gap in favor of women, holding corporatism constant at
one standard deviation below and above the mean. The predictions are
based on Model 4 in Table 3.2.
cates that there is significant interaction between the gender gap and
corporatism.
In order to gauge the direction and magnitude of these associations,
I use the results from Model 4 to simulate the expected expansion of
leave in the face of a shift in the gender gap in favor of women at
high and low levels of corporatism, respectively.34 The results are il-
lustrated in Figure 3.4. The figure displays the predicted increase in
fully-paid weeks of parental leave from a change of two standard de-
viations in the gender gap, or 24.1 percentage points. This amounts
to about the change in the gender gap in, for instance, the United
Kingdom and Denmark between 1985 and 2005.35 In a corporatist set-
ting, such an increase should result in employers and unions using
their policy influence to push for expansion of paid parental leave.
The upper bar shows the predicted increase in parental leave when
gender gap, corporatism, and their interaction are jointly equal to zero, i.e. γ1 =
γ2 = γ3 = 0.
34 The conditional marginal effects plots in Figure B.1.8 in Appendix B.1.7 shows that
the interpretation of the results remain unchanged if we instead inspect the condi-
tional marginal effects of the gender gap and corporatism over the range of the other
variable (see Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012; Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).
35 In Denmark, women outnumbered men by 1 percentage point in 1985 and by 26 in
2005. In the United Kingdom, the gap went from -4 to 20 percentage points during
the same period.
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corporatism is one standard deviation above the mean level of corpo-
ratism, and the lower bar shows the increase when corporatism is one
standard deviation below the mean. Under corporatism, the change
in the gender gap is correlated with a 9.4-week increase in fully paid
leave, whereas under pluralism the 2.8-week increase is not statisti-
cally significant. This is a notable but plausible association between
the gender gap and parental leave under different degrees of corpo-
ratism. The findings are consistent with the argument that the social
partners react to changes in the gender composition of the skilled
workforce and the union members by pushing for wfp reforms. As I
show in Appendix B.1.7, these results are robust to alternative mea-
sures of parental leave, the gender gap in education, and corporatism,
as well as alternative specifications of the statistical model.
Consistent with Morgan (2013), there is an association between
women in parliament and paid leave, which statistically significant at
the one-percent level (see Table B.1.3 in the appendix). The coefficient
on women in parliament indicates that where women’s share of mps
increases with two standard deviations, or about 24 percentage points,
it is associated with a 9.5-week expansion of fully paid leave. This is
a notable correlation, although it is less consistent across alternative
specifications. Regarding the partisan effects, the results are also in
line with the studies showing parties converging on wfp expansion
to appeal to working women, as there are no discernible partisan ef-
fects. In sum, the cross-country regression estimates document that
both the social partners, in the face of a reversal of the gender gap,
and women’s entrance into politics are associated with paid leave re-
forms.
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3.3 tracing the politics of work-family policies : the
case of norway
The cross-national, quantitative analysis gave support to the my argu-
ment’s prediction that the reversal of the gender gap in higher edu-
cation, combined with corporatist social partners, is associated with
an expansion of wfps. The aim of this section is to use within-case
evidence from Norway to see whether the mechanisms stipulated by
theory find support. First, we should see that the unions and em-
ployers’ expressed preferences shifted from being indifferent to, or
even opposing, wfps to favoring and actively pushing for such poli-
cies. This shift should, moreover, coincide with the rise of women
within unions and the gradual reversal of the gender gap in favor of
women. Second, we should be able to detect that the social partners,
together with women within the main parties, influenced the passing
of wfp legislation, both through corporative channels, such as wage
bargaining, and lobbying.
Today, Norway has generous wfps. Norwegian parents can choose
between 49 weeks of parental leave with a 100 percent replacement
rate or 59 weeks with a 80 percent rate,36 one of the most generous
parental leave programs in the world. At current, the leave is “tripar-
tite”, which means that ten weeks are reserved for each of the par-
ents and are non-transferrable. Mothers have three additional weeks
before childbirth and they must take six of their ten weeks right after
childbirth. The remaining 26 weeks can be split as desired. As for pub-
licly subsidized daycare, 80 percent of one- to two-year-olds and 97
percent of three- to five-year-olds attended daycare centers in 2014. 97
percent of these children attended for more than 32 hours per week.
36 There is a ceiling at six basic amounts (see the note to Figure 3.5 for details on the
basic amount), which is in 2015 was equivalent to about 104 percent of an average
wage.
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figure 3.5. The development of paid maternity, paternity, and shared leave
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1990), Ot.prp. nr. 5 (1987-1988), Ot.prp. nr. 7 (1986-1987), Ot.prp. nr. 7
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figure 3.6. Children in daycare centers in Norway, 1963-2014.
Sources: Gulbrandsen (2007), Norwegian Directorate for Educa-
tion and Training (2016), and Statistics Norway (2016d).
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Full-time daycare is also relatively cheap. For example, a family in
which the parents earned respectively 100 and 50 percent of average
earnings paid eleven percent of their net income in daycare fees in
2012, compared to 34 percent in the United Kingdom (OECD 2012a).
Since 2009 parents have a right to daycare for their children starting
at age one.37
In the early 1970s, however, Norway’s wfps were still limited, as
illustrated in Figure 3.5 for parental leave and Figure 3.6 for daycare.
Paid maternity leave was 12 weeks, with payment typically amount-
ing to a third of previous earnings.38 Only 2.8 percent of children
under school age attended daycare institutions, and only 13.2 per-
cent attended other forms of non-parental childcare (Vollset 2011, 32-
6). Norway thus epitomized the work-family policies found across
advanced democracies at that time. Yet three waves of reforms the
first in the late 1970s, the second from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s,
and the third from the 2000s and onwards introduced considerable
reforms of daycare and paid leave.
Turning to the Norwegian labor market institutions, the country
is characterized by corporatist social partners. Centralized peak level
associations organizing a large share of firms and employees partici-
pate in tripartite collective wage bargaining, with the state as the third
part.39 The social partners participate actively in the development
of social and labor market policies, through wage bargaining agree-
ments, participation in official policy commissions, policy consulta-
tions, joint committees, regular meetings, and lobbying. Additionally,
the Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen, lo), the main
trade union confederation, has close ties with the Norwegian Labour
37 Provided that the child turns one year before September 1 that year.
38 Prior to 1978 benefit levels were not fixed by law and therefore varied by workplace.
39 For a thorough analysis of the development of industrial relations in the Nordic
countries, see Dølvik, Andersen, and Vartiainen 2015; Løken, Stokke, and Ner-
gaard 2013.
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Party, with the lo traditionally having a seat on Labor’s executive
committee and supporting the party with election campaign funds.
Each of the national trade unions affiliated with the lo typically
organizes workers in a specific trade, business branch, or public sec-
tor (Løken, Stokke, and Nergaard 2013, 25). The lo hence organizes
workers that are blue and white-collar, skilled and unskilled, and
employed in the private and the public sector.40 In 2014, the union
density, that is, the percentage unionized among the employed, was
52 percent. On the employers side, the Confederation of Norwegian
Enterprise (nho, Næringslivets hovedorganisasjon) is the main employ-
ers’ association, founded in 1989 as a merger between the Norwe-
gian Employers’ Confederation (Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening, naf) and
two smaller industry and craft organizations (Løken, Stokke, and Ner-
gaard 2013).41 Among employers, the share of private sector workers
employed in an organized enterprise is 67 percent (Nergaard 2016).
As I will show in the three next subsections, which deals with the
three waves of reforms, first unions but later also employers, along
with highly educated women within the political parties, played a key
role in this shift from a male-breadwinner to a dual-earner regime. In
each of the three subsections, I consider the role of the social partners
and then the political parties.
40 In addition to the lo, there are three smaller trade union confederations: the Con-
federation of Vocational Unions (Yrkesorganisasjonenes sentralforbund, ys, founded in
1977), which organizes many of the same sectors as the lo; the Confederation of
Unions for Professionals (Unio, founded in 2001), which organizes teachers, nurses
and some other public sector workers; and the Federation of Norwegian Profes-
sional Associations (Akademikerne, founded 1997), which organizes professions such
as lawyers, engineers, and doctors (Løken, Stokke, and Nergaard 2013).
41 There are also three other smaller employers’ associations: the Enterprise Federation
(Virke, founded 1990), which organizes small firms in trades and services; Spekter
(founded 1993), which organizes state enterprises; and the Norwegian Association of
Local and Regional Authorities (Kommunenes sentralforbund, ks), which is “a national
members’ association for municipalities, counties, and public enterprises under mu-
nicipal or county ownership” (Løken, Stokke, and Nergaard 2013, 31).
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3.3.1 The 1970s: the first minor reforms
The first minor reforms of paid parental leave and daycare services
occurred in the mid 1970s. Concerning paid parental leave, the Stort-
ing in 1977 replaced twelve weeks of maternity leave with eighteen
weeks of parental leave, of which twelve weeks could be shared and
six weeks were reserved for the mother. From 1978, parents had the
right to full replacement of earnings during leave (Vollset 2011, 49).
The leave reforms aimed to improve mother’s and children’s health,
improve educational opportunities, and support dual-earner families
(Leira 1992).
The Storting passed the first daycare act in 1975. The reform led to
an expansion of daycare centers for three- to six-year-old children. Be-
tween 1975 and 1980 daycare coverage for this age group went from
eleven percent in 1975 to 32 percent in 1980, as the grey line in Figure
3.6a display. Even so, it is full-time daycare for children under the age
of three that is most geared toward the needs of dual-earner house-
holds, as it allows parents to return early to the labor market (see also
Morgan 2006). This was not the case with the 1975 reform. First, only
around half of these places were full-time places (see Figure 3.6b). Sec-
ond, for children under the age of three, daycare coverage expanded
slowly, with less than one in ten children in this age group attending
daycare in 1985, ten years after the reform. Third, the reform left it
to the more than 400 democratically elected municipal legislatures to
decide whether they would build new daycare centers or not, leading
to considerable variation in daycare coverage across municipalities
(see Chapter 4 of this thesis). As a wfp reform it was consequently a
small reform more aimed at child development and less at respond-
ing to the needs of working mothers (Leira 1992, 125). These reforms,
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nonetheless, marked the onset of the Norwegian welfare state’s move
toward active support for working mothers.
Starting to shift: the role of the social partners
Trade unions took their first steps in the direction of favoring wfps
during this period. The main trade union confederation, the lo, was
heavily male dominated in the 1960s. During the quadrennial, demo-
cratic lo Conventions in 1961, 1965, and 1969 where the mani-
festo and key policies and strategies were discussed, voted on, and
adopted neither gender questions nor wfps were on the agenda
(LO 1961, 1965, 1969). Women’s issues were left to the Women’s Com-
mittee, which was without any formal powers. By the early 1970s,
however, policies supporting working mothers started to become
an issue of contention within the lo, reflecting changes to the lo’s
membership base (Nergaard, Bråten, and Ødegård 2013, 16, 26). The
growth in education and employment rates among women, and par-
ticularly mothers, entailed rising female union membership rates. The
first woman, Liv Buck, entered the lo leadership in 1971 despite the
resistance from the male lo president, Tor Aspengren. As the black
line in Figure 3.7a exhibits, by 1975 one fourth of the lo’s members
were women, rising from one fifth 10 years earlier. The same year,
the women-dominated Norwegian Union of Municipal Employees re-
placed the male-dominated Norwegian Union of Iron and Metalwork-
ers as the largest union affiliated with lo.
Women within the trade union confederation called for longer
and better paid parental leave, as well as increased availabil-
ity of public daycare centers, to help reconcile work and family
life (Vollset 2011, 45, 48; Nergaard, Bråten, and Ødegård 2013, 78;
Leira 1992, 285-7). At the 1973 Convention, for example, several
prominent women emphasized the need for expansion of daycare ser-
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figure 3.7. Working women’s participation in trade unions in Norway.
Sources: LO (2015), Nergaard (2014, 2016), Nergaard, Bråten, and
Ødegård (2013), Nergaard and Stokke (2006, 2010), and Visser (2011).
vices and paid leave (LO 1973).42 Within the unions there was conse-
quently a movement toward putting wfps on the agenda. That said,
women did not yet constitute a sufficiently important share of the
membership base to force the lo to actively promote wfps beyond
minor reforms.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the naf, the employers’ association,
resisted and was against wfp reforms. In 1963, the employers’ as-
sociation argued that separate and lower average wages for women
should be maintained, since working women generally had short ex-
perience, less stability, and higher rates of absence from the work-
place (Danielsen, Larsen, and Owesen 2013, 317; Bjørnhaug 2010, 119).
By 1975, the naf had dropped this stance but still maintained that
expanding wfps was too costly and other social issues were far more
pressing (Vollset 2011, 45). For example, responding to proposed in-
creases in leave rights and payments, the association noted that “in
our opinion, there exist in our country a number of other tasks in the
social sector which should be prioritized than larger financial com-
42 Lillan Bekkevad, head of the Women’s Committee, for instance called for the lo to
“work for greater understanding in the government concerning measures that can
make it less necessary for working women to be absent from work . . . such as . . .
the building of more daycare centers” (LO 1973, 286).
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figure 3.8. Higher education and gender in Norway, 1970-2015.
Notes: Figure 3.8b gives the percent female students that are enrolled
in a field of study in higher education in a given year. The numbers
in parentheses give the percent of the total student body who are en-
rolled in a given field of study in 2014. Sources: Statistics Norway (2015,
2016c,e).
pensation” (NAF 1975, 38). There was thus little interest, and even
outright opposition, to wfps from the employers’ side.
In light of the framework proposed in this study, the employer as-
sociation’s policy stance makes sense. Figure 3.8a shows that the per-
centage of the population aged 25-39 with a higher education degree
was almost 50 percent higher among men than among women in
1970.43 There were thus few reasons for the employers to care about
the labor supply of high skilled women in the course of the 1970s.
Consensual policymaking: the role of the political parties
As women’s entrance into higher education and employment as-
cended, so did women’s active participation in politics. The percent-
age female representatives in the Storting started to rise in the 1970s,
from about nine percent in the 1960s to 23 percent in 1977, as is il-
lustrated by the grey line in Figure 3.9. The white bars in the figure
display the parties’ percentage of the parliamentary seats, whereas
the grey bars show women’s percentage of seats by party. The figure
43 11 percent of women and 16 percent of men in the age group had a higher education
degree.
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depicts that it was foremost the Labor Party and the Conservatives
that contributed to the increase in female mps in the 1970s. Many of
the incoming female mps, who were younger and with higher edu-
cation, tried to raise gender equality issues on the agenda, including
wfps (Brundtland 2008; Notaker 2012; Skard 2016; Vollset 2011). Some
also had links to the women’s movement.44 There is also evidence that
they cooperated across party lines on gender issues (Skard 2016). As
within trade unions, women mps’ stance on wfps often met strong
internal opposition from dominant male figures within the party
(Brundtland 1998; Danielsen, Larsen, and Owesen 2013; Gjertsen and
Lae 2004; Notaker 2012). The dominant Labor Party, for instance, had
44 The women’s movement itself, however, played a limited role. As Leira (1992, 131)
writes, “[w]omen’s associations were divided on the issue of daycare and mothers’
employment in the mid 1970s.”
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been a strong advocate of a welfare state and tax system favoring
single-earner families throughout the post World War II period, and
many mps still held on to this stance (Danielsen, Larsen, and Owe-
sen 2013, 290; Leira 1992, 69). Consequently, as women were a small
minority in the parliament, and were without strong external support
from the social partners, they could not achieve the expansion of wfps
that they favored.
As neither the parties nor the social partners wanted large-scale re-
forms, the expansions of wfps that were agreed on in the 1970s were
modest and passed unanimously in the Storting. In the parliamentary
debates on the reforms, it was not gender equality and labor short-
ages that became the main locus of the discussion. The leave and
daycare reforms were instead predominantly favored on the grounds
of being beneficial for child development (Leira 1992). Only the small
Socialist Left consistently argued for more radical expansions of wfps
to increase the opportunities of working mothers (Skjeie 1993).45
These reforms marked the beginning of a shift in policy stances
among unions and the political parties. For employers, on the other
hand, the need for highly qualified female labor had yet to emerge. It
is also noteworthy that neither the lo nor the naf were interested in
demanding further wfp expansions in the late 1970s, including that
the two-week leave available to fathers right after childbirth became
paid. As Vollset (2011, 108), a former high-ranking official in the min-
istry in charge of wfps, notes, it “should have been an easy matter
for the lo to promote this as a demand and have it implemented,
if this was something unionized fathers prioritized.” There was, in
other words, still opposition to further wfp expansion, both within
labor market organizations and the political parties.
45 For instance, contrary to the wishes of the Socialist Left and the lo, the bill did
not require municipalities to expand daycare coverage (LO 1981, 256; Leira 1992).
As the costs of the reform would be split between the national government, the
municipalities, and the parents, it left it up to municipalities to decide the rate of
expansion.
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3.3.2 The 1980s and 1990s: significant reforms
The reforms introduced in the 1970s did, however, not suffice for long.
A wave of leave expansions started in the latter half of the 1980s. Be-
tween 1987 and 1993, the total paid parental leave went from 18 to 42
weeks, and four of these weeks came as a fathers’ quota (see the black
bars in Figure 3.5). The reforms transformed Norway from a laggard
to a leader in terms of paid parental leave. Norway also expanded
daycare services during the 1980s and 1990s, though these reforms
were less important than the leave reforms. Among the one- to two-
year-olds, daycare coverage increased notably; nevertheless, four out
of ten children still attended daycare on a part-time basis (see Figure
3.6). Daycare was, moreover, expensive and supply did not equal the
demand for full-time daycare (Gulbrandsen 2007; Vollset 2011). Par-
tially, the daycare expansion was a result of the 1975 Daycare Act,
as well as further prioritization over the national budget, as I will dis-
cuss below. Another important reason was that both the youngest and
the oldest children were taken out of daycare. The leave expansion in
practice removed children younger than one from daycare services,
whereas the 1997 school reform, which lowered the entrance age from
seven to six years, pulled out a whole age group from daycare centers.
These reforms freed up daycare places for one- to five-year-old chil-
dren. A considerable share of the daycare expansion of the 1980s and
1990s hence came as a by-product of other policy reforms (Ellingsæter
and Gulbrandsen 2003, 34).
Reforming work-family policies: the role of unions and employers
In Sweden, the social partners played a essential role in expanding
daycare services from the 1960s and onwards, as female union mem-
bership, skill levels, and employment surged earlier than in Norway
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(see Appendix B.1.1). In Norway, the social partners turned around
and started pushing for wfps from the 1980s and onwards, with
unions first shifting their stance and later also the employers.
Women’s share of unionized workers continued to increase
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of deindustrialization
and growth in service sector employment (Nergaard, Bråten, and
Ødegård 2013). Whereas 25 percent of lo members were women in
1980, the percentage was 35 by 1985 and 44 by the late 1990s.46 Dur-
ing the 1980s, the lo faced competition over members from ys, which
was established in 1977 as a contender to the lo. In the ys, the share
of women was even higher than in the lo (see Figure 3.7a).
Women within the trade unions continued to push for better avail-
ability of much demanded leave and daycare services, and ultimately
succeeded in raising the issue to the top of the agenda. During the lo
Conventions in the 1980s and early 1990s, gender equality became a
key issue despite opposition from the male-dominated unions affil-
iated with the lo (Nergaard, Bråten, and Ødegård 2013, 16-17, 26, 30).
In 1981, the lo Convention had gender issues as a central topic, and
by the late 1980s “the growth in the women’s share [of lo members]
produced an irresistible weight”, according to a prominent labor his-
torian (Bergh 2009, 61, 192). Moreover, Esther Kolstøl became the lo’s
first female vice president in 1989, and she contributed to further pro-
mote the focus on women’s issues within the confederation. In short,
women grew into a powerful group in the labor movement.
During this period, the lo completed a u-turn concerning wfps, and
became willing to use its political influence to push for reforms. In the
1980s, the confederation was dissatisfied with the current provision
of wfps. Corresponding directly with the Prime Minister’s Office in
1984, the lo demanded a considerable expansion of employees’ rights
46 Compared to their share of members, however, women were still underrepresented
in leadership position throughout the confederation (Hernes 1987; Nergaard, Bråten,
and Ødegård 2013; Skjeie 1989).
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during childbearing and childrearing. To quote from the letter, the
organization requested that:
• The paid share of the parental leave is being expanded from 18 to 30
weeks.
• 6 weeks are being reserved for mothers in relation to childbirth.
• 20 weeks are being shared between the parents as preferred.
• 4 weeks are being reserved for fathers. . . .
• The father’s right to 2 weeks of care leave in relation to childbirth
must be paid (LO 1984, 1-2).
They argued that there was a “need for an expansion of the [wfp]
provisions if they to a larger extent than today shall contribute to real
equality between women and men in the employment market”, and
that, by “giving a fixed number of weeks reserved for the mother and
the father, both parents’ care duties are being underlined” (LO 1984, 1-
2). The lo secretary Harriet Andreassen, who also sat on Labor’s
central board and had served as a Labor minister in 1981, repeated
this message at the Convention in 1985 (LO 1985).
The union confederation also, from the early 1980s and onwards,
stressed the need for a faster expansion of daycare. At the 1981 Con-
vention, for instance, the lo president and former Minister of So-
cial Affairs under Labor, Tor Halvorsen, called development of more
daycare centers “crucial” for women’s labor market opportunities
(LO 1981, 240). The lo accordingly regularly called for increasing the
pace of the expansion throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The newly
elected lo president in 1988, Yngve Hågensen, was willing to pri-
oritize daycare over pension reforms, which had long been a major
issue to the organization: “the lo drops the demand for a general
reduction of the pension age . . . [which] opens up for demands for
other social reforms such as longer parental leave and more daycare
centers” (NTB 1988a). The other union confederations, as well as the
women’s organization within the Labour Party, seconded these calls
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for increased daycare (Aftenposten 1988; NTB 1988b). Moreover, in
1990 the lo announced that the organization was considering initiat-
ing its own daycare expansion, as it was dissatisfied with the pace
of the expansion (NTB 1990a). At the lo Convention in 1989, Esther
Kostøl, the vice president, made daycare expansion a primary pol-
icy demand from the labor movement (LO 1989). Wfp reforms had
consequently become a top priority for the trade unions.
The employers, fronted by the naf, had opposed extensions of paid
leave during the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, there were signs that
their position started to change. In higher education, women’s en-
rollment rates outpaced that of men, thus closing the gender gap in
higher education among young adults by 1988 (see Figure 3.8a). It
is particularly notable that the largest transformations in higher ed-
ucation’s gender composition took place in the fields that are partic-
ularly valuable to employers relying on high-skilled labor: business
and administration, social science and law, and science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (stem). The percentage of women in
these fields more than doubled during this period, as is depicted by
the black lines in Figure 3.8b, which graphs the percentage of women
in each of the broad fields of higher education.47 The field of busi-
ness and administration, for example, went from having 16 percent fe-
male students in 1980 to 41 percent in 1990. The surge in high-skilled
women, also relative to men, was therefore considerable.
With the increasing number of women with the skills that employ-
ers needed, the naf became more interested in gender issues and
willing to agree to wfp expansions. In response to the Ministry of
Consumer Affairs and Administration’s proposed Action Plan for
Equality from 1980, the employers wrote the following:
a
47 The numbers in parentheses in the figure give the share of students in each of these
fields in 2014.
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The association went on to say that, “a gender equality accord
will have to build on agreements between the social partners”
(NAF 1980, 6). The naf also added an equal status adviser to their
payroll that year. A young, high-profile Conservative, Kaci Kullman
Five who would later become MP (1981-97), deputy leader (1982-8),
Minister of Trade and Shipping (1989-91) and leader of the Conser-
vatives (1991-4) was the first to hold the position. What is more,
in 1982, the naf co-operated with the lo to add a framework agree-
ment on gender equality to the Basic Agreement. The framework re-
quired the social partners to work actively to promote gender equality
(Supplementary Agreement IV) (Aarvig and Erikstad 1989, 47-9). The
framework agreement was a voluntary and contained no promises re-
garding wfps and it had a limited substantial implications; neverthe-
less, it signaled the increasing willingness of employers to promote
and facilitate skilled women’s labor market opportunities.
The changing stances of unions, and to some extent employers,
set in motion wfp reforms. Indeed, the wave of reforms starting
in the 1980s not only were lobbied for by the social partners but
rather arose from their wage settlements (Nergaard, Bråten, and
Ødegård 2013; OECD 1989). Since women were first to become dom-
inant in unions organizing public sector employees, leave was first
expanded through wage negotiations for public employees in the
mid 1980s (Hansen 1991). Moreover, not being content with trying
to lobby the government to expand leave for all employees, as they
did in the 1984-letter to the Prime Minister quoted above, the lo in-
cluded a demand for an increase in paid parental leave from 18 to 30
weeks for all employees in the 1985 wage negotiations. Also the other
union confederations demanded leave expansions (Aftenposten 1985).
In the wage negotiations in the subsequent years, the trade union con-
federations continued to request the government to expand leave for
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all employees through national legislation and the employers were
not hostile to these demands (Dagens Næringsliv 1989). In the words
of Nergaard, Bråten, and Ødegård (2013, 27): “[p]arental leave was
lengthened from 18 weeks in 1986 to 42 weeks in 1993 . . . and the
expansion came as a part of the incomes policy cooperation” (my empha-
sis). Consistent with the argument proposed in this study, unions and
employers’ played a direct and central role in expanding wfps.
Through the corporatist institutions, the naf hence significantly
contributed to bringing about the reforms in the late 1980s. This was,
nonetheless, after pressure from the lo. In the early 1990s, for in-
stance, when further extensions where being discussed, the naf op-
posed this proposal, citing the already generous level of leave. The
reason was not ideological opposition to wfps, but rather that, given
Norway’s difficult economic situation after the bursting of housing
and credit bubbles,48 other government policies, such as investment
in infrastructure, should be prioritized (NTB 1990b). Given that the
number of women with higher education was still increasing from an
initially low level and the gender gap was closing but not yet reversed,
as Figure 3.8a displays, this conditional support from the employers
is what we would expect.
Women rising: the role of the political parties in the reforms
In 1981, ten years of Labour governments ended and the Conserva-
tives took over the cabinet offices, first alone until 1983 and then
together with the Christian Democrats and the Center Party un-
til 1986. Thereafter, Labour ruled (1986-89), then the Conservatives
(1989-90), then Labour (1990-97), and then a coalition of the Christian
Democrats, the Center Party, and the Liberals (1997-2000).
Only after the social partners’ reform initiatives did the political
parties expand wfps, as there were tugs of war within the parties over
48 See Dølvik, Andersen, and Vartiainen 2014.
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whether to prioritize working women. From 1977, when the Storting
extended paid leave to eighteen weeks, until 1985, none of the par-
ties in the Storting, with the exception of the Socialist Left, presented
concrete proposals regarding paid leave (Skjeie 1993, 255). Strikingly,
with the support the Socialist Left, Labour had the majority needed
to pass further wfp reforms between 1973 and 1981, yet did not do
so. The Labour governments in the early 1980s were, in principle,
positive toward extensions of paid leave. Nonetheless, Labour’s 1981
white paper on family policy concluded that “it [is] in the foreseeable
future not possible to fit in these measures [i.e., leave] in the govern-
ment budget” (St. mld. nr. 25 1981-1982, 25). With regard to daycare,
Labour only promised an unspecified “increase” at the beginning
of the 1980s. Consequently, when Labour’s Gro Harlem Brundtland
briefly entered office as Norway’s first female Prime Minister in 1981,
the new government increased the daycare subsidies somewhat but
did not attempt to incentivize further expansion of full-time places or
daycare for the youngest children.
When the minority Conservative government came to power in
1981, it withdrew the white paper on leave, as “it didn’t really con-
tain anything . . . there was not a single concrete proposal there,” the
Conservative political adviser, Erling Lae, later noted (Gjertsen and
Lae 2004, 66). Both the minister in charge of family policy, Astrid
Gjertsen, who belonged to the Feminist Group within the party, and
Prime Minister Kåre Willoch instead wanted a more forward-leaning
white paper though in different ways, it turned out. The vocal
dual-earner wing including Gjertsen and the aforementioned Kaci
Kullman Five wanted to expand leave (Gjertsen and Lae 2004, 70).
The pm, however, together with the Christian Democrats were firmly
against leave reforms. The Christian Democrats had a pivotal posi-
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tion, and accordingly holdup power, in the Storting.49 The deep split
inhibited any substantive new wfp reforms, with the content of the
new white paper becoming a “never-ending tug of war”, as Gjert-
sen later expressed it (Gjertsen and Lae 2004, 66). “It’s evident that I
would’ve liked a further expansion of parental leave”, she also noted,
with Erling Lae, her political adviser, adding that: “[f]rom your [i.e.
Gjertsen’s] side we tried to get the government to accept four weeks,
though. And the Christian Democrats said zero, and then the result
was two” (Gjertsen and Lae 2004, 69). Accordingly, before they lost
power in 1986, the Conservatives had proposed to the Storting to
increase the number of paid leave weeks by two (St. mld. nr. 50 1984-
1985).
The Conservative single-party government (1981-3) also main-
tained Labour’s levels of daycare subsidies, but under the center-right
coalition the state subsidies decreased, again due to opposition from
the Christian Democrats. Before the 1985 budget negotiations, how-
ever, there was a “daycare rebellion” from the dual-earner wing of
the Conservatives, ensuring that daycare subsidies again increased
slightly (Gjertsen and Lae 2004, 73). The dual-earner wing also man-
aged to get the Conservative Party Convention to promise 26 weeks
of paid leave in their 1985 election manifesto, as well as further day-
care expansion (Notaker 2012, 138-9).
The Conservatives were not the only ones to promise expansion
of wfps to appeal to working women. As Figure 3.9 portray, the
number of female mps increased throughout the 1980s, and women
gained foothold in all parties. As a result, and in line with the lo’s
wishes, Labour also promised in the 1985 election campaign to make
it mandatory for municipalities to provide daycare. The party also
49 Although the Christian Democrats only had 9.7 percent of the seats in the 1981-5
Storting, they had 17.6 percent of the Banzhaf voting power, which shows that their
decisiveness for securing a parliamentary majority greatly outweighed their share of
the seats. See Appendix B.1.8 for further details on the seat shares and the calculation
of the Banzhaf power index.
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promised 30 weeks of paid leave with the aim of 52 weeks in the long
run.50 Yet, as we saw above, leave expansion was by then already
well underway in the corporative system. Parties’ promises for leave
expansions thus crucially came after the social partners had started to
expand leave and started to push for national legislation on the issue.
The center-right government lost a vote of confidence in 1986, and a
minority Labour government headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland took
office. After the 1985 election Christian Democrats’ holdup power in
parliament had been significantly reduced, despite increasing their
parliamentary seat share (see Figure B.1.9 in Appendix B.1.8 for fur-
ther documentation).51 With the Labor Party in government and a
majority in the Conservative Party in favor of leave expansions, the
scene was thus set.
Importantly, whereas about four out of a total of seventeen minis-
ters in the 1973-1986 governments were women, 44.5 percent of the
ministers in the Brundtland II government were women.52 In the Con-
servative Party, young, highly-educated women with close links to
the employers’ association were the driving force behind the change
the Conservatives’ shift toward favoring wfps, as discussed above. A
similar but stronger pattern is found in the Labour Party. Of the fe-
male ministers in Brundtland II, seven out of eight had a higher edu-
cation degree, and their average age was 43, compared to 51 among
the male ministers in the same government. Women were thus no
longer a small minority in government or parliament. From this gov-
ernment on, all cabinets have had at least 39 percent female ministers.
The pressure from the social partners, and women’s increased pres-
ence in powerful political positions, lead to wfp reforms. Both the
50 The Socialist Left promised 52 weeks, and also the other parties mentioned leave in
their 1985 manifestoes.
51 They had also started to favor parental leave, although only if benefits for home-
staying mothers were expanded at an equivalent rate.
52 See Figure B.1.10 in the appendix for an overview the percentage female ministers
in all post-World War II governments.
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Brundtland governments (1986-9 and 1990-6) and the non-socialist
coalition government (1989-90) expanded leave, which together gave
a massive increase in leave, from 18 weeks before 1987 to 42 weeks in
1993, as depicted in Figure 3.5 (Vollset 2011, 188; Brundtland 1998).53
One of the aims of the leave expansion was to make it possible for
fathers to take more of it. Yet that did not happen; mothers took more
or less all the leave. An official commission on men’s roles (1986-1990)
therefore supported the lo’s demand for a fathers’ quota. Before the
1993 incomes settlement the union confederation once again repeated
its fathers’ quota request, and the government signaled that it was
willing to consider the measure (Lekang 2007). The policy proposal
spurred left-right divisions, with the Conservatives and the Progress
Party arguing that it infringed on parents’ freedom of choice in their
care arrangements. The Labor government, however, with the support
of the remaining parties in the parliament, reserved four weeks of the
49-week long leave for fathers in 1993, arguing that it would increase
gender equality at home and in the workplace (Håland 2005).
Finally, daycare services also saw an upswing in the latter half
of the decade. In 1988, the Storting stepped up its commitment
to expanding daycare, again coinciding with pressure from trade
unions (see the previous subsection). The Labour government pro-
posed a national plan for daycare expansion, which aimed at increas-
ing state subsidies so that full coverage was to be reached by year
2000 (Skjeie 1993). Yet the government refrained from requiring mu-
nicipalities to expand daycare services and did not intend to reduce
the price for parents (Vollset 2011, 157). Coverage was also predom-
inantly expanded through “family daycare centers”, in which up to
four children could be minded by a daycare assistant in a private
home (Vollset 2011, 179-80). The reform was, in other words, a lim-
53 Note that, due to a housing and credit crisis, unemployment rates surged from 2-3
percent before 1988 to almost 7 percent in 1993. Thus, wfps were expanded despite
difficult economic times.
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ited one. It passed without much debate, as the growth in daycare
subsidies was favored by a large majority of parties. The main parties
had consequently converged on increased daycare provision.54 The
steady daycare expansion continued without much conflict during
the Labour governments of the 1990s.
Despite the disagreements over the fathers’ quota, this wave of
reforms was consequently characterized by a left-right convergence
between Labor and the Conservatives (Hagen and Hippe 1989; Hå-
land 2005; Skjeie 1993). Crucially for the argument proposed in this
study, the reforms were initiated in close dialogue with the social
partners. “We proceeded systematically and gradually in cooperation
with the labor movement”, Prime Minister Brundtland later recalled
(Brundtland 1998, 436; see also Brundtland 2008).
There are additionally indications that female politicians con-
tributed to the wfp expansion. In her in-depth interviews and sur-
veys of 146 out of 157 mps in 1989, Skjeie (1993) found that among
the issues for which the mps deemed that “women’s increased partic-
ipation had contributed towards change in party viewpoints” 35
percent of the responses fell into the work-family policy category
(Skjeie 1993, 242-3). Interestingly, the mps themselves judged that the
increase in women’s representation had been more important for day-
care expansion than parental leave. In accordance with the perspec-
tive proposed in this study, party politics thus seemed to play a larger
role with regards to daycare than to leave and the other way around
for the social partners.
54 The exception was the Progress Party, as well as to some extent the Christian
Democrats. The Socialist Left proposed an alternative, more extensive reform, which
was voted down by the other parties in the Storting.
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3.3.3 The 2000s: further large reforms
Women’s entrance into higher education continued, and it was evi-
dent that the wfp provision did not meet the needs and demands of
dual-earner families at the turn of the millennium.55 Paid leave was
42 weeks, with four weeks reserved for the father. All the same, it be-
came clear that fathers took little more than the four weeks reserved
for them. In 2001, only 13.5 percent of the 85 percent of fathers who
took leave, took more than four weeks (St. mld. nr. 29 2002-2003, 38).
From 2005 to 2013, paid leave was expanded to 49 weeks. Fourteen of
these were reserved for the father, seventeen for the mother (three of
them pre birth), and eighteen that could be split as they wished (see
Figure 3.5 above). In 2014, the total leave was kept constant while the
fathers and mothers’ quotas were each reduced by four weeks, giving
26 weeks of shared leave.
Daycare services were also subject to large-scale reforms in the
2000s. Yet, before these reforms occurred, there were setbacks in
terms of coverage. First, the center coalition in office from 1997 to
2000 introduced a cash-for-care scheme in 1998, which gave parents
with one- and two-year-old children who did not attend publicly sub-
sidized daycare the right to a cash benefit of 3,000 nok per month,
or about one tenth of an average wage in 1998. It was provided irre-
spective of labor market status. Second, despite the promises of full
daycare coverage by 2000, only 37 percent of one- and two-year-old
children attended daycare that year, and merely 66 percent of these
attended daycare for 33 hours or more per week (see Figure 3.6).56
55 Since the late 1990s, the increase in women’s labor market participation rate has
stagnated at about 69 percent, compared to around 76 for men (see Figure B.1.11).
56 Among the three- to five-year-olds, daycare coverage was 78 percent in 2000 but only
62 percent attended daycare for 33 hours or more per week.
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Importantly, the demand for daycare places for the youngest children
was far greater than the number of places available.57
In 2002, however, the opposition forced the center-right minority
coalition to introduce a large daycare reform, which was further en-
larged by the center-left majority coalition in office from 2005. The
reforms increased government subsidies with 230 percent between
2002 and 2008 and reduced the parental fees with an average of 32
percent. By 2014, 80 percent of children aged 1-2 went to daycare
centers and 96 percent of these attended for 33 hours or more per
week.58 In 2009, the government additionally introduced the right to
daycare from the age of one.59 The reform, in other words, installed
a full-time, affordable daycare regime for all children under school
age. Chapter 4 of this thesis analyzes the consequences of the reform
for mothers’ possibility of entering into occupations requiring long
hours and leadership positions.
The social partners pushing for further reforms
By 2000, women made up 45 percent of the lo members, and by 2010
they were in the majority.60 In 2001, the lo elected its first female
president, Gerd-Liv Valla, a former Minister of Justice. Valla was also
the first lo leader with higher education and who came from the
public sector. As such, she epitomized the lo’s turnaround on gender
issues, from a male confederation favoring male-breadwinner policies
to a gender-mixed confederation favoring wfps.
57 In 2002, 70 percent of parents with one- or two-year-olds would like to use day-
care services, either full time or combined with other arrangements, when asked to
disregard parental fees and hours and place availability (my calculations from the
representative Child Care Survey, Barnetilsynsundersøkelsen, conducted by Statistics
Norway in 2002).
58 96 percent of children aged 3-5 went to daycare and 98 percent of these attended for
33 hours or more per week.
59 Provided that the child was one-year-old before September 1 in the given year.
60 The proportion female members was also sizable in the other union confederation
(see Figure 3.7a).
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That the trade unions were not content with the level or design of
wfps, was especially evident from the late 1990s and onwards. The
organization called for the price of daycare to be reduced “while si-
multaneously demanding full daycare coverage with opening hours
that are better adapted to the needs of businesses”, as Esther Kostøl,
the lo’s vice president, put it in 1996 (quoted in NTB 1996). The lo
teamed up with Labour in their ardent opposition to the center gov-
ernment’s 1998 cash-for-care reform, and commissioned a report for
alternative use of the public funds spent on the cash-for-care scheme.
The lo president, Yngve Hågensen, noted that “the cash-for-care re-
form . . . is at the expanse of daycare and a forward-looking gen-
der equality policy” (LO 2001, 72). Full daycare coverage hence re-
mained a top priority for the trade unions (Nergaard, Bråten, and
Ødegård 2013). The lo hence supported the major daycare compro-
mise reached among the opposition parties in 2002 but were not con-
tent with the size of the reform. At the 2005 lo Convention Valla
asserted that “more daycare slots is of outmost importance to pre-
vent that more women choose the dangerous, but simple, path back
to the kitchen counter, whose name is the cash-for-care scheme. All
children shall have a right by law to a place in the daycare center”
(LO 2005, 25). The daycare reforms had thus been long in demand
from the lo.
The unions also pushed for further leave reforms. In 2000, the social
partners used the wage negotiations to agree that employees would
get seniority while on parental leave. In 2001, the lo Convention de-
manded further expansion of parental leave and particularly the fa-
thers’ quota (Dagbladet 2001). President Valla was definite about this
demand, stating that “[w]e need to create gender equality both at
home and in the workplace to achieve true gender equality. We want
to expand the fathers’ quota” (transcribed in LO 2001, 139). She also
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called “an expansion of the fathers’ quota the most important mea-
sure for increased gender equality” (quoted in NTB 2003).
In these efforts, the unions were increasingly joined by the nho, as
women continued to outpace men in higher education enrollment. By
2000, 35 percent of women aged 25-39 had a higher education degree,
compared to 28 percent of men. By 2010, the same numbers were 45
percent and 30 percent, respectively that is, a fifteen percent gap in
favor of women (see Figure 3.8 above). With this change, which made
highly educated women the key source of labor supply, employers
became increasingly vocal about new wfp reforms in the course of
the 2000s.
The nho had been against the idea of a fathers’ quota in 1993. See-
ing the effects of the 1993 expansion, however, they later admitted
that the effects of the reform had been advantageous for inducing
men to take more of the leave. “These are well spent money”, nho
Director Olav Magnussen said in 1997 (quoted in Aftenposten 1997).
The employers furthermore expressed their concern about the 1998
cash-for-care reform’s impact on women’s labor supply. Director Mag-
nussen warned that “if it has already started to burn, it doesn’t take
much before it all bursts into flames”, referring to the projected re-
duction in women’s labor supply as a result of the reform (quoted in
Dagens Næringsliv 1998). The employers’ confederation stated that
they would instead like to see men taking more of the leave (Dag-
bladet 2001). By 2003, the nho was accordingly demanding an expan-
sion of the fathers’ quota without increasing the total leave period
(Dagens Næringsliv 2003).
Concerning daycare, the nho in 2001 indicated that it was prob-
lematic for businesses that families with young children avoided
moving to municipalities with low availability of daycare centers
(Orheim 2001). The employers thus favored the 2002 daycare reforms
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but was worried about the increased government spending that re-
sulted from the reform. Summarized, by the early 2000s, both em-
ployers and unions agreed that new wfp reforms were required to
improve gender equality in the workplace.
The center-right government expanded the fathers’ quota and the
leave by one week in 2005 and the red-green government in office
from 2005 did the same in 2006. The unions and employers in unison,
however, held out for the need for a “tripartite” leave, whereby the
paid leave would be split in three equally long parts one for each
of the parents and one that could be shared between them as they
deemed. As Rita Lekang, the lo secretary, wrote in an op-ed directed
at the government in 2007:
The government has announced a white paper on men and
men’s roles. The distribution of parental leave should have a
central role in this document. The lo is of the opinion that:
• The mother should have the right to the first 16 weeks
after birth.
• The father should have half of the remaining weeks, while
the rest of the leave can be split as the mother and father
agree (Lekang 2007).
The social partners received additional support from the
government-appointed Commission on Equal Pay in 2008, which
made tripartite leave one of their key proposal for a more gender
equal labor market.61 nho backed the commission: “[a] tripartition
of the parental leave may cause women to return quicker to the
workplace. This is a good measure for equalizing pay”, nho director
Sigrun Vågeng argued (quoted in Dagens Næringsliv 2008). The lo
61 The commission consisted of professorial researchers and was headed by former
Center Party leader Anne Enger. The commission had a reference group consisting
of representatives from all the major social partners.
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echoed the employers’ statements.62 The social partners were jointly
calling for a tripartite paid leave.
The 2009 general election gave the red-green coalition four more
years in government and they had pledged to expand both the fa-
thers’ quota and the total length of leave. In 2009 the leave was hence
extended from 44 to 46 weeks and the fathers’ quota from six to ten
weeks. The social partners, however, still pressed for a fully tripar-
tite leave. In the lo-nho 2010-2013 Basic Agreement they therefore
agreed to prioritize to push for change in the leave scheme, arguing
that “it is important to see the connection between working life and
family life and to ensure a better distribution of parental leave be-
tween the parents” (LO & NHO 2010, Supplementary Agreement II;
NTB 2009). The social partners were partnering wfp change.
Both unions and employers have also defended the daycare reforms
and have later demanded further improvements of daycare. The Di-
rector General of the nho, John G. Bernander, wrote in 2010 that
“daycare centers and the government should receive credit for having
achieved full daycare coverage. It gives more people the opportunity
to participate in the labor market and is important both for parents
and businesses” (Nettavisen 2010). Abelia, the nho-affiliated employ-
ers’ association for knowledge- and technology-based companies, em-
phasized daycare services as a competitive advantage for Norwegian
businesses (Dagsavisen 2010). What is more, in 2013, the nho voiced
that they would like to see compulsory and free daycare for five-year-
olds. “The nho is interested in this because Norwegian business are
dependent on skilled labor. The educational system is the economy’s
most important supplier”, argued Kristin Skogen Lund, the first fe-
male nho Director General, appointed in 2012 (NHO n.d.). Most re-
cently, the social partners have also called for more frequent daycare
62 The lo went further with respect to the length of the leave, demanding 52 weeks of
paid leave and increased wage ceiling for the benefits.
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admissions, so that children born after September 1 do not have to
wait until the year after to start in daycare, which is the case today
(Aftenposten 2016).
In sum, the social partners have become close partners in push-
ing for wfp reforms during the 2000s. Skogen Lund characterized
parental leave, the fathers’ quota, and full daycare coverage as “mile-
stones in the development of equality between women and men in
the Norwegian economy” (quoted in Halrynjo and Teigen 2016, 314).
And in a joint op-ed the lo and nho highlighted the combination of
fathers’ quota and full coverage of affordable daycare as “unique” for
both Norwegian workers and employers (LO & NHO 2014).
Giving in to the pressure: the politics of the reforms
After the election in 1997, Labor had to cede government control to
a center coalition consisting of the Christian Democrats, the Center
Party, and the Liberals. All parties in the new government expressed
their support for the existing levels of paid parental leave, the fathers’
quota, and continuing the expansion of daycare services. “The goal of
full daycare coverage by year 2000 remains set. The government will
continue the gender equality foundation in family policy”, the Min-
ister of Children and Family Affairs, Valgerd Haugland reassured
in 1998 (Haugland 1998). Simultaneously, however, the government
joined forces with the Conservatives to instigate a cash-for-care re-
form. As we saw above, the reform met fierce resistance from the
social partners. Labor and the Socialist Left also ardently opposed
the introduction; though, they did not have the votes needed in par-
liament to stop the reform. There were thus still left-right divisions
regarding whether the state should provide benefits also for home-
staying women.
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After a brief one-year spell with a minority Labour government
in 2000 to 2001, the Christian Democrats re-entered the government,
this time in a minority coalition with the Conservatives and the Lib-
erals. Despite the pressure from the social partners, and a situation
where demand for daycare greatly exceeded the supply, the govern-
ment showed no sign of further expanding daycare services. In a sur-
prising move, however, the opposition parties from the Socialist Left
via Labour to the Progress Party reached out to each and other and
came to a daycare agreement in the Storting in 2002. The opposition,
in other words, forced the government to come up with a proposal
and allocate the necessary funds to expand daycare. Women within
these parties, combined with pressure from the social partners, and
the wish to steal female voters from the incumbent government were
important factors leading to the reform. To try to appear less hostile
to working women, and after pressure from the social partners, the
center-right government in the end voted in favor of the daycare re-
form and initiated a one-week expansion of paid leave, and reserved
it for fathers.
Before the 2005 election, Labour, the Socialist Left, and the Center
Party pledged to form a government coalition if they together won
a majority of seats in the parliament, which they did.63 The coali-
tion promised to speed up and expand the daycare reform further to
ensure full daycare coverage, lower parental fees, and longer hours.
After the election, reaching full daycare coverage by 2009 was estab-
lished as one of the red-green government’s key policy goals. This
lead to a further allocation of funds to daycare services in the national
budget.
With the red-green government in office, also the leave reforms
requested by the social partners were put on the table. Still, the gov-
ernment proceeded slowly. One additional week was added to the
63 The lo President Valla played a key role in creating the coalition.
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fathers’ quota in 2006. When the Equal Pay Commission proposed
the tripartite leave in 2008, which the social partners favored, the
red-green government gave the proposal an unenthusiastic and di-
vided response. Jens Stoltenberg, the Prime Minister and Leader of
the Labour Party, was against the proposal, and so was Helga Ped-
ersen, the Deputy Labour Leader, and Anniken Huitfeldt, the Head
of Labour’s Women’s Network and recently appointed Minister of
Children and Family Affairs (Klassekampen 2008; VG 2008). Others
in the party, notably mps with long records of voting in favor of gen-
der equality measures, as well as the Women’s Network in the Oslo
Labour Party, sided with the social partners. In the Socialist Left,
which had been a long-standing supporter of longer leaves for fa-
thers, the party leader and Minister of Finance, Kristin Halvorsen
rejected the proposal, whereas several mps supported the proposal
(Dagbladet 2008). Thus, although all the government parties were
in favor of expanding the leave and giving fathers some of the new
weeks of leave, only the Center Party wholeheartedly decided to favor
a full tripartition of the leave (TV2 2009).64
Among the opposition parties the resistance was even stronger.
Erna Solberg, the leader of the Conservatives, attacked the triparti-
tion proposal as infringing on families’ right to choose their organiza-
tion and reflected “a rich state coupled with lust-for-power politicians
who don’t set the limits for politics” and naming “the fathers’ quota
as a socialist ideology of force proceeding at the expense of families’
freedom of choice” (quoted in Klassekampen 2013).
Given the hostility both within the government and from the op-
position, the fierce pressure from the social partners may have been
decisive for the 2009 leave expansion, which increased the length of
the leave with one week but the fathers’ quota with two weeks. There
64 This is also reflected in the party manifestoes from the 2000s. The red-green parties
voice support for expanding the fathers’ quota, which the opposition is against; yet,
only the Center Party commits to a tripartition of the leave.
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was no promise to introduce a full tripartition of the leave. In the
2009 election campaign, furthermore, the incumbent red-green par-
ties moved closer to promising a tripartition of leave. Labour pledged
“to expand parental leave to 48 weeks with a 100 percent wage re-
placement rate, and that 14 of these weeks are reserved for the fa-
ther” (Labour 2009). The Center Party and the Socialist Left explicitly
promised to introduce a full tripartition of the leave, with one-third
of the leave reserved for fathers. The Conservatives and the Progress
Party were still firmly opposed, arguing that it infringed on families
right to choose the division of leave between the parents.
The red-green coalition was re-elected, and, as we saw above, the
social partners continued to push for the government to live up to its
campaign promises. When Audun Lysbakken, the Minister for Chil-
dren and Equal Status, in 2010 proposed an expansion of the fathers’
quota to twelve weeks and the overall leave to 47 weeks, the employ-
ers and unions applaud the proposal but argue that it still does not
go far enough. In the words of the nho:
No true tripartition is being proposed. The share which is op-
tional is still larger than the fathers’ share. . . . The government
has yielded a bit to the pressure, and gone too far in the di-
rection of freedom of choice. This gives a limited gender equal-
ity effect. . . . Tripartition is a true and extremely important gender
equality measure. We need all good hands and head in employment.
There are so many well-educated women, and it is a large problem
that they have difficulties with entering the labor market on the same
level as men (quoted in Klassekampen 2010, my emphasis).
Moreover, in the 2011 wage settlement they include a six-point gen-
der equality plan of action, which explicitly calls for the government
to introduce tripartite leave and abolish the cash-for-care scheme. In
2013, the government finally yields and legislates that mothers and fa-
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thers have the right to fourteen weeks each and that eighteen weeks
can be split as they wish (see Figure 3.5).65
Whereas the Christian Democrats and the Liberals ended up vot-
ing in favor of the tripartite leave, the Conservatives and the Progress
Party entered the 2013 election campaign with manifestoes promis-
ing to make the whole leave shared, i.e., removing the fathers’ quota.
In an unusual move during the campaign, the nho director general,
Kristin Skogen-Lund, warned the Conservatives and the Progress
Party of the dangers of this position and repeated the employers’ sup-
port for the tripartite leave (Dagsavisen 2013). The lo did the same.
The center-left lost the 2013 election and the Conservatives and the
Progress Party formed a coalition government, with parliamentary
support from the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. Already in
2014, the right-wing government decided to cut the fathers’ quota to
ten weeks. The reactions from the employers and trade union were
immediate. Notably, the nho announces that if the fathers’ quota is
removed, then leave should be cut back to the 1993 level to allow the
saved funds to instead be spent on more frequent daycare admissions
for one-year-olds (Lund 2014). The remark made by Skogen Lund is
worth quoting at length, as it sums up the employers turnaround on
wfps:
The nho is an ardent supporter of the Norwegian parental leave
scheme with a long fathers’ quota. Early on we spoke up for ear-
marking one-third of the leave period to fathers. We stand by
this. Even though parental leaves sometimes can be experience
to be a practical challenge to firms, the nho is of the opinion
that the fathers’ quota has been advantageous to the business
sector. It promotes high female labor market participation and
gender equality in the workplace. Norway has a modern family
policy which services our most important resource: the work ca-
pacity and the skills of both men and women. For the business
65 In addition, mothers have the right to three weeks before childbirth.
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sector and economy more generally this is of crucial importance
(Lund 2014).
Due to intense pressure from employers, labor, and the other parties,
the government has scrapped its plan to reduce the fathers’ quota
further. Additionally, when the government in 2014 proposed to make
it easier to transfer leave from fathers to mothers, the social partners
were once again up in arms, with the lo and the nho calling for
the government to “withdraw” and “shelve” the proposal (LO 2014;
NHO 2014). To this date, the government has not gone ahead with
the proposal.
3.3.4 Summary
The analysis of the Norwegian case has fleshed out how both unions
and employers have gone from being indifferent (in the case of
unions) and outright negative (in the case of employers) to actively
pushing for wfps. Given that demands for paid parental leave expan-
sions could be specified through the wage negotiations, whereas day-
care service reforms and subsidies were outside this system, the so-
cial partners have had even stronger influence on the development
paid leave than daycare. In addition, the case study documented that
women within the parties played an important role in calling for wfp
reforms together with the social partners.
In Appendix B.1.1, I extend the analysis to Sweden, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom. The case study of Sweden docu-
ments that the unions and employers were crucial to the wfp expan-
sion also there. Importantly, as both women’s entrance into unions
and higher education started significantly earlier than in Norway,
Sweden preceded Norway by ten to twenty years in the expansion
of wfps. Only in the 2000s did Norway catch up with Sweden. Next,
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the Dutch case study shows that the Netherlands again has lagged
behind Norway when it comes to women’s entrance into unions and
higher education. Thus, even though the social partners play a key
role in policymaking in the Netherlands, they have only recently be-
come interested in using their position to call for and instigate wfp
reforms. Finally, the study of the United Kingdom documents that,
although women have entered unions and education on a large scale,
the fragmented organization and limited influence of organized em-
ployers and workers have meant that their increasing calls for wfps
have largely been unsuccessful. Instead, it was only when women ac-
quired key government positions under New Labour that serious wfp
reforms took place.
3.4 conclusions : the continued but changing role of
corporatism
I started out by asking when employers, trade unions, and politi-
cal parties go from being against to being in favor of work-family
policies (wfps). I have analyzed the development of wfps and argued
that corporatist institutions and social partners, which were pivotal in
the expansion of classic welfare programs, still remain fundamental
to understand the rise of these new welfare policies. I have, never-
theless, shown that the stances of the social partners are highly de-
pendent on dynamic factors associated with the rise of knowledge
economies, in particular the reversal of the gender gap in higher ed-
ucation and the associated rise of women within trade unions. My
empirical findings based on a quantitative analysis of eighteen ad-
vanced democracies from 1960 to 2010, an in-depth case study of
Norway, and briefer case studies of Sweden, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom support these theoretical claims. As women’s
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union membership rose and as women outnumbered men in higher
education, the social partners have become increasingly interested in
developing wfps further. Centralized trade unions and employers’ as-
sociations have used wage bargaining and their policy influence to
push parties to enact wfps. By neglecting the possibility of such shifts
in preferences and cross-class coalitions, the study contributes to the
existing literature by showing that long-lasting labor market institu-
tions can effectively be used as a vehicle for new policy demands.
4
C A R E F O R C A R E E R : M O T H E R S , T O D D L E R S ,
A N D T H E I M PA C T O F U N I V E R S A L D AY C A R E
O N F E M A L E L E A D E R S H I P
abstract : Women remain underrepresented in leadership positions and
high-powered jobs. In this paper, we argue that work family-policies can
reduce the underrepresentation. In particular, we contend that subsidized
child daycare services increase mothers’ willingness to and opportunities for
entering occupations with longer hours and leadership positions. To provide
empirical evidence, we make use of a daycare reform in Norway, which led to
a staggered and extensive expansion of daycare services across the about 400
municipalities. With administrative register data on the whole population,
our instrumental-variable approach reveals that mothers with two-year-olds
in daycare are more likely to work in occupations requiring longer hours and
in managerial positions. Moreover, using survey data we find that mothers
with access to daycare are more inclined to view their career as equally im-
portant as men’s. Our results document how public policies can be used to
address gender inequalities in access to powerful positions.
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Women’s large-scale entrance into education, employment, and
politics delineates the last half-century from the previous ones. De-
spite this “quiet revolution,” one of the notable inequities that per-
sists is the gender segregation in the labor market. Across advanced
democracies, women, and especially mothers, tend to work in jobs
paying less and with fewer hours, often in the public sector. Positions
of leadership, be they in politics or the corporate world, are dispropor-
tionately occupied by men. Women make up about half of the labor
force; yet, only one in three managers today are women (ILO 2016).
Moreover, the more senior the position, the fewer women, both in
politics and in the labor market (Folke and Rickne 2016). Among
the biggest United States companies, for instance, only about one
in twenty CEOs and one in four senior managers are women (Cata-
lyst 2016). In the world of politics, only every fourteenth head of gov-
ernment and every fifth member of parliament is a woman (IPU 2015).
Women are thus significantly underrepresented in positions of power.
In this study, we ask whether the availability of full-time, subsidized
child daycare services can facilitate mothers’ career investment.
Gender differences in supply-side factors such as labor market ex-
perience (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010), perceptions of one’s qual-
ifications (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Koenig et al. 2011), and
career ambitions (Fox and Lawless 2014b; but see Ely, Stone, and
Ammerman 2014), as well as demand-side factors such as recruit-
ment, promotion, and professional networks (Crowder-Meyer 2013;
Fox and Lawless 2010; Koenig et al. 2011) are well documented rea-
sons for the lack of women’s lack of access to leadership positions,
both in the economy and in politics. Gender quotas, as well as more
proportional electoral systems, have gone some way in remedying
these differences (see, e.g., O’Brien and Rickne 2016). A substantial
gender gap, nevertheless, remains. A series of experimental studies
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have therefore recently zeroed in on psychological differences in how
willing women and men are to compete, bargain, and take risk in
order to obtain leadership positions (see, e.g., Buser, Niederle, and
Oosterbeek 2014; Kanthak and Woon 2015). Despite their valuable
insights, a drawback with these studies is that they lump together
all women and look at gender differences at large. As a result, the
psychological approach cannot address why the career and wage tra-
jectories of men and women are similar until the arrival of children
and then diverge, with men’s career racing ahead (Bertrand, Goldin,
and Katz 2010; Cools and Strøm 2014).
A key observation is that employed women, and mothers in partic-
ular, still do more of the caregiving and household work than their
male counterparts, leaving less room for jobs that demand longer
and less flexible hours but have more career and wage advancement
opportunities (Goldin 2014; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Women’s,
and particularly mother’s, propensity to take on leadership positions
is accordingly more sensitive to time constraints than what is typi-
cally the case for men. Silbermann (2015), for instance, documents
that commuting time decreases women’s but not men’s willingness
to stand for election, and Goldin (2014) shows that there is a larger
gender wage gap in professions with less working-time flexibility.
Given the unequal burden at home, the career-family conflict attenu-
ates mothers’ professional ambitions more than it does for fathers.
The theoretical contribution of our study is to highlight the impor-
tance of work-family policies for women’s access to leadership posi-
tions. A set of studies investigate how the availability of child day-
care services may enable women to participate in the labor market,
both through providing child care and service sector jobs (Esping-
Andersen 2009; Estévez-Abe 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Yet
few studies theorize how the expansion of daycare services may en-
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hance women’s career ambitions and propell women into senior pro-
fessional positions (for an exception, see Rosenbluth, Salmond, and
Thies 2006). Particularly, we argue that the availability of daycare en-
hances mothers’ willingness to invest in a career. Career investment
and entering into leadership positions typically require more pres-
ence at work and longer hours. Without long-term reliable full-time
care options for the children until they start school, taking on more
responsibility at work entails higher risks for mothers than other em-
ployees. The development of full-time daycare may hence increase
mothers’ willingness to enter into occupations with long hours, as
well as accepting leadership responsibility, as unpredictable child care
duties are taken care of.
The empirical contribution of the paper is to provide a causal test of
how individual mothers’ take-up of daycare impacts career investment.
The few existing empirical studies of a relationship between daycare
and career investment rely on cross-national measures of daycare cov-
erage and are thus plagued by concerns about omitted variables and
measurement errors (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Rosenbluth,
Salmond, and Thies 2006).1 We are able to more accurately gauge
career investment by using population-wide administrative register
data from Norway to look at (1) whether mothers of young children
enter into occupations with longer average hours and (2) whether
they are more likely to access leadership position both in the short
term and five years later.
Moreover, to address the endogeneity concern that career-minded
mothers are both more likely both to have children in daycare and to
advance up the occupational ladder, our study analyzes a large-scale
1 In economics and sociology, a number of studies investigate the effect of daycare
on fertility, women’s labor force participation, wages, and child outcomes, see,
e.g. Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008), Cornelissen et al. (forthcoming), Eckhoff-
Andresen and Havnes (2014), England (2005), Fitzpatrick (2010), Havnes and
Mogstad (2011a,b), and Pettit and Hook (2009). None of these studies studies deal
with career investment beyond employment.
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reform that lead to a staggered expansion of daycare centers across
the about 400 Norwegian municipalities between 2002 and 2008. The
reform passed by the national parliament required all municipalities
to expand daycare coverage to meet the demand from parents, which
was far surpassing the supply of daycare slots. The reform shifted
coverage upwards across municipalities, but to a different extent, as
they had a wide range of coverage rates before the reform. With ad-
ditional unique data on parents use of daycare, we use the plausibly
exogenous change in daycare coverage at the municipality level as an
instrument for whether individual mothers’ two-year-old children at-
tended daycare or not. In short, we combine fine-grained data on the
entire population of municipalities and mothers with young children
with a causal research design to test our novel argument.
The empirical estimates from our instrumental variable
strategy which makes it possible to consider our findings as
representing causal effects of daycare reveal that the take-up of
daycare has a significant and substantive impact on women’s access
to powerful positions in the labor market. Mothers of two-year-olds
benefitting from full-time daycare due to the reform are substantially
more likely to work in occupations requiring longer hours and to be
in a professional leadership position, compared to mothers without
the same access to the exogenous expansion of daycare. We also
document that this effect is present five years later, which attests
to the importance of the reform for mothers’ continuous career
investment. Finally, as our argument implies that the availability of
daycare should increase mothers’ willingness to go after a career,
we corroborate the results by using waves of survey data to show
that the reform increased support among young mothers for the
importance of having a professional career.
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Our findings should have significance beyond the Norwegian case.
Across advanced economies, women’s access to positions of power
lags far behind participation rates in the labor market and in poli-
tics. This “glass ceiling” or “leaking pipeline” has made prominent
scholars of gender equality talk of a stalled revolution (England 2010;
Goldin 2014). As many countries are considering, or have started
to introduce, full-time affordable daycare centers, our results show
that these initiatives can have important consequences for women’s
advancement into the top positions in the labor market and in pol-
itics. A number of recent studies convincingly document that the
presence of women in visible positions has important role model
effects, again increasing recruitment, aspirations, and participation
among women and decreasing bias and stereotypes against women
and particularly mothers in the labor market (Beaman et al. 2009,
2012; Gilardi 2015; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). Female leaders
may also help to develop a female-friendly culture inside the orga-
nization (Tate and Yang 2015) and decrease the gender wage gap in
the establishment (Cohen and Huffman 2007). What is more, a part
of the gender gap in political representation stems from the fact that
men more often than women have the work experience that voters
and legislators consider advantageous for entering and succeeding in
politics, such as a professional career and years of political and pro-
fessional experience (Crowder-Meyer and Lauderdale 2014; Iversen
and Rosenbluth 2010; Teele et al. 2015). Many young mothers choose
not to enter into the professional careers that qualifies one to run for
office, thus decreasing the pool of potential female candidates. More-
over, the women who nonetheless do enter into political office are
less likely to have children than their male colleagues (Carroll and
Sanbonmatsu 2013). Increased career investment among mothers, for
instance as a result of the introduction of full-time affordable daycare,
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may thus also have important positive knock-on effects for gender
equality in politics.
The remainder of our study is organized as follows. In Section 4.1
we develop the key predictions regarding the effect of daycare on
women’s career investment. Section 4.2 provides details on the ex-
pansion of daycare coverage in Norwegian municipalities, the factors
associated with expansion, and on the Norwegian 2002-2008 daycare
reform, which we will use to test our predictions. Thereafter, in Sec-
tion 4.3 we test the argument using an instrumental variable strategy
to identify the causal effects of daycare take-up on mothers’ propen-
sity to enter into occupations with longer average hours and into
leadership positions. In Section 4.4, we extend the main analysis by
using survey data to show that the daycare reform also lead moth-
ers to evaluate their career as more important. Section 4.5 discusses
the generalizability of the findings, before Section 4.6 concludes the
paper.
4.1 daycare services and women’s career opportunities
Reaching and occupying leadership positions typically require full-
time work, and often longer hours than the average occupation,
which comes in conflict with family commitments. We can use data
from the European Working Condition Surveys to illustrate this point.
Figure 4.1a displays that, across Western European countries in the
2000s, individuals in occupations with long average work hours tend
to report that their work fit less well with family and social com-
mitments than individuals in occupations with shorter work hours.2
General managers, corporate managers, and legislators and senior of-
ficials, which together capture leadership positions in the economy,
2 See the note to Figure 4.1 for measurement details.
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figure 4.1. Plots showing the average survey responses to questions
about hours of work, whether working hours, and gender by
occupational groups (isco-88 2-digit) across Western European
countries in the 2000s.
Note: The survey item about work and family commitments is formu-
lated as follows: “In general, do your working hours fit in with your
family or social commitments outside work?” It ranges from 1 ("Not
at all well") to 4 ("Very well"). Sources: European Working Conditions
Survey (2000, 2005, 2010)
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have among the longest average hours per week. Figure 4.1b depicts
that this pattern is again associated with gender segregation across oc-
cupations: occupations with longer average working hours per week
tend to have an underrepresentation of women. Only about every 30
percent of managers are woman, as shown by the black points in the
figure (see also Cha 2010, 2013; Cha and Weeden 2014; Goldin 2014;
Stone 2007).
Yet we know little, both theoretically and empirically, about
whether universal daycare can help to reduce the gender gap in ac-
cess to occupations requiring long hours, including leadership posi-
tions. We aim to address this shortcoming in existing scholarship. We
argue in the following that daycare services (1) influence the choice
of career investment and occupation among women, and (2) thereby
further women’s chances of reaching leadership positions.
4.1.1 Daycare and Career Investment
Work-family reconciliation lies at the heart of gender differences
in the labor market (Goldin 2014). Following childbearing, birth,
and childrearing, women are more likely to have career interrup-
tions, shorter working hours, and increased unpaid work (Bertrand,
Goldin, and Katz 2010; Manning and Petrongolo 2008). Although
employed and highly educated women do a smaller share of the
household work and childcare than homestaying women, they still
tend to do significantly more than their male counterparts (Esping-
Andersen 2009, 40; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Lewis, Campbell,
and Huerta 2008). Women are more likely to experience conflicting
demands from family and work, as exemplified in Figure 4.1 (Blair-
Loy 2003; Blair-Loy and Wharton 2004; Wharton and Blair-Loy 2006).
Several studies accordingly indicate that a result of increased child-
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care responsibilities is that women with small children often refrain
from taking on a more senior position, or more often than fathers
switch to jobs that they expect will have shorter average hours and
higher working time flexibility even if they are over-qualified for
the job and it entails lower wages (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010;
Manning and Petrongolo 2008).3 Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010),
for instance, show that among MBA graduates from a leading busi-
ness school in the United States, a gender gap in wages appears over
the course of these professionals’ careers, and it can be traced back to
career interruptions, weekly working hours, and training prior to mba
graduation (see also Munasinghe, Reif, and Henriques 2008). Mother-
hood, in difference from fatherhood, is in other words associated with
scaling down paid work and scaling up unpaid work, and working
in occupations that fits with caring for children.4
The availability of full-time affordable daycare may, however, in-
crease mothers’ opportunities to combine childrearing with a ca-
reer, both by allowing mothers to return faster to work after birth
and to engage in full-time work while the children are under
school age (Estévez-Abe 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Esping-
Andersen 2009, 84). More decisively, mothers’ willingness to enter into
a more demanding job or take on a leadership position, which typi-
cally requires more presence and longer hours, might increase with
the knowledge that reliable, affordable, and full-time care for their
children will be available on a daily basis throughout the pre-school
3 For the United Kingdom, Woodland et al. (2003) report that as many as 40 percent
of employers would not allow women returning from maternity leave to retain their
current job but switch from full time to part time, thus essentially forcing them to
change job. Another 20 percent would be allowed to switch from full time to part
time but then not retaining her seniority (Manning and Petrongolo 2008, F43).
4 There is solid evidence of a motherhood penalty in wages and employment but
a small, or absent, fatherhood penalty (Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens forthcom-
ing; Budig and England 2001; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Mason et al. 2013;
Miller 2009; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007). It is present even in Scandinavia
(Angelov, Johansson, and Lindahl 2016; Cools and Strøm 2014). The motherhood
penalty, moreover, does not seem to be restricted to low-income mothers (Bertrand,
Goldin, and Katz 2010).
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years. Without daycare which generally means relying on grand-
parents, nannies, or neighbors it might be more difficult to know
whether a more senior and demanding position will be compatible
with family obligations. With children attending full-time daycare
from for instance the age of one, mothers’ opportunity and the will-
ingness to enter into more time-demanding occupations should thus
increase. The first hypothesis we will test is therefore:
H1: The availability of full-time, affordable daycare services in-
crease mother’s entrance into occupations with longer average
working hours.
4.1.2 Daycare and Leadership
With daycare services present, women may also be more likely to en-
ter into leadership positions. Due to employment spells in relation
to motherhood, women face particular risks when making career de-
cisions, such as the risks of skill depreciation and missed training
and promotion opportunities (Estévez-Abe 2005, 192) These risks are
particularly high in jobs where a large share of the training is done
on the job, such as among corporate managers, as opposed to pro-
fessions where more of the key skills are acquired through univer-
sity education, such as in health care (Estévez-Abe 2006). Still, being
present at work is not only important for obtaining experience, it is
also important for signaling commitment to work Spence (1973). As
Goldin (2014, 1094) succinctly puts it, “[p]ersistence . . . and continu-
ous time at the job probably matters far more to one’s success than a
desire and ability to compete.”5 Through long hours of “face time” at
work an employee can show that she or he is invested in the job, de-
velop networks, and upgrade skills. Although most full-time daycare
5 Goldin is specifically writing about winner-take-all positions, including top man-
agers and partners in private law firms.
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is (still) only open during normal working hours, the service never-
theless goes a long way in making it possible for mothers to be more
continuously present at work.
The availability of daycare may also affect the demand for female
leaders. Social policies in general do not only affect employees’ career
decisions but also employers’ hiring, promotion, and training deci-
sions (Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001). With young women
being more likely to leave the labor market than men, profit-seeking
employers may engage in statistical discrimination and hire men in-
stead of women, since it lowers the chance of having to find costly
(temporary) replacements and provide retraining.6 With employers
knowing that daycare will be available and affordable to potential fe-
male candidates, the statistical discrimination against mothers may
decrease, thus mitigating the structural barriers against women’s ac-
cess to leadership positions.
Based on this discussion, we have the following hypothesis:
H2: The availability of full-time, affordable daycare services in-
crease mother’s chances of accessing leadership positions in the
labor market.
4.2 daycare services in norway
To test the hypotheses put forth in the preceding section, we investi-
gate a staggered expansion of daycare across more than 400 Norwe-
gian municipalities in the 2000s. Norway is an ideal case for investi-
gating the impacts of daycare services on women’s career investment.
First, and as we will detail below, since the daycare reforms was
legislated at the national level, the variation in the daycare coverage
6 Analogously, employers in occupations with long hours might be reluctant to hire
young women since they suspect that they will not put in the same number of hours
as young men.
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expansion across municipalities can be treated as a natural experi-
ment at the municipality level. This allows us to give an estimate of
the causal effect of daycare.
Second, Norway is one of few countries with a daycare system
that is simultaneously universal (high coverage), full-time, and afford-
able. It thus provides a predictable childcare option for parents and is
the type of system where we should see the hypothesized effects on
mothers’ career investment. Figure 4.2 illustrates the generosity of the
Norwegian system by plotting the percentage of children aged 0 to
2 who attend daycare (y-axis) against the average hours per week in
daycare (x-axis) in 2013. The horizontal bars for each country shows
the typical daycare cost, calculated as the percentage of a dual-earner
couple’s total wage, where one of the spouses earns an average wage
and the other earn half of an average wage. In addition to Norway,
only Denmark, Sweden, France, and Belgium have a daycare system
that are about equally extensive. The two other clusters of countries
either have low coverage or part-time daycare and high costs. The
Norwegian case thus provide us with a possibility to directly test our
hypotheses.
Third, although Norway and the other Scandinavian countries are
known for their gender egalitarian attitudes (see e.g. Inglehart and
Norris 2003, 33), they are comparable to other European countries
when it comes to labor force participation and women in leadership
positions (see Figure C.1.1). By the 2010s, women make up about
half of the labor force in most advanced democracies, including Nor-
way (ILO 2016). Among leaders, there is some more variation, with
Italy scoring particularly low and France especially high; however, in
most countries, including Norway, about one in three managers are
women.Our findings should thus be of more general interest.7
7 We discuss this point further in Section 4.5 below.
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figure 4.2. Variation in daycare coverage, costs, and average weekly hours
among advanced industrialized democracies in 2013
Note: The horizontal bars gives the percentage of a net dual-earner
income where one of the parents earn 100 percent and the other 50
percent of the average wage that is spent on daycare. Source: OECD
(2012a)
4.2.1 The 2000s Daycare Reforms
In the mid 1970s, the Norwegian parliament set in motion the first
significant expansion of subsidized, formal daycare, although mostly
for three- to six-year-olds, as Chapter 3 analyzed in detail. Daycare
services were gradually expanded over the next three decades; never-
theless, places for children aged one and two remained much harder
to come by than for older children. Figure 4.3 illustrates the de-
velopment. By 2002, right before the parliament passed the major
daycare reform we investigate in this paper, 84 percent of three- to
five-year-old children attended daycare. Still, less than one in three
one-year-olds and less than one in two two-year-olds attended for-
mal daycare. Among the parents, moreover, demand for formal day-
care of toddlers exceeded supply. Using the representative Child Care
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figure 4.3. The percentage of children in formal daycare, 1963-2014
Note: Daycare coverage is measured as the percentage of children in a
given age group who attend formal daycare. In 1997 school-starting age
was reduced from seven to six. Sources: Gulbrandsen (2007), Norwegian
Directorate for Education and Training (2016), and Statistics Norway
(2016d).
Survey (Barnetilsynsundersøkelsen) conducted in 2002, we find that 60
percent of parents with one-year-olds and 81 percent with two-year-
olds responded that if price, hours, and availability were not an
issue they would like to use daycare either full-time or in combina-
tion with other types of childcare.
Fueled by a lower growth than expected in new daycare slots in
2001 and 2002, and, importantly, responding to the demand from
particularly highly educated women and their employers, Chapter
3 documented that an alliance of trade unions, employers’ associa-
tions and women within the political parties pushed for daycare re-
forms (St. mld. nr. 3 2002-2003, 30). They succeeded. The 11th of June
2002, a broad coalition of opposition parties encompassing the So-
cialist Left and the Labor Party on the left, the agrarian Center Party
in the center, and the populist Progress Party on the right forced
the minority center-right government consisting of the Christian
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Democrats, the Conservatives, and the Liberals to implement a ma-
jor reform changing both the financing and management of daycare
centers in Norway. The Daycare Agreement (Barnehageavtalen) ini-
tially stipulated the creation of 32,500 new daycare slots, 80 percent
funding from the central government, and a cap on parents’ payments
to be introduced and lowered between 2003 and 2005.8 It also gave
municipalities the duty to supply sufficient daycare slots. Already
in the 2003 budget, passed in the fall of 2002, the government duly
followed up on the Daycare Agreement by allocating the required
financial resources to the daycare expansion.
The willingness to reform accelerated further in 2005. During the
campaign for the 2005 General Election, the Socialist Left, the Labor
Party, and the Center Party promised to form a coalition if they col-
lectively gained the majority of parliamentary seats. A key campaign
promise was further investments in daycare, the right to full-time day-
care for all children between one and five, and further reductions in
the parental fees. These political parties won the election, and the
zeal for reform continued uninterruptedly until the government pro-
claimed in 2008 that they had secured full daycare coverage.
Together, the 2002-2008 reforms created a massive surge in full-
time, affordable daycare. Central government subsidies increased
with about 230 percent between 2002 and 2008, from 0.68 to 2.24 bil-
lion 2011 NOKs (see Figure C.1.2b in Appendix C).9 Coverage for
one-year-olds doubled and coverage for two-year-olds increased with
50 percent. Figure 4.3 depicts this surge in coverage. Furthermore, be-
fore the reform about 70 percent of children in daycare were enrolled
full time and the rest part time, whereas after the reform almost 90
percent of the children were enrolled full time (see Figure C.1.2c). Fi-
nally, the parliament lowered the maximum parental fees, giving on
8 The final agreement set a max price of 2500 NOK in 2004 and 1500 NOK in 2005.
9 This is equivalent to an increase from about 122 to 403 million 2011 USD.
4.2 daycare services in norway 173
average a 32 percent reduction in the price of daycare between 2002
and 2008 (see Figure C.1.2a). As illustrated by the bars in Figure 4.2
above, parents with one child and earning 100 and 50 percent of an
average Norwegian wage, respectively, spent 11 percent of their net
income on daycare after the reform. The scale and breadth of the re-
form consequently gives us a rare opportunity to study the effects
of universal daycare on women’s opportunities for career investment
and advancement.
Since the reform foremost increased daycare availability for one-
and two-year olds, we analyze the consequences of the reform for
mothers with children in this age group. For mothers of two-year-old
children we can also, as we further discuss below in Section 4.3, create
a measure of daycare services at the individual level.
4.2.2 Municipal Variation in Daycare Coverage Expansion
Daycare coverage varied considerably across the municipalities be-
fore 2002. Norwegian municipalities are governed by democratically
elected municipal councils and have the responsibility and fiscal au-
tonomy to make priorities in many areas, such as health and educa-
tion. Prior to the 2000s reform, municipalities, in other words, had
autonomy in the area of daycare provision, which meant that some
municipalities expanded daycare, whereas others did not.10 At the on-
set of the 2002 reform, the more than 400 municipalities consequently
had very different levels of daycare coverage. The gray-filled bars in
Figure 4.4 which plot the distribution of coverage rates in 2002 for
one- and two-year-olds across municipalities illustrates this point.
10 The supplementary analysis in Table C.1.1 in the appendix, where we regress day-
care coverage on a series of covariates and municipality and year effects, reveals
that the historical variation is positively associated with the women’s share of the
highly educated, turnout, women’s share of the population, municipal public expen-
ditures per capita (net of daycare spending), and population change, and negatively
associated with unemployment.
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figure 4.4. Distribution of daycare coverage across municipalities in 2002
(grey) and 2008 (black) for one- and two-year-olds, respectively.
Note: Daycare coverage at the level of municipalities. See notes to Figure
4.3 and the text for details. Source: Statistics Norway (2016b).
During the 2002-2008 national-level reform, the distribution of cov-
erage rates shifted from right- to left-skewed for both one- and two-
year-olds, as displayed by the black-outlined bars in the Figure 4.4.
The reform created notable variation in coverage rate changes across
municipalities. Figure 4.5 plots the density of the municipal-level
changes in daycare coverage between 2002 and 2008. The median
change in coverage rates was 39 percentage points for one-year-olds,
with a standard deviation of 22, and 33 percentage points for two-
year-olds, with a standard deviation of 26. The variation in expansion
was spread out all over the country (see the maps in Figure 4.6).
These changes provide us with the opportunity to test for the ef-
fect of daycare service expansion on women’s career opportunities in
a quasi-experimental setting. Since the reform was introduced at the
national level, we can sidestep the worry that daycare expansion was
a result of municipal level politics.11 In other words, although local
factors produced variation in the levels of daycare coverage before
the reform, the yearly changes in daycare coverage between 2002 and
2008 are plausibly exogenous to such factors. If daycare expansion
is as good as random, it means that we can use municipal variation
11 For a similar approach, see, e.g., O’Brien and Rickne 2016.
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figure 4.5. Density plot of change in the daycare coverage between 2002
and 2008.
Note: See notes to Figure 4.3 and the text for details. Source: Statistics
Norway (2016b)
in coverage rates changes to identify the causal effects of the reform
(Cornelissen et al. forthcoming). To support this assumption, we look
at whether the yearly timing of daycare coverage expansion is plausi-
bly quasi-random. Using a model with municipality- and year-fixed
effects, we assess whether changes in the set of covariates both at time
t and t-1 are related to changes in the daycare coverage rate (see Ta-
ble C.1.2 in Appendix C). There are some indications that changes in
daycare coverage is associated with the unemployment rate, munici-
pal expenditures per capita (net of daycare spending), median wage,
and population size changes. To make sure that the results presented
below are not driven by the significant covariates, we include these in
the empirical models presented in the next section.
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figure 4.6. Daycare coverage in Norwegian municipalities in 2002 and 2008
and density of yearly changes in coverage and changes between
2002 and 2008.
Note: Daycare coverage at the level of municipalities. See notes to Figure
4.3 and the text for details. Source: Statistics Norway (2016b).
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4.3 the effect of daycare services on mother’s career
investment
We are interested in analyzing women’s career investment, in the
form of entrance into time-demanding occupations and leadership
positions. The Norwegian registry data provide a unique opportunity
to study this question with individual level data for the whole popu-
lation. Our data consist of merged administrative registers encrypted
to prevent identification of individuals and made available by Statis-
tics Norway for research purposes. The Norwegian registry data are
known for their unrivaled data quality (see Atkinson, Rainwater, and
Smeeding 1995). The starting point is a public demographic register
with information on all births in Norway linked to information on
the mother regarding employment status, occupation, earnings, wel-
fare benefits, education, residence, partner, and more. The sample
consists of all mothers who had a two-year-old child in the reform
period (2002-2008), which gives us 268,000 observations.
4.3.1 Measuring Career Investment and Daycare Uptake
We study two main dependent variables, hours and leadership. For
reasons of space, we here provide a brief description of how these
variables are constructed, and refer to Section C.1.5 in Appendix C
for details. The first dependent variable, hours, is the work pressure
in a job, operationalized as the average working hours in a detailed
set of occupations. We make use of two data sources to obtain such a
measure. From the register data, we know the detailed occupation of
each of the employed individuals in our sample. From the Norwegian
Labor Force Surveys, we compute the average actual hours worked
for each of these occupations in the years prior to the reform. Thus,
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each mother with an occupational code is assigned the average hours
worked of her occupation. Figure C.1.4 shows that there is a strong
negative correlation between average hours and the female percent-
age in that occupation, supporting the relevance and the validity of
our measure.
The second dependent variable, leader, is a binary indicator equal
to 1 if the mother is in a leadership position, and 0 otherwise. The
leadership positions are identified from the ISCO-88 three digit-level
occupational groups (see Section C.1.5 in Appendix C for a list of
the occupations). 9.8 percent of employed men and 4.6 of employed
women were leaders in the 2003-2008 period. In 2003, 28.4 percent of
leaders were women, which corresponds to the estimates provided
by the ILO (2016) and in Figure 4.1b. By 2008 the number had in-
creased to 33 percent. In other words, women did gain better access
to leadership positions during this period.
Since our argument implies that the effect of daycare should be
persistent over time, we study the hours and leadership dependent
variables at t+1 and t+5, i.e., when the child is at the age of three
and seven. We measure the outcome at t+1 instead of t because the
occupation codes are not available before 2002. Since the latest year
for which we have occupation codes is 2010, our t+5 can only include
mothers with a two-year-old child between 2002 and 2005.
The key independent variable, daycare, is constructed from informa-
tion on uptake of the cash-for-care subsidy. The cash-for-care subsidy
is a direct cash transfer scheme. All mothers mothers of one- and
two-year-olds who do not have their child in subsidized childcare are
entitled to and receive the cash-for-care subsidy. Mothers who have
their child in part-time child care can receive a share of the subsidy.
We have the exact amount of cash-for-care paid to the mother in the
year the child was two years of age, which allow us to calculate the
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share of daycare utilized by the mother. About 33 percent in our sam-
ple have full time daycare, about 31 percent have no daycare, while
the average is about 49 percent daycare share.
4.3.2 Estimating the Effect of the Daycare Reform
Empirically, we aim to estimate the causal effect of daycare, D, on
the outcomes Y. Regressing D on Y with a set of covariates as con-
trols is unconvincing to reveal the causal effect of D, since the as-
sumption of selection on observables is unlikely to hold. For instance,
mothers might have preferences over daycare which are correlated
with our outcomes. Such preferences are hard to observe and we
have no information about them in our data. Instead, we rely on an
instrumental-variable approach. As described in the previous section,
we get exogenous variation in the uptake of daycare services by ex-
ploiting the spatial and temporal variation in the expansion of public
child care services over the period 2002-2008 (Eckhoff-Andresen and
Havnes 2014). We employ exact data on the daycare coverage for one-
and two-year-olds in each municipality-year in the expansion period
(2002-2008) to construct coverage rates, which we use as instruments
for daycare share in a 2SLS set-up.
We estimate the following first stage of a 2SLS model:
Dimt = γ1dc2mt +γ2dc1m,t−1 +γnXimt + θnXmt + ηm +χt + eimt (4.1)
In this set-up i indexes mothers, m municipalities, and t years, dc2mt
is the daycare coverage of two-year olds, dc1m,t−1 is the daycare cover-
age of one-year olds at t− 1, Ximt is a vector of individual level covari-
ates, ηm is municipality fixed effects, χt is year fixed effects, and eimt is
a normally distributed error term. In addition we control for several
time-varying municipality level covariates, Xmt: the employment rate
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of childless men, which picks up differences in labor demand that
are not influenced by the reform; the log of municipal expenditures
per capita (excluding daycare expenditures) and the mean wage level
among childless men, which both account for varying fiscal possibili-
ties to expanding daycare; and the percent change in population size,
which controls for population movement and growth during the re-
form period.12 The key coefficients in the first stage are γ1 and γ2. We
expect these to be positive and sufficiently strong to serve as instru-
ments for Dimt.
The second stage of the 2SLS is then:
Yimt = β1D̂imt + βnXimt + ζnXmt + ρm + φt + eimt (4.2)
where D̂imt is the predicted daycare share from the first stage, with
the corresponding β1 giving us the estimate of daycare usage on Y. It
is important to remember that β1 is a local average treatment effect
driven by the compliers, i.e., those who change their daycare usage
in response to the reform. We return to this issue below when we
interpret our results.
The key, untestable assumption of our approach is that the instru-
ments influence Y only through its relationship with D (the exclusion
restriction). One concern is that expansion is a response to increasing
demand for labor; in other words, that local labor market develop-
ments influence both uptake of daycare and career investment. The
controls for the labor market situation in the municipality will at least
partly account for this potential problem. In addition, we exclude
those employed in the daycare sector to avoid an almost mechani-
cal correlation between expansion and employment. We discuss and
address additional concerns when we interpret the results.
12 As Table C.1.2 indicated that either lags or simultaneous values on these variables
are associated with changes in daycare coverage, we include these at t, t-1, and t-2
(see C.1.5 for a full variable description).
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Our instruments for daycare daycare coverage for two-year-olds
(dc2) and lagged for one-year-olds (dc1) are, as explained above,
the daycare coverage in the mother’s municipality of residence the
year the child was two years of age. To ensure that our results are
not driven by alterations in the geographical size of municipalities,
we limit our analysis to municipalities without missing data that do
not change borders and exist throughout the whole period, meaning
that our analysis comprise 395 out of the 434 municipalities existing
in 2002.
The vector of individual level controls includes age, age-squared,
whether the mother is foreign born, whether she is married, a set of
dummies for the number of children, a set of dummies for the level of
education (measured the year the child was born since education level
might be affected by the reform), earnings in the year prior to giving
birth, and a dummy for the education level of the partner. Unless
stated, the variables are measured in the year the child was two years
of age. Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics are included
in C.1.5. We consistently include mothers who are not employed to
avoid conditioning on employment, which is an endogenous variable,
since the reform did influence mothers’ labor supply (see Eckhoff-
Andresen and Havnes 2014).13 Obviously, those without employment
have no leadership position and no working hours.
13 In Appendix Table C.1.10 we show that all conclusions remain if we restrict the
sample to those with an occupation. In the main analysis below, we consistently
control for pre-birth employment and earnings.
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4.3.3 Results: Daycare Coverage Expansion and Women’s Career
Opportunities
Our main estimates are presented in Table 4.1.14 To recap, daycare is
measured the year the child was two years of age, while the outcomes
are measured one and five years later. For transparency, we present
reduced form, first stage and second stage estimates for all outcomes.
The validity of our approach is strengthened by the correctly signed
coefficients for both instruments across the first stage models, as well
as the corresponding high Kleibergen-Paap F-values. Furthermore,
the reduced form estimates are also correctly signed, the coefficient
sizes of the instruments are not implausible, and the instruments are
jointly significant in the reduced form estimations (as indicated by
high p-values of the F-tests). Finally, as an additional test of weak
instrument bias, we exploit that we have two instruments and fol-
low the advice to estimate the IV models using only the strongest in-
strument (Angrist and Pischke 2009b, 213). Reassuringly, the results,
presented in Table C.1.6, produce the same conclusions as those dis-
cussed below.15
The second stage estimates are presented in top row in the table.
The results tell the same story for both outcomes: the exogenous
shock in daycare increased mothers’ presence in occupations with
longer expected hours of work and the probability of holding a lead-
ership position. As our administrative data stops in 2010, we have
only long-run estimates (t+5) available for mothers with two-year-old
children between 2002 and 2005. For these women, there is a clear
14 Table C.1.4 in the Appendix presents the endogenous estimates of the relationship
between daycare and our two outcomes. In line with our hypotheses, women with
children in daycare are more likely to be employed in occupations with a higher
workload and to be in leadership positions.
15 As evident in the tables, the estimations further produce insignificant Hansen J-
values. Although large p values in these tests are reassuring, overidentification tests
are known to be biased against finding significant values when the instruments are
correlated (as they are in our case).
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table 4.1. Regression results reporting the association between daycare us-
age and the outcomes of interest
Hours Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+5 t+1 t+5
IV
Daycare 2.6∗∗ 3.8∗∗ .04∗∗ .07∗∗
(1.2) (1.6) (.02) (.03)
First stage
Coverage, age 1 .28∗∗∗ .27∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗ .27∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Coverage, age 2 .05∗∗∗ .03 .05∗∗∗ .03
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Reduced form
Coverage, age 1 .58 .88 .01 .01
(.41) (.61) (.01) (.01)
Coverage, age 2 .34 .28 .01∗ .01
(.36) (.49) (.01) (.01)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Controls X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome 22.3 (13) 22.3 (13) .05 (.22) .05 (.22)
Mean (SD) daycare .49 (.43) .4 (.42) .49 (.43) .4 (.42)
F-test (p-value) 3.08 (.05) 2.93 (.05) 3.41 (.03) 3.97 (.02)
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.7 115.1 93.7 115.4
Hansen J (p-value) .33 (.57) .12 (.72) 1.81 (.18) 1.75 (.19)
Observations 268,060 153,931 268,525 154,039
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age,
age squared, number of children, level of education in the year prior to giving birth,
education level of the partner, whether the mother is foreign born, whether she
is married, earnings and employment in the year prior to giving birth, year fixed
effects and municipality fixed effects. See Appendix C.1.5 for variable definitions
and summary statistics.
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effect of daycare also five years later, when the child is seven years
of age. These results support the expectation that publicly provided
child care is important for mothers’ career development.
The magnitude of the effects suggests that they are sociologically
and economically important. For the short-term effects on occupa-
tional hours, a one standard deviation shift in the daycare share vari-
able amounts to a shift of, on average, 1.1 hours. With a median work-
ing week amounting to about 32 hours in the 1997-2001 pre-reform
period and the regulated full-time working week being 37.5 hours, the
impact of daycare on hours is thus substantive in size. For instance,
with 47 working weeks in a year, which is the case in Norway, this
increase in typical working time would amount to about 52 hours per
year, that is almost one and a half week extra work per year.16 Regard-
ing leadership, a one standard deviation shift in daycare increases the
probability of being in a leadership position by 1.7 percentage points.
In 2003, 9 percent of employed men, 4 percent of employed women,
and 1.2 percent of employed mothers where in a leadership position.
The effect of having the child in daycare is therefore of great impor-
tance for mothers’ access to more senior positions in the labor market.
We carry out several tests to address potential threats to treating
these results as causal. One potential threat is selective migration. If
parents have information on what municipalities which are about to
increase their childcare coverage, we might expect migration to ex-
panding municipalities. This type of migration is likely to be selec-
tive; parents with strong preferences for childcare and labor market
careers is most likely to respond to such information. If so, our esti-
mates will not reflect shifts in behavior but also reflect that the com-
position of the population shifts with our instruments and blow up
the size of the second stage coefficient.
16 As a comparison, to expand or reduce vacation with one and a half week would be
likely to cause large political turmoils (see Rasmussen 2015).
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To ensure that migration is not driving our results, we conduct a
robustness analysis where we use childcare coverage in mothers’ mu-
nicipality of residence the year prior to giving birth instead of the
year the child was two years of age. This approach discards recent
(and potentially endogenous) changes in municipality of residency.
If endogenous migration is unimportant, the results using this ap-
proach should be similar to the previous ones. Reassuringly, this is
what we find in Table C.1.8. Selective migration does therefore not
seem to be driving our findings.17
A second potential threat may be that the daycare variables pick up
the influence of municipality-specific shocks that are correlated with
both the expansion of child care and the probability of becoming a
leader.18 Remember that our specification includes a set of municipal-
ity controls, which will capture much of the effects of labor market
shocks. In Table C.1.9 we additionally present, in our view, very con-
vincing evidence that general shocks or omitted variables do not ex-
plain the results in Table 4.1. Table C.1.9 displays that the instruments
do not predict our outcomes for a group of women which should not
be directly affected by the daycare expansion, namely women above
the age where they have small children in daycare. More specifically,
we employ the same empirical approach and specification as in Ta-
ble 4.1, but on the population of 55 year old women in the years
2002-2008. This constitutes a set of placebo analyses which should
not produce significant results, since the expansion is not directly rel-
evant for the career development of these women. If, however, they
produce similar results as above, it raises concerns regarding what
the estimates in Table 4.1 signifies. The reduced form estimates in
these placebo regressions are never statistically significant and very
17 The conclusions remain also if we exclude movers from the sample (Table C.1.7);
however, doing so is potentially problematic since we condition the sample on a
potentially endogenous variable (immobility).
18 We discussed this possibility in Section 4.2.2, and the empirical evidence presented
there does not indicate any such correlated shocks.
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different from those above, which makes us much more confident in
interpreting the results in Table 4.1 as reflecting the causal effects of
daycare.
Spillover effects is a third threat. It is plausible that the reform had
effects beyond those on mothers who were directly affected by the
reform. For instance, the reform might have influenced perceptions
of female leaders among employers (a demand-side effect), which
could have influenced the probability of becoming leader among
mothers not directly affected by the reform (the “never-takers” and
the “always-takers” in the IV terminology). If so, the reduced form
reflects the combined effect on those directly and those indirectly af-
fected by the reform. Such spillover effects are hard to detect empir-
ically, but are less plausible in the short than in the long run. Ac-
cordingly, it is only the long run effect that may also reflect such
demand-side mechanisms.
To sum up, we find strong and robust effects of the daycare reform
on mothers’ career investments. The increased availability of daycare
led to mothers working in occupations with higher expected hours at
work and a higher probability of being in a leadership position.
4.4 daycare coverage and women’s attitudes towards
having a career
Our analyses have given evidence that daycare positively impacts
women’s career investment. In this section, we study an additional,
key implication of our argument, namely whether mothers see their
career as more important as a consequence of having daycare avail-
able. If our theoretical perspective of a supply effect of the reform is
correct i.e., that daycare has a positive impact on the share of moth-
ers who are willing to invest more in their career we should see that
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attitudes towards career investment change as a result of the reform.
If we fail to find such effects, the effects above are more likely to be
driven by effects on the demand side.
To investigate this question, we use the biannual Norwegian Mon-
itor survey. What makes this survey particularly suitable is that it
asks the respondents’ about their opinion on women’s career. The sur-
vey furthermore contains the respondents’ municipality of residence,
which allows us to use the same empirical framework as above. To see
whether changes in daycare impact career attitudes among mothers
with young children, we regress attitudes among the respondents on
daycare coverage and municipality- and year-fixed effects. We study
mothers whose youngest child is under the age of three. The depen-
dent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent fully agrees with the
statement “women have the same need for a professional career as
men have” and 0 otherwise.19 Since the survey do not contain data
on daycare usage at the individual level, our results will be reduced
form estimates.
The results are presented in Table 4.2. In model 1, a 20 percentage
points increase in daycare coverage in a municipality, which is about
a standard deviation, is predicted to lead to 12 percentage point in-
crease in a the probability of a mother fully agreeing that women have
the same need for a career as men have, which is a substantial effect.
These results hold up to alternative specifications: in model 2, we in-
clude a set of individual- and municipality-level controls; in model 3,
we treat the dependent variable as continuous;20 and in model 4, we
restrict the sample to mothers whose youngest child is two years of
age. The results remain significant and similar or larger in magnitude.
As daycare services increase women’s career opportunities but do
not generally incentivize men to change their behavior, it is assuring
19 The set of response categories are: fully disagree, partially disagree, partially agree,
fully agree, and fully impossible to answer.
20 With values 1 (fully disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (agree), and 4 (fully agree)
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table 4.2. Regression results reporting the reduced form effect of daycare
coverage on agreeing with the statement “women have the same
need for a professional career as men have”.
Mothers’ attitudes Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Covars. Continuous Age 2 Fathers Age ≥ 50
Daycare coverage 0.64∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.13 0.17
(0.21) (0.24) (0.31) (0.38) (0.31) (0.14)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome .62 (.49) .62 (.49) 3.52 (.7) .63 (.48) .61 (.49) .72 (.45)
Mean (SD) daycare .58 (.21) .58 (.21) .58 (.21) .59 (.2) .6 (.2) .72 (.16)
Observations 971 971 971 303 669 3575
Municipalities 153 153 153 73 120 299
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for cluster-
ing on municipalities in parentheses. All the models contain year- and municipality-
fixed effects. The municipality-level covariates are unemployment, municipal expen-
ditures per capita, female share of the population, and percent change in the pop-
ulation size. The individual-level covariates are age, age-squared, dummies for the
number of children under age 6, dummies for level of education, and whether the
respondent is married.
that model 5 shows that the effect of daycare coverage for fathers
is small in magnitude and far from significant. Likewise, we find a
small and insignificant coefficient when we restrict the sample to re-
spondents above 50 years of age (model 6). The “placebo” results in
models 5 and 6 are reassuring also from a political economy perspec-
tive, because large effects on these groups would have opened up for
a reverse causality story where the coverage rates are expanded due
to local political demand. This story is implausible when the effect is
concentrated among mothers with small children, because this group
constitutes a relatively small group of the electorate.
In total, there is not only clear evidence that the reform increased
mothers’ entrance into occupations with longer hours and positions
of leadership, but also that the reform made mothers more career
minded. Our results hence indicate that the access to full-time daycare
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induces more mothers to go for a professional career and thereby
reducing persistent gender inequities in the labor market.
4.5 generalizability : the expected impact of daycare
beyond norway
In this paper, we have studied the impact of daycare in Norway in
the 2000s. Our empirical analyses revealed substantive impacts of the
Norwegian daycare reform on entrance into more work-heavy oc-
cupations and leadership positions, as well as on attitudes toward
having a professional career. These results should hold relevance
beyond the Norwegian case. Across advanced economies, women
make up half of the labor force but only one in three in manage-
rial positions, reflecting the fact that parents, and particularly, moth-
ers are torn between work and family demands. In a number of
advanced democracies including Germany, Japan, and the United
Kingdom expanding subsidized daycare has thus risen on the polit-
ical agenda, with proponents arguing that such welfare state services
can increase the labor supply of highly educated women and facili-
tate career investment. Understanding whether daycare reforms may
help to reduce the motherhood penalty in getting access to a profes-
sional career and senior positions in the labor market is thus of more
general interest.
Whereas the other Scandinavian countries have a long tradition of
subsidized daycare, daycare coverage for toddlers in Norway was,
prior to the reform, quite limited and more on par with other Euro-
pean countries. What characterized the reform was its introduction of
affordable, full-time daycare available to all parents. As the demand for
daycare from parents exceeds supply and as women are underrep-
resented in leadership positions across Western countries, a similar
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large-scale reform may be expected to raise mothers’ access to profes-
sional careers also outside Norway.
That said, our study can say less about reforms that have a more
limited scope, such as simply increasing childcare subsidies, introduc-
ing tax breaks for childcare, or expanding part-time daycare. There
is, for instance, evidence to suggest that the 1975 daycare reform in
Norway, which expanded daycare for older children but mostly on
a part-time basis, did not increase mothers’ labor force participation
or investment in education (Havnes and Mogstad 2011a). Our results
do accordingly not lend credence to beliefs about similar impacts of
more modest reforms.
What is more, the effect of a daycare reform is likely to have var-
ied effects across different types of market economies. Norway’s co-
ordinated market economy with wage compression between the
top and the bottom made private, unsubsidized childcare costly,
as childminders are relatively more expensive than in liberal market
economies (LMEs). Bonoli and Reber (2010) and others have force-
fully shown that in liberal market economies it is possible for high-
income earners to buy childcare off the market. The consequence
is that the introduction of subsidized daycare in a liberal market
economy should have less effect on high-income than on low-income
mothers. Moreover, the large wage disparities among working moth-
ers mean that there is less of a unified demand for daycare services,
making extensive daycare reforms unlikely. Our results are therefore
foremost expected to travel to other coordinated market economies
with relatively low wage inequality and more limited unsubsidized
daycare service markets.
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4.6 conclusions : care and career
In this study, we have argued that daycare services make it possible
for mothers of young children to enter into occupations with longer
hours and into leadership positions. Childbearing and more than a
fair share of childcare responsibilities mean that mothers face par-
ticular risks when making career decisions, including skill deprecia-
tion and lacked promotion opportunities. Entering into occupations
requiring long working hours and continuous presence, and where
skills and experience are acquired on the job, may be particularly
risky. The result is that women are severely underrepresented in high-
powered occupations. We have contended that daycare services can
help to reduce these risks by making it possible for mothers to return
to work more quickly and to enter into occupations and positions
that otherwise are viewed as incompatible with raising toddlers. Day-
care services accordingly hold promise of reducing the motherhood
penalty in professional career investment.
Unique individual-level data on the whole population of Norwe-
gian mothers combined with plausibly exogenous municipal varia-
tion in the expansion of affordable, full-time daycare centers in the
2000s have made it possible for us to investigate these hypotheses
in a much more rigid way than in the existing literature. The far-
reaching Norwegian 2002-2008 daycare reform we analyzed increased
daycare coverage for one-year-olds from 29 to 66 percent and for two-
year-olds from 51 to 86 percent. Whereas around 60 percent of these
children were enrolled in full-time daycare in 2002, it had increased
to almost 90 percent by 2008. To our knowledge, our study is the first
one to investigate the causal impact of daycare services on women’s
career investment beyond labor supply decisions.
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We document a substantial effect of the reform on mothers’ career
opportunities. Mothers’ with two-year-old children in formal daycare
are (1) more likely to enter into occupations requiring longer hours,
and (2) they have a higher chance of entering into leadership posi-
tions. Importantly, these effects are persistent. We show that they are
present also five years down the line, when the children are seven
years of age. The empirical analysis thus supports the claim that af-
fordable daycare can pave the way for women’s entrance into occu-
pations and positions which are still heavily dominated by men. In
an extension of this analysis, we used survey data to gauge whether
the reform also induced mothers’ to judge their career as more impor-
tant, and presented clear evidence that it did. Our results therefore
also speak to an burgeoning literature on how the welfare state affect
(gender) norms and preferences (see, e.g., Cavaillé 2014, 2015; Gin-
grich 2014; Gingrich and Ansell 2012).
The positive effects of daycare services do not imply that daycare
services are a panacea that will propel women into executive posi-
tions. Though they seem to aid the possibility of young mothers to
combine family and career, most daycare is limited to care during
standard, 9-5 working hours. Full-time affordable care may alone be in-
sufficient to enable more mothers to reach the highest echelons of pro-
fessional life, which typically require extensive traveling and evening
work. Daycare services cannot, moreover, guard against children be-
coming sick and requiring home care. Without fathers taking a larger
share of the childcare and household work, daycare services can only
go some way in facilitating women’s ascendence to the top of occupa-
tional hierarchies. Future research should therefore also beyond in-
vestigating whether similar effects of daycare services are detectable
elsewhere delve deeper into what institutional factors that influence
norms about fathers’ role in the household and incentivize fathers to
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stay more at home (see e.g. Cools, Fiva, and Kirkebøen 2015; Kot-
sadam and Finseraas 2011a). Only such attitudinal and behavioral
changes will make it possible to achieve gender equality in access to
leadership positions.
5
C O N C L U S I O N S
Moreover, in a hundred years, I thought, reaching my own doorstep, women will have
ceased to be the protected sex. Logically they will take part in all the activities and exertions
that were once denied to them.
—Virginia Woolf (A Room of One’s Own, 1928)
In the epigraph, written in 1928, Virginia Wolf predicts that by 2028,
or twelve years from now, gender equality will be reached. Unfortu-
nately, her prophecy will not be fulfilled in time. Significant gender
inequities persist, both at home, in politics, and in the workplace, in
the developed as in the developing world. The empirical essays in this
thesis, however, have pointed to several ways in which public insti-
tutions, combined with structural changes and political movements,
can, and have, driven the gender revolution forward.
First, reforms of public institutions can, in relatively short time,
significantly alter gender inequalities in both politics and the labor
market. In Chapter 2, I argued and showed empirically that replac-
ing a plurality with proportional representation (pr) system raised
women’s inclusion in the act of voting. Although the process was
more gradual, Chapter 3 demonstrated that, in the course of a couple
of decades, trade unions and employers were willing to use corpo-
ratist institutions to push for work-family policies (wfps) aiming to
accelerate the gender revolution. Finally, Chapter 4 indicated that the
introduction of full-time, affordable daycare available to all children
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simplified mothers’ career investments and made them see women’s
careers as equally important to men’s. Institutional reforms may, in
other words, advance gender equality.
Second, the thesis also documented the importance of women’s
political organization and structural changes. In Chapter 3, the quan-
titative and qualitative empirical evidence suggested that women’s
entrance into higher education, unions, and political parties was in-
dispensable for securing the expansion of wfps. The positive im-
pact of pr on women’s share of the votes cast in Chapter 2 was
also stronger in municipalities where there were women’s networks
and organizations present. In line with research on other aspects
of the gender revolution such as the introduction of women’s suf-
frage (Teele forthcoming), women’s political leadership (O’Brien and
Rickne 2016), and addressing violence against women (Htun and
Weldon 2012) institutions’ effects were magnified by the political
agency of organized women working within the system to shape the
pace and scope of the gender revolution.
In this concluding chapter, Section 5.1 summarizes the three empir-
ical chapters and discusses the wider implications and contributions
of these studies. In Section 5.2, I thereafter consider the limitations of
the research, as well as how future research may address these short-
comings. Finally, Section 5.3 concludes by proposing that, in order to
finalize the gender revolution, we need to “bring men back home.”
5.1 contributions and wider implications
5.1.1 PR as a vehicle for women’s inclusion in politics
The effects of political institutions notably electoral systems, quotas,
and voting laws have long been of interest to scholars of women’s
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presence in politics. As Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012, 2) draw
attention to, however, “almost no research has considered the way in
which [electoral] institutions may have different effects on men’s and
women’s political involvement.” Chapter 2 therefore theorized and
empirically investigated to what extent a move from a plurality to a
pr electoral system helped improve the gender imbalance in voting
in the early twentieth century. Women had recently gained the right
to vote but were in practice severely underrepresented in the political
sphere, both as voters and elected politicians.
The chapter specified three mechanisms through which substitut-
ing plurality with pr could lead to improved inclusion of women at
the voting booth. The first was an electoral mechanism, whereby the
increased incentive to mobilize voters under pr would lead elites to
particularly turn to women, which made up about half of the eligible
voters but were “undertapped” in terms of participation in voting.
The second was a representation mechanism, which combined the ev-
idence that women’s representation in elected bodies is higher under
pr than under plurality, with the findings that elected women serve as
role models for other women, thus encouraging and lowering the cost
associated with turning out to vote for other women. The third was
a organizational mechanism, saying that where political elites seek-
ing to mobilize more voters could tap into pre-existing women’s net-
works and organizations to get out the vote, the impact of switching
to pr would be stronger. The chapter thus drew on and developed the
existing literature on electoral institutions and interest organizations
to provide an argument about the link between electoral systems and
women’s share of the turnout.
The empirical investigation made three contributions. First, it used
exogenous variation in electoral institutions at the municipal level
in Norway to separate the effect of switching from plurality to pr
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from potential confounders, which has been difficult cross-national
research on women’s political participation (see, e.g., Kittilson and
Schwindt-Bayer 2012). Second, it collected and made use of data on
women’s share of the vote for Norwegian municipalities between
1898 and 1928, thereby directly measuring the outcome of interest
instead of having to rely on, for instance, self-reported survey data.
Third, to go beyond the main finding that the switch from plural-
ity to pr substantively increased women’s inclusion at the ballot box,
the chapter sought to look into the explanatory power of the three
mechanisms. It found indicative evidence in favor of both the elec-
toral and the organizational mechanisms but not the representation
mechanism. In total, the chapter’s results imply that institutions and
organizations were crucial to fight the de facto exclusion of women
from the political sphere.
By providing a theoretical argument and a first causal empirical
test of the link between pr and women’s share of the votes cast, the
study adds to the institutional literature on gender equality in pol-
itics, which shows that institutional design, such as quotas,1 closed
compared to open electoral lists,2 voting laws,3 presidentialism4 and
labor market institutions5 can significantly contribute toward increas-
ing women’s presence in and engagement with the political system.
The evidence from the chapter leads us to expect that the countries
which adopted both pr and women’s suffrage in the first half of the
twentieth century achieved not only de jure inclusion of women,
but also a better de facto inclusion, than the countries enfranchis-
ing women but retaining the plurality electoral system. Extending
this reasoning to electoral system reform in the developing world to-
1 See, for example, Besley et al. 2013; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Dahlerup 2013;
O’Brien and Rickne 2016.
2 Iversen and Soskice 2008; Thames and Williams 2010.
3 Corder and Wolbrecht 2006.
4 Krook and O’Brien 2012.
5 Estévez-Abe 2006, 2011; Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006.
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day, the results from Chapter 2 could consequently be informative
to reformers. Scholars disagree about the relative weight to put on
the different advantages of pr and plurality systems (see, e.g., Balin-
ski and Laraki 2010; Hix, Johnston, and McLean 2010; Lijphart 2004).
Carey and Hix (2011) convincingly argue that low-district magnitude
pr may be the “electoral sweet spot” between representation and ac-
countability. We could add that, if women are severely underrepre-
sented at the ballot box, then my findings suggest pr may addition-
ally be a tool to start leveling the political playing field.
The chapter’s findings may also help us think further about the
policy effects of pr. As a number of studies document, politicians
are responsive and enact policies in response to the preferences of
their voters (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2015; Hobolt and Klem-
mensen 2008; Lax and Phillips 2009; Lijphart 1997). The results should
therefore also lead us to expect legislatures to be more responsive to
the needs of women after the move to pr. Future studies should there-
fore investigate whether legislatures enacted policies that directly ad-
dressed women’s preferences such as for instance land and inheri-
tance rights, access to education and public positions, and widow’s
pensions (Duflo 2011; Hanssen, Pettersen, and Tveit Sandvin 2001;
Htun and Weldon 2011; Schrumpf 1985).
Finally, the chapter also contains lessons about the link between
electoral institutions and women’s representation in legislatures. The
argument that pr leads to a higher presence of women in parlia-
ment has often been couched in general terms, leading to the expec-
tation that it would hold across all time periods and countries after
women got the right to vote (e.g., Norris 2006; Paxton, Hughes, and
Painter 2010). I find, however, that replacing plurality with pr did
not increase women’s presence in local legislatures, at least not in the
short to medium run. This finding points in the direction that the rela-
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tionship between pr and women’s legislative representation is condi-
tional on a supply of women the relevant experience and willingness
to go into politics, as for instance Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008) have
argued. Another avenue for future research is therefore to pin down
the conditions that are necessary for pr to have an impact on women’s
entrance into parliaments.
5.1.2 Corporatism and the new welfare state
Pr reduced the gender gap in voting in the early twentieth century;
yet the broader transformation of women’s role in society had to
await the second wave of the gender revolution, starting in the 1960s.
Indeed, the post-war growth period reinforced the male-breadwinner
division of labor. It was instead the massive expansion of education,
and the entrance of women into the labor market, that marked the
onset of the second wave of the gender revolution (Goldin 2006). Still,
the extent to which mothers in particular, and dual-earner house-
holds generally, became supported by the welfare state in their need
for work-family policies was by no means automatic. Rather, as I ar-
gued in Chapter 3, it crucially depended on the presence of central-
ized and influential social partners.
More precisely, I contended that unions and employers turned
around and started favoring, and pushing for, wfps for two inter-
related reasons. For trade unions, as organizations with democratic
decision-making procedures, their preferences is a function of their
membership base and prospects for future recruitment. If women’s
share of union members grows, I argued that unions become in-
creasingly likely to favor wfps. For employers, the change in pref-
erences from (a) an indifferent, or even outright hostile, attitude to-
ward the increased taxes and labor costs wfp reforms would entail,
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to (b) favoring and pushing for wfps, materialized as women became
a growing source of highly-skilled labor power. To successfully in-
fluence policy, however, unions and employers needed to be inte-
grated into centralized corporatist institutions, which gave them a
direct say in the making of wfps. Additionally, and in accordance
with recent analyses, I highlighted the importance of highly edu-
cated women’s rise within parties (Morgan 2013). Employing a multi-
method approach combining a time-series cross-national analysis
with process tracing of wfp reforms in Norway but also briefer stud-
ies of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden I showed
that this explanation contributes to the welfare state literature with
important answers to the puzzle of wfp reforms, especially since the
argument can explain both cross-national variation and the within-
country timing of reforms.
The study also speaks to the general literatures on institutional
change (Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2015; Streeck and Thelen 2005)
and employers and unions (Hacker and Pierson 2002; Mares 2003a;
Paster 2013; Swenson 2002). The study shows that old institutions,
such corporatism, can be redirected to new use, in this case to ex-
pand wfps, for instance by including new groups such as women.
Thelen (2003, 2004) labels this “conversion” and notes that “institu-
tions do not survive through ‘stasis’ or by standing still but rather
precisely through their ongoing adaptation and renegotiation in re-
sponse to shifts in the political, market, and social environments”
(Thelen 2004, 276; see also Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2015). In line
with Martin and Swank (2012) and Thelen (2014), the findings in
Chapter 3 show that, in the face of a reversal of the gender gap in
higher education and women’s entrance into unions, centralized cor-
poratist institutions have been effective in updating their preferences
and using their influence to redesign the welfare state to meet the
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needs of dual-earner couples, and ensure the labor market partici-
pation of high-skilled women. Indeed, by organizing workers across
sectors, professions, and industries, the centralized trade union fed-
erations have partially succeeded in compensating for the declining
number of industrial male workers with the entrance of female ser-
vice sector workers.
Comprehending wfps and women’s entrance into higher education
and unions may thus be conducive to further our knowledge regard-
ing the future role of corporatism, and hence the development of the
welfare state. In difference from new politics of the welfare state liter-
ature, which argued that unions and employers have lost their sway
over social policy expansion and retrenchment (Pierson 1996), this
study has documented that the development of the welfare state still
hinges on the preferences and power of employers and trade unions.
Moreover, unlike the studies seeing employers as unequivocally for or
against publicly-funded social services and benefits, the chapter has
shown the policy preferences of the social partners to be conditional
on structural changes in the labor market (see also Hall and Gin-
gerich 2009; Mares 2003a; Paster 2013). In doing so, the chapter also
indicated that the institutional change literature has paid too little
attention to how specific structural changes incentivizes institutional
political actors to change their policy stances and behavior.
5.1.3 Daycare services and mothers’ careers
Social policies do not always, or even predominantly, work as in-
tended. Policymaking is ridden with unintended consequences. A
crucial task for social scientists is therefore to assess the effects of
public policies (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). This is particularly im-
portant when there are well-founded, theoretical reasons for believ-
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ing that the policy may address unfair social inequities, such as the
underrepresentation of women in powerful labor market positions
(Deaton 2010). As we move up the occupational or political ladder,
the absence of women becomes more and more striking, as docu-
mented by for instance the OECD (2016) and Folke and Rickne (forth-
coming). Given that women, and mothers in particular, still do a dis-
proportionally large share of the childrearing and household work,
an important question is whether affordable, full-time daycare ser-
vices for children under school age can reduce the trade-off between
work and family, and thereby increase mothers’ career investment
(Esping-Andersen 1999a, 2009; Estévez-Abe 2006; Iversen and Rosen-
bluth 2006, 2010; Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006; Stier, Lewin-
Epstein, and Braun 2001). Chapter 4 argued that daycare services may
particularly intensify the willingness of mothers to enter into occupa-
tions requiring longer hours and to apply for leadership positions, as
the service provides parents with a reliable source of care for their
children. As such, it makes it possible to enter into positions with
limited working-time flexibility and requiring continuous presence.
To test for the impact of full-time affordable daycare services on
mothers’ propensity to enter into occupations with longer hours and
managerial positions, Chapter 4 made use of a large-scale reform of
the Norwegian daycare service system between 2002 and 2008. The
reform aimed to ensure full daycare coverage across the country, thus
leading to a 35 percentage point increase in daycare coverage for one-
and two-year-old children. The study exploits the fact that the yearly
change in daycare coverage varied greatly across municipalities and
was plausibly exogenous to local politics, at least after conditioning
on local labor market conditions. Using the municipal variation in
daycare as an instrument for individual mothers’ uptake of daycare,
and register data on the whole population of Norwegian mothers
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in the reform period, the chapter found that daycare services make
mothers of two-year-olds more likely to enter into occupations re-
quiring longer hours as well as leadership positions. The study conse-
quently provides evidence that daycare services may help to reduce
the dominance of men at the top of the labor market.
With regard to Chapter 2 on pr, I discussed the “role model effect”,
whereby the presence of women leaders in politics and in the labor
market raise the aspirations and participation of other women. With
more women entering into leadership positions as a consequence of
the daycare service reform, this might have the knock-on effect of
subsequently induce more women to aspire to become executives and
leaders in private firms and government agencies. The reform may
therefore “snowball” over time and thus further help to break down
the barriers to women’s leadership in the economy.
Although the chapter investigated the labor market as a whole, the
results have implications for women’s presence in politics, and partic-
ularly in senior positions (cf. Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006).
Several studies indicate that mothers, due to family responsibilities,
are at a disadvantage when it comes to relevant labor market ex-
perience for successfully advancing in politics (Iversen and Rosen-
bluth 2008; Teele et al. 2015; but see Fox and Lawless 2014a). They
also have fewer opportunities for continuous presence, network build-
ing, and time investment than their male counterparts, which again
affects their opportunities for successfully obtaining positions such as
committee chairs, cabinet ministers, and heads of government (Camp-
bell and Childs 2014; Childs 2016; Lacey and Perrons 2015; Loven-
duski 2005; Wangnerud 2009). Given the similarities between politics
and managerial positions in terms of working time, the findings pre-
sented in Chapter 4 give rise to the expectation that daycare services
can reduce the gender bias in senior political positions by making it
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possible for more mothers to reconcile having a family with invest-
ment in a political career.
5.2 limitations and related avenues for future re-
search
5.2.1 Generalizability
The empirical findings in the three empirical chapters mainly stem
from subnational evidence, and, as noted in the introduction, the the-
sis intentionally traded off external for internal validity. Here I will
mainly focus on what this choice implies for future research.
The findings regarding the effect of pr on women’s inclusion in
voting stems from an analysis of municipal elections. In their meta-
analysis of the literature on the determinants of overall voter turnout,
Cancela and Geys (2016) find that the effect of pr is stronger in stud-
ies investigating subnational than national elections. As they point
out, one reason for this pattern might be that the subnational results
predominantly stem from quasi-experimental studies. Still, if these
differences are due to substantive differences for instance, that they
are caused by smaller population sizes, which is positively associated
with voter turnout then this might imply that the results I found
in Chapter 2 would be weaker in national elections. Future research
should therefore seek to replicate and expand on the findings by in-
vestigating national elections. Using district-level data and the move
to pr at the national level in Norway could prove valuable in this
regard (cf. Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2015).
Additionally, the chapter’s results are from the historical setting
in which women were considerably less likely to vote than men. Yet,
to identify the domain of cases to which the finding applies, future
5.2 limitations and related avenues for future research 205
research should also seek to investigate electoral changes in contem-
porary politics, both in the developed and the developing world.
The fact that Italian and French municipalities have to use different
electoral systems depending on whether their population is above
or below certain population thresholds (Bordignon, Nannicini, and
Tabellini 2014; Eggers 2015), might prove useful in this regard.6 Given
the theoretical framework, it would be particularly interesting to an-
alyze the effect of electoral institutions in countries where gender
inequality in turning out to vote is prevalent, such as in India (Nor-
ris 2002). To try to extend the findings to other settings could also an-
swer the question of whether the results are applicable to the switch
from single-member district plurality (smd) to pr, and not just from
multi-member district plurality, which is what I investigated with the
Norwegian reform. There is no a priori reason to believe that the re-
sults would not hold also for smd but the exercise would nonetheless
help to determine the generalizability of the results.
Likewise, the findings from the daycare services reform also raise
questions about how applicable the results are to other institutional
settings. One of the strengths, but also weaknesses, of investigating
the reform is its scope. The strength is that it allowed us to investi-
gate the effect of full-time, affordable daycare. The weakness is that
the costliness of the reform makes it unlikely to be implemented at
a similar pace or scope anywhere else. Indeed, most of the studies
that look at the effect of daycare on mothers’ labor supply use much
smaller reforms. It is therefore crucial to look at similar outcomes as
in Chapter 4, but using more modest reforms as the treatment vari-
able, to determine whether such reforms may still enhance mothers’
possibilities to obtain leadership positions in the labor market.
6 Though such analysis would also require the number of voters broken down by
gender, which might be harder to obtain.
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The study of the politics of wfp reforms in Chapter 3 do not run
into the same questions of generalizability, as the analysis covers the
advanced democracies for which the argument is intended to hold.7
Moreover, by emphasizing centralized and corporatist unions and em-
ployers as crucial actors in wfp reforms, it is not evident that the anal-
ysis would travel to other parts of the world. In Latin America, as well
as in South-East Asia, unions are neither centralized nor encompass-
ing enough to be able to significantly push governments to enact wfps.
As Schneider (2009, 561), for instance, notes: “labour relations in Latin
America are atomistic and often anomic because most workers have
fluid, short-term links to firms and weak or no horizontal links to
other workers through labour unions” (Schneider 2013, see addition-
ally,). The weakness of organized labor makes it unlikely that a simi-
lar surge in higher education rates and labor market entrance among
women would result in the development of generous wfps. Yet, if the
gender gap in higher education reverses also here, we might see that
individual business and constellations of firms start calling for wfps.
5.2.2 Mechanisms
Instead of extending the analysis of wfps to other parts of the globe,
another area for future research would be to delve further into the
intra-organizational mechanisms of how unions, employers and par-
ties come to favor wfps. For instance, within the employers’ associ-
ation, were the employers relying on high-skilled female labor the
most eager to make the organization come out in favor of wfp re-
forms? Given that it is more difficult for small than large firms to
find temporary replacement for workers on parental leave, were small
firms consistently more opposed to the employers accepting reforms
7 It would, of course, be valuable to also expand the analysis to in-depth case studies
of other countries beyond Norway.
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of parental leave? Similarly, within the trade union confederations, it
would be valuable to map out the stances of affiliated unions and
whether their attitudes toward wfps correlated with the female share
of their members. In other words, future research should seek to
go even further in establishing the exact intra-organizational mech-
anisms behind the results. The chapter was also foremost concerned
with the generosity of wfps and had less to say about the precise design
of these policies, such as whether public funding should be provided
through tax deductions or the provisions of services, whether pol-
icy provision should be centralized or decentralized to subnational
governments, whether provision should be publicly funded or also
publicly provided, and how and to what extent markets should be
introduced in the provision of daycare services (Gingrich 2011). An
profitable path for research would therefore be to theorize further,
and investigate, the social partners and parties’ preferences over these
different designs of wfps.
In the chapter on pr, I investigated three central mechanisms that
could be at play, and found support for both the electoral and the or-
ganizational mechanisms. There might, however, also be other mech-
anisms than these three at play. One example would be to further
examine the role of linkages between political parties and women’s or-
ganizations (cf. Powell 1982). A possible hypothesis could be that par-
ties with stronger ties to civil society, such as the Labour party, would
be more successful in mobilizing women than the more loosely orga-
nized parties and lists found to the right in the political landscape
in Norway during the early 1900s. Unfortunately, the election reports
from the time period do not contain data on party vote or seat shares
for more than a handful of cities (Hjellum 1967),8 which makes such
an inquiry difficult, if not impossible, to carry out for the Norwegian
8 The election reports from Statistics Norway were written on the basis of election
forms that the municipalities mailed Statistics Norway after the elections. These orig-
inal forms did contain party vote shares but the information was not reported in the
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elections. An important topic to explore in future investigations of
other cases is therefore the role of different political parties in mobi-
lizing women to vote as the electoral system switches from plurality
to pr. Such inquiries would provide a more complete account of the
mechanisms leading to positive impact of pr on women’s inclusion
in voting.
Finally, also the mapping of how daycare services affect women’s
possibility to enter into leadership positions would benefit from fur-
ther investigations of the mechanisms behind the result. For instance,
future research should try to identify which aspect of the daycare
reform, such as the reduction in the price of daycare or the in-
creased availability of full-time daycare, that had the largest effect on
women’s career investment. Another option would be to see whether
other policies have comparable results, and which mechanisms they
hit. For instance, Kotsadam and Finseraas (2011b) find that the 1993
paternity leave reform in Norway resulted in lower levels of conflict
over the household division of labor among parents. It would be fruit-
ful to investigate whether men’s increasing presence at home also
leads mothers to become more career minded. Indeed, the most ef-
fective way of giving mothers more time for career investment would
probably be to incentivize fathers to do more at home.
5.3 bringing men (back) home to finalize the gender
revolution
Compared to a century ago, gender equality has reached revolution-
ary heights. The opportunities to pursue one’s life goals have perhaps
never in modern human history been as equally distributed across the
genders as today. So far, however, women’s roles have changed far
Statistics Norway reports. Sadly, when there was a fire at Statistics Norway a few
decades later, the original forms were turned to ash.
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more than men’s. To finalize the gender revolution, which involves
addressing the uneven division of household work and occupational
gender segregation, we may therefore paradoxically have to focus on
men. Women have entered the previously male-dominated spheres
of politics and careers. Men have not to the same extent entered the
female-dominated sphere of the family to the detriment of both
women and men. Future research on the gender revolution should
therefore seek to investigate how public institutional reforms can en-
able women and men to invest in care and career.
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a.1 appendix
a.1.1 From a candidate-centered plurality to a party-centered PR
electoral system
The plurality and the pr systems used in Norwegian municipalities
in the pre-World War II period had different incentives for cultivat-
ing a personal vote, i.e. the value of personal reputation for getting
elected. In table A.1, I use Carey and Shugart’s (1995) scoring scheme
to classify the two systems for each of the three variables influencing
the incentives to cultivate a personal vote. A score of 6 means a fully
personalistic system and 0 means a fully party-centered one. The plu-
rality system scores 5 in total, indicating that it was a personalistic
system: there was no leadership control over ballots, there was no
pooling across candidates, and voters vote for as many candidates as
there were seats.1 A similar system is today used in the Philippine
Senate. The pr system, on the other hand, only scores 2. It was, in
other words, a party-centered system: parties’ nomination meetings
decided the lists (but voters could cumulate), votes were pooled at
the party level, and voters had as many votes as there were seats. The
1 If voters had cast one vote for a single candidate, then it would have been a fully
personalistic system.
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move from plurality to pr in Norwegian municipalities consequently
meant a shift from a typically candidate-centered plurality system to
a typically party-centered pr system.
table a.1. Incentives to cultivate a personal vote in the plurality and pr elec-
toral systems in Norwegian municipalities.
Electoral system (both with m> 1)
Multi-member plurality Open-list pr
Ballot (0-2) 2 (no leadership
control over
ballots)
1 (party lists with
preferential
voting)
Pool (0-2) 2 (no pooling) 0 (pooling at party
level)
Votes (0-2) 1 (vote for several
candidates)
1 (vote for several
candidates)
Sum (min: 0, max: 6): 5 (candidate
centered)
2 (party centered)
Other example: Philippine Senate
(Carey and
Shugart 1995)
Italy pre 1993
(Carey and
Shugart 1995;
Katz 1980)
Note: Based on Carey and Shugart’s (1995, 420-3) scoring scheme, which is as follows.
Ballot “measures the degree of control party leaders exercise over access to their
party’s label”, with: 0 = leaders present a fixed ballot, voters may not “disturb”
list; 1 = leaders present party ballots, but voters may “disturb” list; 2 = leaders do
no control access to ballots, or rank. Pool “measures whether voters case for one
candidate of a given party also contribute to the number of seats won in the district
by the party as a whole”, with: 0 = pooling across whole party; 1 = pooling at sub-
party level; 2 = no pooling. Votes “distinguishes among systems in which voters are
allowed to case only a single vote for a party, multiple votes, or a single vote for a
candidate”, with: 0 = voters cast a single vote for one party; 1 = voters cast votes for
multiple candidates; 2 = voters cast a single vote below the party level.
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a.1.2 Map of the electoral system used in 1916
PR
Plurality
figure a.1. Map of type of electoral system used in Norwegian municipali-
ties in 1916.
Notes: The map shows the administrative borders for Norwegian mu-
nicipalities in 1918. White colored municipalities have missing data.
Sources: Statistics Norway (1917).
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a.1.3 The covariates of proportional representation
table a.2. Regression results reporting the association between pr and a set
of covariates.
Cross section Over time
(1) (2) (3)
βˆ1916 βˆt βˆt−1
Population (log) .14∗∗∗ -.07 -.04
(.03) (.08) (.08)
Women (% of pop.) -.03∗∗∗ .01 .00
(.01) (.01) (.01)
% of employed (agriculture omitted)
Industry .01∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Services .00 .01∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Shipping -.02∗∗∗ -.02∗ -.02
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Non-religious (% of pop.) .01 .04∗ .05∗∗
(.02) (.03) (.03)
Poor relief (% of pop.) .05∗∗∗
(.02)
1905 signatures (% of female pop.) .00∗∗∗
(.00)
Observations 625 2448 1864
Municipalities 625 655 655
Adjusted R2 .30 .63 .64
Municipality FEs X X
Election FEs X X
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. OLS regressions with standard errors in
parentheses. Models 3 and 4 report robust standard errors clustered by municipality
in parentheses.
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a.1.4 Weighted regression results
table a.3. Regression results reporting the effect of pr on women’s share of
total turnout in municipal elections, Norway 1910-1928.
Women’s percentage of votes cast
(mean among reformed in 1919: 32%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PR 11.4 10.1 10.6 11.6 10.7
(.8) (.7) (.9) (1.0) (1.1)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X
Covariates X X
Trends X X X
Trends2 X X
Observations 4,127 4,127 4,127 4,127 4,127
Municipalities 593 593 593 593 593
Effect size (% ∆) 54 46 49 56 49
95% CI [47,62] [40,52] [41,57] [47,66] [39,59]
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by municipality in
parentheses and p-values in italics. Trends are municipality specific. The covariates
are: eligible voters (log), women’s percentage of eligible voters, representatives in
the municipal council (log), population (log), women’s percentage of the population,
percentage of the population in nonconformist (dissenting) religious societies, and
variables for the percentage of the population in each of the employment categories
industry, shipping, services, agriculture, home services, and non-employed (with
agriculture as the omitted category). The effect size is calculated by dividing the es-
timated pr coefficient by the sum of the mean for the treated units minus the to pr
coefficient and then multiplying this number by 100.
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a.1.5 The association between switching to PR between the 1913
and the 1916 election and women’s share of the votes cast.
table a.4. Regression results reporting the association between pr on
women’s share of total turnout in municipal elections, Norway
1913-1916.
Women’s percentage of votes cast
(1) (2)
PR 5.3 5.5
(1.5) (1.6)
<0.001 <0.001
Municipality FEs X X
Election FEs X X
Covariates X
Observations 490 490
Municipalities 245 245
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by municipality in
parentheses and p-values in italics. Trends are municipality specific. The covariates
are: eligible voters (log), women’s percentage of eligible voters, representatives in
the municipal council (log), population (log), women’s percentage of the population,
percentage of the population in nonconformist (dissenting) religious societies, and
variables for the percentage of the population in each of the employment categories
industry, shipping, services, agriculture, home services, and non-employed (with
agriculture as the omitted category). The effect size is calculated by dividing the es-
timated pr coefficient by the sum of the mean for the treated units minus the to pr
coefficient and then multiplying this number by 100.
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a.1.6 The effect on overall turnout
table a.5. Regression results reporting the effect of pr on turnout in munic-
ipal elections, Norway, 1910-1928.
Turnout
(mean among reformed in 1919: 41%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PR 7.3 7.2 12.1 12.2 11.1
(.9) (1.0) (1.3) (1.5) (1.6)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X
Covariates X X
Trends X X X
Trends2 X X
Observations 4,125 4,125 4,125 4,125 4,125
Municipalities 593 593 593 593 593
Effect size (% ∆) 22 21 42 42 37
95% CI [16,27] [15,27] [33,51] [32,53] [27,48]
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by municipality in
parentheses and p-values in italics. Trends are municipality specific. The covariates
are: eligible voters (log), women’s percentage of eligible voters, representatives in
the municipal council (log), population (log), women’s percentage of the population,
percentage of the population in nonconformist (dissenting) religious societies, and
variables for the percentage of the population in each of the employment categories
industry, shipping, services, agriculture, home services, and non-employed (with
agriculture as the omitted category). The effect size is calculated by dividing the es-
timated pr coefficient by the sum of the mean for the treated units minus the to pr
coefficient and then multiplying this number by 100.
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a.1.7 Main results after controlling for turnout
table a.6. Regression results reporting the effect of pr on women’s share of
total turnout in municipal elections, Norway, 1910-1928.
Women’s percentage of votes cast
(mean among reformed in 1919: 33%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PR 6.3 5.8 3.6 4.9 4.5
(.5) (.5) (.7) (.8) (.9)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X
Turnout covariate X X X X X
Other covariates X X
Trends X X X
Trends2 X X
Observations 4,125 4,125 4,125 4,125 4,125
Municipalities 593 593 593 593 593
Effect size (% ∆) 24 21 12 17 16
95% CI [20,27] [18,25] [8,17] [12,23] [10,22]
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by municipality in
parentheses and p-values in italics. Trends are municipality specific. The covariates
are: eligible voters (log), women’s percentage of eligible voters, representatives in
the municipal council (log), population (log), women’s percentage of the population,
percentage of the population in nonconformist (dissenting) religious societies, and
variables for the percentage of the population in each of the employment categories
industry, shipping, services, agriculture, home services, and non-employed (with
agriculture as the omitted category). The effect size is calculated by dividing the es-
timated pr coefficient by the sum of the mean for the treated units minus the to pr
coefficient and then multiplying this number by 100.
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a.1.8 1905 Petition
figure a.2. An example of the signatures collected for the 1905 indepen-
dence petition (from Gildeskål).
Source: The Norwegian Parliamentary Archives.
B
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b.1.1 Shadow case studies
To ensure that the mechanisms linking the social partners to wfp ex-
pansion are not specific to the Norwegian case, and also to investi-
gate countries with different levels of corporatism and gender gap in
higher education, this section conducts brief case studies of Sweden,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom based on the secondary
literature. These cases cover the range of both corporatism (see Fig-
ure B.1.5) and the development of the gender gap in higher education
(see Figure B.1.5). As such, the cases complement both the quantita-
tive cross-country analysis and the in-depth case study of Norway.
Sweden: centralized corporatism and high education rates among women
Until the 1960s, Swedish family policy was geared towards male-
breadwinner families, and the preference for such a family ar-
rangement “was strong, especially within the trade unions” (Hird-
man 1998, 38; Ginsburg 2001, 213-5). As in Norway, few Swedish chil-
dren attended daycare centers the coverage rate was three percent
in 1965 (Sörensen and Bergqvist 2002, 8). The six-month parental leave
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available was paid at a low rate (Björklund 2006). In Sweden, however,
women’s education and employment rates started to surge earlier
than in Norway (Barro and Lee 2010; Sörensen and Bergqvist 2002).
Accordingly, whereas the Norwegian wfp reforms in the 1970 were
minor, Sweden considerably expanded daycare and leave already dur-
ing this decade.
First, the Swedish 1975 Daycare Act aimed at ameliorate working
mothers’ labor market position and was a major reform. As a result
of the reform, Sweden’s daycare coverage for one- to two-year-olds
considerably outpaced Norway’s coverage until the 2000s which is
visible from the different trends in Figure B.1.1. From early on, more-
over, a larger share of children attended daycare on a full-time basis
(Sörensen and Bergqvist 2002). Second, also leave was expanded at an
earlier point in time than in Norway. In 1974, parental leave benefits
were increased to 90 percent of previous earnings. Thereafter the Riks-
dag extended the length of the leave to eight months in 1978, nine
months in 1980, twelve months in 1989. In 1995, the fathers’ quota
was introduced. Today, Swedish parents have 480 days of leave, with
390 of them paid at a 77.6 percent replacement rate and the rest at a
flat rate.
Like in Norway, both unions and employers played a key role in
turning the Swedish welfare state around to favor working moth-
ers and dual-earner households (Swenson 2002, ch. 13; Hinnfors 1992;
Huber and Stephens 2000; Daguerre 2006; Ginsburg 2001; Danielsen,
Larsen, and Owesen 2013). Within the trade unions, the share female
members, and their representation in leadership positions, rose ear-
lier than in Norway, as can be glanced from Figure B.1.2a. For in-
stance, in Sweden 30 percent of union members were women in al-
ready in 1968; in Norway women reached the same number around
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figure b.1.1. Daycare coverage in Sweden and Norway, 1963-2014.
Source: Nordic Council (2016) and Sörensen and Bergqvist
(2002)
1980.1 Hinnfors (1992) documents that the lo started its turnaround
and came to favor daycare expansion from the late 1960s, as a
means to improve the labor market position of working women.
Thus, in 1969 the Social Democrats and the lo releases a joint re-
port arguing that “a continued strong expansion of daycare centers
are therefore one of the most important equality reforms” (cited in
Hinnfors 1992, 147). The result was that “both lo and the [social-
democratic] party became advocates for child care and, ultimately, for
parental leave” (Mahon 1997, 389). They were, furthermore, joined by
the employers, who also started to favor wfp expansion during this
period to increase mothers’ supply of skilled labor (Swenson 2002).
As Figure B.1.2b shows, also the enrollment rate in higher education
among women surged in Sweden before Norway.
The dominant position of the Social Democrats in Swedish poli-
tics meant that it had an important role in the wfp expansions; still,
1 Unions also organized a larger share of the workforce in Sweden than in
Norway Sweden’s mean union density across the 1970-2009 period was 78 percent
and Norway’s was 56 percent (Visser 2011).
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figure b.1.2. Women in trade unions and higher education in Sweden and
Norway.
Notes: See Figure 3.1 for the definition of enrollment in higher educa-
tion. Sources: Visser (2011) (union membership); Barro and Lee (2015)
(education).
also the Liberals and the agrarian Center Party embraced the re-
forms (Sörensen and Bergqvist 2002). Within the parties, and par-
ticularly within the Social Democratic Party, the women’s network
actively pushed for wfp reforms (Bergman 2004; Daguerre 2006; Hin-
nfors 1992). The within-party splits between those favoring home-
care allowances and those favoring daycare services was decided in
favor of the latter as women’s representation grew (Sörensen and
Bergqvist 2002, 11). The result was that a broad coalition of parties
supported the introduction of wfps from the 1960s and onwards.
In sum, from early on, the existing research documents that
both the employers’ and the trade union confederations, along with
women within parties, played a pivotal role in changing the Swedish
welfare state from favoring male-breadwinner families to actively sup-
porting dual-earner ones. A similar key role of the social partners,
and convergence among the political parties, can be found in Fin-
land and Denmark, also there coinciding with the rise of women’s
education rates and their representation within unions (Abraham-
son 2010, see, e.g., Borchorst 2002; Hansen and Petersen 2000; Lammi-
Taskula and Takala 2009).
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figure b.1.3. Women in trade unions and higher education in the Nether-
lands and Norway.
Notes: See Figure 3.1 for the definition of enrollment in higher educa-
tion. Sources: Visser (2011) (union membership); Barro and Lee (2015)
(education).
The Netherlands: corporatism and lower education rates among women
Work-family policies were developed much later in the Netherlands
compared to Norway. By 1988, only about two percent of the chil-
dren under the age of three attended daycare (Bussemaker 1997, 32).
Although coverage increased somewhat during the 1990s, it was just
above 20 percent in 2001, and demand far exceeded supply (Betten-
dorf, Jongen, and Muller 2015, 115; Gustafsson and Kenjoh 2004, 45).
Since then it has increased to 55 percent in 2013 (see Figure 3.3). That
said, it is a part-time service average hours of attendance per week
is only seventeen and the cost of a daycare slot is twice that of
for instance Norway, Belgium, and Germany (OECD 2012a; Betten-
dorf, Jongen, and Muller 2015, 114). Daycare services are, in other
words, still much more limited than in Norway. Paid maternity leave
was twelve weeks with full pay until 1990, when it was increased to
16 weeks. In 2009, 26 weeks of paid parental leave was introduced
(OECD 2012a). Payment and rights to leave have, however, varied ex-
tensively depending on agreements between unions and employers
in sector-level collective bargaining (Plantenga and Remery 2009).
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Unions and employers play a key role in the making of Dutch wfps.
Plantenga and Remery (2009, 182) put this point concisely: “[f]rom the
very beginning, employers have been given an important role in the
introduction of leave policies within the Dutch working time regime.
By way of collective labour agreements, the social partners are sup-
posed to top up public policy, which is mainly concerned with guar-
anteeing the minimum right.” This also holds for daycare, where a
“main part of the organization of childcare provision has been dele-
gated to employers and employees, who have to negotiate childcare
in their collective agreements” (Bussemaker 1998, 88).
In difference from Norway, however, women’s entrance into both
unions and higher education has been slower in the Netherlands, as
Figure B.1.3 delineates. Additionally, although collective bargaining
covers a large share of the labor market, union density is today only
around twenty percent down from about 40 percent in the 1960s
and 30 percent in the 1980s and bargaining is more decentralized to
the sectoral level in the Netherlands than in Norway. The enactment
of wfp reforms has consequently been slow.
Daycare became an issue of political contention in the 1970s,
brought to the agenda by women within the trade unions, the so-
cial democratic, and the communist parties (Kremer 2002, 123; Mor-
gan 2013, 91). Yet, with the majority of employers and trade unions
uninterested, and with the Christian Democrats and Liberals domi-
nating government, the flame quickly died out. Hence, by the late
1980s formal daycare was almost absent (Kremer 2002, 118). The same
was true for parental leave (Plantenga and Remery 2009). There was
an early initiative on leave in 1980s, with the Social Democrats propos-
ing a partially paid parental leave as an addition to the paid maternity
leave. Yet, employers and the other parties were against and unions
were largely uninterested in making leave paid (Plantenga and Re-
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mery 2009). Paid leave was thus left to social partners, which meant
that many workplaces did not pay leave until late 1990s (Plantenga
and Remery 2009).
By the early 1990s, employers, unions, and political
parties notably the Social Democrats and the Liberals, but also to
some extent the Christian Democrats started to become interested
in daycare as a labor market policy for ensuring the labor market
attachment of highly educated women (Bussemaker 1998, 86-7).2
From 1987 and onwards trade unions requested that daycare arrange-
ments should be included in collective agreements (Gustafsson and
Kenjoh 2004). Also the Social Economic Council Sociaal-Economische
Raad, which represents the employers and unions’ interests and
is the government’s main advisory board on social and economic
policy expressed a preference for some expansion of daycare
(Plantenga and Remery 2009, 177). The first daycare reforms, initi-
ated under the Christian Democratic-Social Democratic government
in office from 1989, and the Liberal-Social Democratic government in
place from 1994, gave a modest expansion of daycare slots. The latter
government had a record number of women ministers, 26 percent,
and these played a part in these reforms (Morgan 2013, 92). The social
partners were given the role of implementing the reform through
collective agreements (Bussemaker 1998). Still, by 1995, only eight
percent of children under the age of four attended formal daycare;
and by 2001 the number was just above twenty (Kremer 2002, 119;
Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller 2015). Despite being in the position to
expand wfps, the social partners were thus content with quite minor
reforms. As the Netherlands did not experience an equivalently
rapid surge in female union membership or higher education rates
2 The exception was the smaller Christian parties on the right-wing, which still op-
posed the expansion of daycare (Bussemaker 1998, 87).
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during this period as Norway, this is the behavior that the theoretical
argument would lead us to expect.
Education and unionization rates among women, however, contin-
ued to grow in the late 1990s and 2000s.3 New reforms were put in
place by another Liberal-Social Democratic government at the turn
of the millennium. The daycare reforms raised the attendance rate
in formal daycare reaching a coverage rate of 25 percent in 2004. A
large share of these daycare slots were subsidized by employers and
local governments (Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller 2015, 114).
The government also modestly expanded leave to include sixteen
weeks of leave and two days of paternity leave. The payment of
leave was, however, left up to employers, although half of the leave
payment would be subsidized. Employers in general have been re-
luctant, and small employers negative, to increase leave payments,
which may reflect the fact that skilled women are still a less decisive
part of the workforce than in the Nordic countries (Plantenga and
Remery 2009, 183).
The 2005 Daycare Act, initiated by Liberal-Christian Democratic
government (2003-6), changed the daycare arrangements so that sub-
sidies were transferred to parents instead of daycare centers (Betten-
dorf, Jongen, and Muller 2015, 114). Over 2005-2009 period, the gov-
ernments increased subsidies considerably, leading to daycare cover-
age to reach 55 percent by 2015. As mentioned above, however, most
of the daycare slots are still part-time.4 In 2009, the Social Democratic-
Christian Democratic government (2006-10) also expanded parental
leave to 26 weeks, though, apart from some tax deductions for half of
the leave, payment was still left up to the collective agreements, with
3 The same holds for women’s share of mps. In government only about one third of
ministers have been women throughout the 2000s, with the exception of the current
government, in which 38 percent of the minsiters are women.
4 The 2010-2012 center-right government moderately cut back daycare subsidies (Mor-
gan 2013).
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the public sector employees being more likely to have paid leave than
private sector employees (den Dulk 2015, 236).
To summarize, wfps arrived much later and are much more modest
than in Norway. As we would expect in a corporatist country, unions
and employers are central in the making and implementation of wfp
reforms. Women’s share of union members, however, has been slower
to expand, reaching 30 percent in the late 2000s (compared to the late
1980s for Norway). The same holds for enrollment in higher educa-
tion. Neither unions nor employers have thus had the same incentives
to push for wfp expansion as in Norway. Only more recently have
women within the dominant parties been able to work work actively
with employers and unions to significantly expand wfps. Comparing
the Dutch to the Norwegian case, in other words, illustrates that, even
where the social partners have the power to influence policy, their in-
centives to do so vary in accordance with the gender gap in higher
education and women’s entrance into trade unions.
United Kingdom: low corporatism and lower education rates among women
In the United Kingdom, daycare and leave policies are still limited.
Daycare coverage for children under three years of age was 35 per-
cent in 2013, compared to for instance 55 percent in the Netherlands.
Moreover, the average hours of attendance per week is sixteen, mean-
ing that full-time daycare coverage is even lower. The cost of daycare
is also considerable. A dual-earner family in which the parents earn
respectively 100 and 50 percent of an average income typically pay
34 percent of their net income in fees for a full-time daycare slot
(OECD 2012a). Paid maternity leave is available for six weeks with
benefits equal to 90 percent of previous earnings and then with a low
flat rate payment (£140 in 2015) for 33 weeks. There is additionally
a two week paternity leave paid at the same low flat rate. Wfps are
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thus still more restricted in the United Kingdom than in both the
Netherlands and Norway.
Despite a brief level of higher coordination between unions and
employers’ associations in the 1960s and 1970s, the United Kingdom
is best characterized as having “pluralist, weakly organized, decen-
tralized employer associations and trade unions, and collective bar-
gaining agreements cover only a small part of the British economy”
(Martin and Swank 2012, 191).5 The institutions that facilitate policy
influence for the social partners are thus much weaker in Britain than
in Norway. Women make up an increasing share of union members,
and this trend track that of Norway, as is illustrated in Figure B.1.4a.
Nevertheless, a declining share of workers are union members. Union
density reached a peak around 1980, when 52 percent of the em-
ployed were organized, before it started to decline, dropping to 25
percent by 2014. Thus, although the social partners never had the
same degree of centralization and influence as in Norway, women’s
increased share of union members coincided with unions further de-
cline. Thus, from Thatcher and onwards, there was “a reduced role
in policy-making for trade unions” (Randall 1995, 177) Additionally,
women’s enrollment in higher education has lagged that of both Nor-
way and the Netherlands, as displayed in Figure B.1.4b. British em-
ployers have consequently been less dependent on high-skilled labor
in general, and from women in particular.
As in other advanced democracies, not only the British Conserva-
tives, but also the trade unions and the Labour Party, favored the
male-breadwinner perspective until at least the 1970s (Ruggie 1984;
Randall 2000). Yet, as women entered education and employment,
and became increasingly active in trade unions and the political par-
ties, this perspective was challenged, much as it were in Norway.
5 See, e.g., Crouch 1993; and Thelen 2004, for accounts of the craft- and occupation-
based origins of the fragmented industrial relations in Britain.
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figure b.1.4. Women in trade unions and higher education in the United
Kingdom and Norway.
Notes: See Figure 3.1 for the definition of enrollment in higher educa-
tion. Sources: Visser (2011) (union membership); Barro and Lee (2015)
(education).
Figure B.1.4a illustrates that in the 1970s, when union density was
still rising in Britain, women entered trade unions at the same pace
as in Norway and also in the uk did women call for daycare re-
forms. In the words of Randall (2000, 184): “It has been women in the
Labour Party and the trade unions who have pushed the issue up the
agenda.”
The British case, however, illustrates the importance of timing. Just
as women within the Labour Party began to push for daycare re-
forms, the Thatcher era began, and with it the active reduction of
trade unions’ influence and coverage (Glyn 2006, 124). Thus, although
the importance of the daycare issue to trade unions continued to
grow during the 1980s, “[s]uch voices carried little political weight
under Thatcher, however”, Randall (2002, 225) remarks. Like Norway,
trade unions were thus increasingly titling towards favoring the dual-
earner model and wfps. Unlike Norway, they did not have the influ-
ence to translate the changing preferences into policies, at least not
to any significant extent. In other words, whereas Norway moved
beyond the minor reforms in the 1970s, Britain did not. A paid mater-
nity leave, with six weeks paid at 90 percent of previous earnings and
twelve weeks with a flat rate benefit, was introduced under Labour in
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1976, but it had strict eligibility criteria.6 Daycare coverage remained
low. By 1980 only about two percent of children under the age of
three attended publicly funded daycare and did not improve during
the 1980s (Bussemaker 1997).7 By 1988, the number was still two per-
cent, and local authority full-time daycare covered just one percent
of children aged zero to four. It had not improved by the mid 1990s
(Bussemaker 1997).
The gender gap in higher education enrollment rates started to di-
minish in the 1960s and 1970s in Britain, though at a slower pace
than in the cases discussed above (see Figure B.1.4b and Figure 3.1).
Whereas Norway and Sweden massively expanded higher education
in the 1960s and 1970s, Britain held back the expansion until the latter
half of the 1980s and in the 1990s (Ansell 2010, ch. 5).8 The labor sup-
ply of highly-skilled women compared to men was in consequence
even less of a concern to employers in Britain than in Norway in the
1970s and early 1980s. Wfps were, in other words, not of interest to
employers (McRae 1991).
By the late 1980s, however, there were signs of change in employ-
ers’ policy preferences, as they “added their voice to pressures on the
government to take more of a lead on the child care question” (Ran-
dall 2002, 225). Their lack of willingness to put this policy demand
at the top of the agenda, as well as their more limited policy influ-
ence compared to employers in Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands,
meant that the government could get away with symbolic gestures
(Randall 2000). The daycare services that were available by 1990 were
6 To qualify for the benefit, a mother needed to have “two years of continuous em-
ployment of sixteen hours over over wit the same employer” (O’Connor, Orloff, and
Shaver 1999, 84). A large share of working mothers were therefore ineligible or only
qualified for reduced benefits.
7 For children aged three to five, the coverage rate was 34-40 percent in 1988 (Ran-
dall 1995, 329).
8 The British Conservatives envisioned a limited expansion in the early 1960s, which
would benefit mostly the upper classes, whereas the Labour government in power
from 1964 rejected the proposal to build six new universities (Ansell 2010, 197-201).
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thus largely fully private ones (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999, ch.
3).
As women’s entrance into higher education continued to rise, and
outpaced men’s entrance in the early 1990s, the social partners have
growingly emphasized the need for expansive wfp reforms. From the
early 1990s and onwards, both the Trade Union Congress and the
Confederation of British Industries called for a national daycare strat-
egy. Employers became interested in ensuring the labor supply of
highly skilled women (Daguerre 2006, 221-3).
The Labour Party also paid more attention to the issue, both
as women rose through the ranks of the party and as highly ed-
ucated women became an increasingly important group of voters
to attract (see, e.g., Annesley 2010; Morgan 2013). Labour’s 1997
manifesto included only unspecified pledges for increased wfp pro-
vision but by the time of the 2001 election, the appeal to work-
ing women had become explicit (Morgan 2013).9 Within the gov-
ernment, the wfp reforms “were initiated, carried forward and re-
fined by a coalition of feminist actors located in significant institu-
tional positions in and around the New Labour government” (An-
nesley 2010, 54). These included advisers, mps, trade union repre-
sentatives, and ministers notably Patricia Hewitt, the Minister for
Women and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry from 2001 to
2005.
Under New Labour, both paid leave and daycare were expanded,
albeit from a low initial level. Daycare coverage reached 35 percent for
children under the age of three by 2010, though it was still costly and
most daycare slots were only available on a part-time basis. Paid leave
was expanded several times during the New Labour period, extend-
ing the flat rate benefit period to 33 weeks. Merely six weeks were still
9 By 2001, also the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats had turned around and
started to favor wfp expansions (Morgan 2013).
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paid at 90 percent of previous earnings. Compared to the reforms in
the other cases discussed above, as well as the recent daycare expan-
sions in Germany (see Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011), these
are reforms are quite small. That said, they marked the first shift in
the British approach to family policy.
In line with women’s growing share of trade union members, and
the rise of women in leadership positions with in the trade unions,
it is unsurprising that the New Labour wfp reforms received active
support from the trade unions (Randall 2000). On the employers’ side,
Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) convincingly document that
the cbi also promoted daycare expansion to enable mothers to more
fully participate in the labor market. Regarding leave, they have been
more ambivalent. Although they accepted the leave expansions under
New Labour, they also criticized the costs of these reforms for smaller
businesses, as my theoretical argument would lead us to expect.
Despite promises of further wfp expansion, the Liberal Democratic-
Conservative coalition (2010-5) have not expanded leave. Daycare cov-
erage has remained at 35 percent (2013 numbers). It is telling that
although the cbi and the trade unions have become vocal supporters
of further wfp reforms,10 they have not been able to exert sufficient
influence to pressure the government to do so.
In short, the British case shows that although the social partners
also here have turned around and gone from opposing to favoring
wfp reforms, they have only to a limited extent been in a position to
notably influence the policy trajectory. Compared to the other cases,
this appears to be an important reason for why both the provision of
daycare services and the length and benefits of paid leave are more
limited in the United Kingdom than in Norway, Sweden, and the
Netherlands. The small set of reforms that, nonetheless, have taken
place seem to be the result of the active lobbying from women within
10 Personal conversations with the cbi.
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the Labour Party, combined with the importance of attracting highly
educated female voters.
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b.1.2 Details on variables
Parental leave
The leave data is based on Gauthier (2011) but it has been
updated using a number of different sources (Akgunduz and
Plantenga 2012; Blum 2010; Borchorst 2004, 2006; Datta Gupta,
Smith, and Verner 2008; Finch 2006; Gregg, Gutierrez-Domenech, and
Waldfogel 2007; ILO 1984; Kamerman and Moss 2009; Merz 2004;
Moss 2009, 2010; Moss and Korintus 2008; Moss and O’Brien 2006;
Moss and Wall 2007; Moss 2011, 2012; Moss and Deven 1999;
OECD 2012b; Prskawetz et al. 2008; Rasmussen 2010; Rønsen
and Sundström 2002; Ruhm 1998; Sundström and Duvander 2002;
Zabel 2009). Below, I show that the results hold when using either the
original Gauthier (2011) data or alternative measures of paid parental
leave.
Covariates and summary statistics
The covariates included in the regression analysis in Tables 3.2 and
B.1.3 are defined as follows:
women in parliament. The percentage of seats in the legislature
held by women in a given year. The data are from Brady, Huber,
and Stephens (2014).
government partisanship. If a party is in government, then the
variable is equal to the left-wing parties’ percentage of the to-
tal number of parliamentary seats held by all the government
parties together. If the party is not in government, then the
variable is equal to zero. The center government variable is de-
fined in a similar way. For details on the categorization of par-
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ties into left, center, and right, see Brady, Huber, and Stephens
(2014, Appendix B). The data are from this source.
unemployment. The percentage of the civilian labor force who are
unemployed. The data source is Armingeon et al. (2012).
elderly. The percentage of the population aged 65 or more. The
source is the same as for the unemployment varible.
gdp per capita . The log of the gross domestic product (given in
millions of us dollars at purchasing power parity) divided by
the country’s population. The source for both of these variables
are Brady, Huber, and Stephens (2014).
The summary statistics for the variables are provided in Table B.1.1.
table b.1.1. Summary statistics for the variables used in the time-series
cross-section regressions in Table 3.2
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Gender gap 890 −0.51 12.07 −20.65 36.07
Corporatism 890 0.04 0.76 −1.58 1.23
Women in parliament (%) 890 14.41 11.84 0.00 47.30
Left cabinet 890 32.75 38.60 0.00 100.00
Center cabinet 890 26.93 34.45 0.00 100.10
Unemployment 890 5.10 3.30 0.00 16.80
Elderly 890 13.11 2.83 5.70 22.70
Gdp per capita (log) 890 2.40 0.95 0.02 4.12
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b.1.3 Corporatism scores in the 2000s
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figure b.1.5. Corporatism in advanced democracies (2002)
Notes: See Section 3.2.2 for how corporatism is measured and defined.
Source: Martin and Swank (2012).
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b.1.4 Scatter plot of the change in parental leave generosity and
change in the gender gap in higher education enrollment be-
tween 1970 and 2010
Figure B.1.6 displays the relationship between leave and the gender
gap separately for countries with corporatism above and below the
mean. The x-axis shows the change in the gender gap between 1970
and 2010 and the y-axis shows the change in parental leave generos-
ity during the same period. Among corporatist countries, a larger
change in the gender gap in favor of women is associated with a
larger change in parental leave between 1970 and 2010. Among less
corporatist countries, however, the relationship is somewhat negative:
a shift in the gender gap is not associated with an expansion of paid
leave.
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figure b.1.6. Correlation between change in parental leave generosity and
change in the gender gap in higher education enrollment,
1970-2010.
Notes: See the text and for the definition of parental leave generosity.
See figure 3.1 for the definition of the gender gap. Sources: OECD
(2012a); Martin and Swank (2012); see also Appendix B.1.2.
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b.1.5 Women’s percentage of union members
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figure b.1.7. Percentage female among union members in advanced democ-
racies, 1960-2010.
Source: Visser (2011)
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b.1.6 Conditional marginal effect plots of the effect in Table 3.2
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figure b.1.8. The estimated marginal coefficients of the gender gap in
higher education and corporatism on parental leave generosity
(with 95 percent confidence intervals). The grey histogram
shows the distribution of the conditioning variable.
Notes: Based on Model 4 in Table 3.2.
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b.1.7 Additional regression results
This section of the appendix describes and discusses the robustness
checks of the regression results presented in Section 3.2 and Table
3.2 of the study. Table B.1.2 reports Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.2 but
includes the estimates for the covariates.
Table B.1.3 presents the results of a series of additional tests. As
in the main analysis the gender gap and the corporatism variables
are “demeaned” at one standard deviation above the mean (see Sec-
tion 3.2 for details). We might worry that the results are driven by
the particular operationalization and measurement of the gender gap,
corporatism, or parental leave. I therefore specify a set of models us-
ing alternative measures. Model 1 shows the results when using the
alternative measure of the gender gap. The alternative measure is de-
fined as the average years of education among women over the age
of 25 minus the average years of education among men over the age
of 25. The data comes from Gakidou et al. (2010) and are available
for the 1970-2009 period. The results are, if anything, stronger when
using this alternative measure. The same holds when I, in Model 2,
use the percentage of women enrolled in higher education, instead of
the difference between women and men, as the measure of women’s
entrance into higher education. The source and definition of the vari-
able is the same as for the main analysis (see the note to Figure 3.1
for details).
In model 3, I use an alternative measure of corporatism from Jahn
(2014). This measure takes into account the organizational structure
of collective actors, the structure of work council representation, the
rights of work councils, the government intervention in wage bar-
gaining, the dominant level of wage bargaining, the involvement of
unions and employers in government decisions, the coordination of
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wage bargaining, and the mandatory extension of collective agree-
ments. The corporatism index is derived from a factor analysis and
is z standardized (for details, see Jahn 2014). Employing this measure
of corporatism fully supports the findings from the main models.
In Models 4 to 6, I turn to three alternative measures of the depen-
dent variable. The first comes from Tanaka (2005) and is defined as
the weeks of job-protected paid leave. It is available for 16 advanced
democracies from 1969 to 2000 Tanaka (see 2005, for further details).
The estimates in Model 4 indicates that my results are not sensitive
to the use of this alternative operationalization of the dependent vari-
able, which has the advantage of taking into account whether the
leave is job protected. In Models 5 and 6, I use data from the Parental
Leave Benefits Database (Ferrarini et al. n.d.), which include informa-
tion on both duration and replacement rates for paternity, maternity
and shared leave. Unfortunately, it is only available for every fifth
year. I make use of two measures from this database. The first, which
is the dependent variable in Model 5, is the number of weeks of pa-
ternity and shared leave multiplied by the weekly replacement rate.
In Model 6, I use the database’s measure of the net replacement rate
during the child’s first year as a percentage of the average production
worker wage. This measure has the advantage that it captures the to-
tal generosity of the benefits during the period that constitutes the
most important for leave. As these two measures are only available
for every fifth year, I take the mean value of the independent variables
over the five year preceding the years for which the parental leave mea-
sures are available. Using these reliable and accurate measures again
confirms the results from the main analysis.
Next, in Models 7 to 9, I use different specifications of the model,
namely a Prais-Winsten AR(1) model (Model 7), a lagged dependent
variable model (Model 8) and an error correction model (9). The in-
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teraction term in all of these models is statistically significant, albeit
only at the 10 percent level in Models 8 and 9, and the effect of the
gender gap when corporatism is held constant at one standard devia-
tion above its mean is in the right direction and significant in Model 7
and borderline insignificant in Models 8 and 9. Thus, although some-
what weaker, also these results are consistent with the results in the
main set of models in Table 3.2.
Finally, in Model 10, I bootstrap the standard errors of Model 4 in
the main analysis in Table 3.2. The clustered standard errors assume a
large number of clusters, whereas I have 18 countries in the analysis.
Esarey and Menger (forthcoming) recommends robustness checking
the results using bootstrapped significance tests and confidence in-
tervals and shows that the “wild bootstrap” procedure typically pro-
vides the most reliable uncertainty estimates. Model 10 reports the
main results when using a wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications to
obtain p-values and confidence intervals. These results are highly sig-
nificant and very similar to the main results in Model 4 in Table 3.2.
Summarized, these robustness tests have shown that the main re-
sults and conclusions are backed up when using different measures
for the key variables, alternative specifications of the model, and boot-
strapped standard errors.
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table b.1.2. Full regression results for the provision of leave schemes, 18
OECD countries, 1960-2010
Dependent variable: Parental leave
Covariates Basic
(1) (2)
Gender gap (gg) 0.16 0.38∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13)
Corporatism 1.31 2.96
(2.07) (1.95)
GG × corp. 0.18∗∗
(0.06)
Women in parliament (%) 0.57∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.17) (0.15)
Left cabinet -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Center cabinet 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment 0.19 -0.11
(0.3) (0.27)
Elderly 1.06∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.34)
gdp per capita (log) 20.29∗∗ 12.44∗∗
(7.56) (5.87)
F(γ1=γ2=γ3=0) 0.88 3.11
∗∗
Observations 890 890
Countries 18 18
Adj. R2 0.85 0.86
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). OLS fixed effects regres-
sions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regres-
sions include country and year fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged by
one year.
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table b.1.3. Regression results for the provision of leave schemes, 18 OECD
countries, 1960-2010
Dependent variable: varies
Alt. GG (I) Alt. GG (II) Alt. corp. Alt. DV (I) Alt. DV (II) Alt. DV (III) AR(1) LDV ECM Bootstrap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Gender gap (gg) 8.82∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.04 0.04 0.38∗∗
(3.81) (0.07) (0.13) (0.27) (0.22) (0.32) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) CI: [.09,.67]
Corporatism 17.43∗∗∗ -5.15∗∗ 3.40∗∗ 3.12 0.85 4.82 1.04 -0.06 0.18 2.96
(3.41) (2.06) (1.44) (2.82) (4.34) (6.29) (0.77) (0.33) (0.36) CI: [-1.59,7.42]
gg × corp. 12.35∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.2∗ 0.2∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(2.36) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) CI: [0.03,0.33]
F(γ1=γ2=γ3=0) 9.39
∗∗∗ 5.17∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 2.9∗∗ 2.93∗∗ 4.79∗∗∗ χ2 : 4.3 χ2 : 2.88 4.79∗∗∗
Observations 720 708 890 495 144 144 890 889 886 890
Countries 18 18 18 15 18 18 18 18 18 18
Adj. R2 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.76 0.82 0.83 0.96 0.83 0.83
ρ/LDV (Models 8 & 9) 0.86 0.87 -0.13
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). OLS fixed effects regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All
regressions include the covariates specified in Section 3.2 and country and year fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged by one year. The ECM model
also includes the first difference of all independent variables.
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b.1.8 The Norwegian case
Seat percentages and voting power in the Storting, 1961-2017
This section describes how voting power is measured. The most used
voting power index is the Banzhaf index (bi) (Banzhaf 1965). McLean
(2001, ch. 4), for instance, uses this measure to calculate the relative
power of each of the parties represented in the uk parliament between
1868 and 1910. With the bi we measure whether a given legislator’s
defection from a winning coalition is critical in the sense that it then
becomes a losing coalition (Taylor and Pacelli 2008, 83-4). More pre-
cisely, to arrive at the power of a legislator vi, or what can be called
the “total Banzhaf power” (tbf), we count the number of coalitions
C that simultaneously fulfill three criteria. First, that vi belongs to C;
second, that C is a winning coalition; and third, if v withdraws from
C then C is no longer a winning coalition (Taylor and Pacelli 2008, 83).
Thus if C1, C2, . . . , Cj is the number of coalitions that fulfills the three
criteria for voter vi then tbf(vi) = ∑
j
i=1 Cj. We arrive at the fraction
of the voting power that belongs to vi (the normalized bi) with the
following formula:
BI(vi) =
TBP(vi)
∑ni=1 TBP(vn)
(B.1)
In Figure B.1.9, I use this formula to calculate the relative voting
power of each party for each parliamentary period (the grey bars).
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figure b.1.9. Parties’ seat percentages and Banzhaf-power index score,
1961-2017.
Notes: See the text for the details on how the Banzhaf power index is
calculated. Sources: The Norwegian Parliament (www.stortinget.no)
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figure b.1.10. The percentage female cabinet ministers, 1945-2016
Sources: The Norwegian Parliament (www.stortinget.no)
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Female and male labor force particpation
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figure b.1.11. Percentage female and male labor force participation in the
population aged 15-74, 1972-2014.
Sources: Statistics Norway
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c.1.1 Cross-national variation in women’s share of managers and
the labor force
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figure c.1.1. Percentage women among managers and among the employed
in advanced democracies in the 2010s.
Note: “This indicator refers to the proportion of females in total em-
ployment in senior and middle management corresponding to the
ISCO-88 categories 11 (legislators and senior officials) and 12 (corpo-
rate managers). The indicator provides information on the proportion
of women who are employed in decision-making and management
roles in government, large enterprises and institutions” ILO (2016).
Source: ILO (2016)
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c.1.2 The daycare reform: background statistics
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(c) Percentage of age group registered in daycare for more than 30 hours per week,
1963-2015
figure c.1.2. The development of daycare prices, daycare financing, and
full-time attendance in Norway.
Note: Prices given in CPI deflated 2011 NOKs. Sources: Statistics Nor-
way (2015, 21, 2016a), Gulbrandsen (2007), Norwegian Directorate for
Education and Training (2016), and Statistics Norway (2016d)
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c.1.3 The Associates of Daycare Coverage Expansion, 1972-2001
table c.1.1. Daycare coverage for one- and two-year-olds across Norwegian
municipalities, 1972-2001
Age 1 Age 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βˆXm,t βˆXm,t−1 βˆXm,t βˆXm,t−1
Higher edu. share 21.88 20.53 44.22 42.18
(28.16) (29.67) (28.46) (28.47)
Higher edu. share women 42.10∗∗∗ 46.51∗∗∗ 38.23∗∗∗ 47.83∗∗∗
(12.11) (12.27) (13.00) (12.60)
Women reps. share -1.53 -0.17 3.07 0.50
(2.52) (2.33) (3.03) (2.89)
Left seats share 2.84 3.63 5.75 8.25∗
(3.92) (4.01) (4.25) (4.51)
Turnout share 28.56∗∗∗ 26.19∗∗∗ 33.36∗∗∗ 28.59∗∗∗
(7.45) (7.23) (8.38) (8.15)
Unemployment share -37.29 -54.36∗ -97.25∗∗∗ -118.30∗∗∗
(28.07) (31.01) (35.72) (32.87)
Log exp. per cap. 7.84∗∗∗ 8.96∗∗∗ 12.68∗∗∗ 13.52∗∗∗
(1.29) (1.33) (1.60) (1.54)
Women pop. share 102.59∗∗ 91.93∗ 136.92∗∗∗ 142.89∗∗∗
(51.35) (47.69) (48.66) (49.07)
Change in pop. (%) 0.28∗∗∗ -0.01 0.17 0.07
(0.10) (0.02) (0.11) (0.04)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Observations 11,678 11,295 11,678 11,295
Municipalities 403 403 403 403
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses.
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c.1.4 The Associates of Daycare Coverage Expansion, 2002-2008
table c.1.2. Daycare coverage for one- and two-year-olds across Norwegian
municipalities, 2002-2008
Age 1 Age 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βˆXm,t βˆXm,t−1 βˆXm,t βˆXm,t−1
Higher edu. share 0.23 0.01 1.45 0.65
(1.01) (1.08) (1.05) (1.12)
Higher edu. share women -0.37 -0.49 0.17 0.10
(0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.42)
Women reps. share -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Left seats share -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.12
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
Turnout share 0.14 0.38∗ -0.04 0.12
(0.16) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21)
Unemployment share -0.59 -2.48∗∗∗ -0.75 1.35
(0.92) (0.95) (0.95) (1.34)
Log exp. per cap. 0.05 0.04 -0.10∗∗ 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Median wage -0.33 0.18 1.28∗∗∗ 0.54
(0.41) (0.53) (0.47) (0.55)
Women pop. share -1.45 1.61 0.95 -0.37
(1.19) (1.72) (1.32) (1.79)
Change in pop. (%) 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Observations 2,760 2,365 2,761 2,366
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses.
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c.1.5 Data Description and Sources
data sources for figures 4 .1-4 .6
• Figure 4.1: European Working Conditions Survey (2000, 2005,
2010)
• Figure 4.2: OECD (2012a)
• Figure 4.3: Gulbrandsen (2007), Norwegian Directorate for Edu-
cation and Training (2016), and Statistics Norway (2016d)
• Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6: Statistics Norway (2016b)
construction of the dependent variables We study two
main dependent variables, hours and leadership. The first, hours, is
the work pressure in a job, operationalized as the average working
hours in a detailed set of occupations. When parents, and particu-
larly mothers, select their occupation, it is plausible that they do so
partially on the basis of perceived working hours. Measuring the av-
erage workings hours of her occupation should tell us whether she is
in an occupation with higher or lower work pressure which is the
first outcome of interest. We make use of two data sources to obtain
such a measure. First, from the register data we know the detailed
occupation of each of the employed individuals in our sample. These
occupation codes are based on the widely used ILO ISCO-88 classifi-
cation (three-digit level), where a “set of jobs whose main tasks and
duties are characterised by a high degree of similarity constitutes an
occupation” (Statistics Norway 1998, 11). Second, we need the aver-
age working hours for each of these 107 occupations. The registry
data do not contain the actual hours worked. Even if they did, actual
working hours during the 2002-2008 period are likely to be influenced
by mothers’ labor supply. A variable based on actual (or contracted)
C.1 appendix 255
working hours would hence capture a mix of changes in labor sup-
ply and inflow of mothers to occupations with higher average hours
of work. Our approach ensures a cleaner measure of the latter effect:
we pool the the quarterly Norwegian Labor Force Surveys from 1997
to 2001, which contains information both on the 220,000 respondents’
occupation and actual working hours, to create a precise measure of
the average working hours for each of the 107 occupations. To do so,
we regress actual working hours on a set of occupational dummies
and year and quarter fixed effects to adjust for yearly and seasonal
variation.1 We use the estimates for these occupational dummies to
predict the average actual working hours for each occupation. Figure
C.1.3 supplies the full list of occupations and their predicted average
working hours, and Figure C.1.4 shows that there is a very strong
correlation between average hours and the female percentage in that
occupation, echoing the cross-national results in Figure 4.1a and sup-
porting the validity of our measure. Also reflecting the cross-national
results, occupational groups consisting of directors, chief executives,
and managers are among the occupations with the longest average
hours. Finally, we merge the data on the estimated occupational work-
ing hours with the registry data, so that each mother with an occupa-
tional code is assigned the average hours worked of her occupation.
The second dependent variable, leader, is a binary indicator equal
to 1 if the mother is in a leadership position, and 0 otherwise. At the
ISCO-88 three digit-level, we thus identify a leadership position as be-
ing in one the following occupational groups: senior government of-
ficials (ISCO code 112), senior officials of interest organizations (114),
directors and chief executives (121), production and operations de-
partment managers (122), other department managers (123), or gen-
eral managers of small enterprises (131).
1 We also control for whether the survey interview was done directly with the respon-
dent or with another member of the household.
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descriptions of the variables Unless otherwise stated, the
variables are measured in the year the child was two years of age.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table C.1.3 below.
Individual level:
one child : Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mother has one child.
two children : Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mother has two
children.
three children : Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mother has
three children.
four children : Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mother has four
children.
five or more children : Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mother
has five or more children.
age : Age in years.
earnings (t-3): Earnings prior to tax and transfers.
no education (t-3): Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mother has
not completed compulsory education.
compulsory education (t-3): Binary indicator equal to 1 if the
highest completed education is compulsory education.
high school education (t-3): Binary indicator equal to 1 if the
highest completed education is high school education.
university education (low) (t-3): Binary indicator equal to 1
if the highest completed education is a bachelor/cand.mag. de-
gree.
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university education (high) (t-3): Binary indicator equal to 1
if the highest completed education is a masters/phd degree.
unknown education (t-3): Binary indicator equal to 1 if level of
education is missing.
married : Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mothers is married.
foreign born : Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mother is foreign
born.
employed (t-3): Binary indicator equal to 1 if the mother is regis-
tered with earnings.
partner has university education : Binary indicator equal to
1 if the mother has a partner with a completed university de-
gree.
Municipality level:
daycare coverage , age 1 (t-1): The share of children age 1 en-
rolled in daycare. Source: Statistics Norway (2016b).
daycare coverage , age 2 : The share of children age 2 enrolled
in daycare. Source: Statistics Norway (2016b).
employment rate of childless men (t-1 , t-2 , and t-3):
Share of men without children who are employed. As we
calculate this variable from the register data, we only have
these data for 2002 and onwards and therefore have to use the
general unemployment rate for t-1 and t-2, as this variable is
available also before 2002.
expenses per capita (log) (t-1 , t-2 , and t-3): The log of the
municipal government’s total non-daycare expenditures per
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capita. Total expenditures is the sum of gross current expen-
ditures and gross investment. Source: Fiva, Halse, and Natvik
(2015).
mean wage level among childless men : The mean wage in
the municipality among men without children, which is calcu-
lated from the administrative registers. This variable is not avail-
able before 2002 and is therefore only included at t.
percent population change (t-1 , t-2 , and t-3): The percent
change in the municipality’s population from the previous year.
Source: Fiva, Halse, and Natvik (2015).
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c.1.6 Descriptive Statistics for the Individual Level Variables
table c.1.3. Descriptive statistics for the individual level
variables.
Standard
Mean deviation
Individual level (N = 268,060)
Daycare 0.492 0.428
One child 0.353 0.478
Two children 0.396 0.489
Three children 0.185 0.388
Four children 0.0480 0.214
Five or more children 0.0188 0.136
Age 32.44 5.151
Earnings (t-3) 182,943 138,994
No education (t-3) 0.00239 0.0488
Compulsory education (t-3) 0.175 0.380
High school education (t-3) 0.352 0.478
University education (low) (t-3) 0.328 0.470
University education (high) (t-3) 0.0819 0.274
Unknown education (t-3) 0.0580 0.234
Married 0.552 0.497
Foreign born 0.151 0.358
Employed (t-3) 0.865 0.342
Partner has university education 0.272 0.445
Municipality level (N = 395×7 = 2,795)
Daycare coverage, age 1 (t-1) 0.41 0.22
Daycare coverage, age 2 0.67 0.22
Employment rate of childless men 0.66 0.07
Expenses per capita (log) 4.05 0.27
Mean wage level of childless men 194,017 35,453
Percent population change −0.07 1.39
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c.1.7 Estimates of the endogenous correlations between daycare
and our outcomes
table c.1.4. Regression results reporting the association between daycare us-
age and the outcomes of interest
Hours Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+5 t+1 t+5
Daycare 2.7∗∗∗ 1.9∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗
(.2) (.2) (.002) (.002)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Controls X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome 20.5 (13.8) 22.3 (13) .03 (.18) .05 (.22)
Mean (SD) daycare .49 (.43) .4 (.42) .49 (.43) .4 (.42)
Observations 268,060 153,931 268,525 154,039
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age,
age squared, number of children, level of education in the year prior to giving birth,
education level of the partner, whether the mother is foreign born, whether she
is married, earnings and employment in the year prior to giving birth, year fixed
effects and municipality fixed effects. See Appendix C.1.5 for variable definitions
and summary statistics.
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c.1.8 Estimated average actual hours worked in three-digit occu-
pational groups
915: Messengers, porters, doorkeepers, and related workers 
913: Domestic and related helpers and cleaners 
513: Personal care and related workers 
323: Nursery and Registered Nurses for the Mentally Subnormal (RNMS) 
733: Handicraft workers in wood textile, leather, and related materials 
514: Other personal services workers 
332: Pre−primary education teaching associate professionals 
331: Primary education teaching associate professionals 
234: Special education teaching professionals 
932: Labourers in manufacturing 
421: Cashiers, tellers, and related clerks 
334: Technical and subject teaching and other teaching associate and pedagogical professionals 
232: Secondary education teaching professionals 
411: Secretaries and keyboard−operating clerks 
826: Textile−, fur−, and leather−products machine operators 
223: Nursing and midwifery professionals 
346: Social workers (college−trained), child care officers, etc. 
422: Client information clerks 
322: Modern health associate professionals (except nursing) 
414: Library, mail, and related clerks 
511: Travel attendants 
255: Writers and creative or performing artists 
732: Potters, glass−makers, and related trades workers 
348: Religious associate professionals 
522: Shop, salespersons, and demonstrators 
512: Housekeeping and restaurant services workers 
743: Textile, garment, and related trades workers 
344: Public service administrative associate professionals 
321: Life science technicians and related associate professionals 
827: Food and related products machine operators 
745: Laboratory assistants 
347: Artistic, entertainment, and sports associate professionals 
412: Numerical clerks 
349: Journalists, librarians, and information associate professionals 
813: Glass, ceramics, and related plant operators 
828: Assemblers 
235: Other teaching professionals 
253: Curators, librarians, and related professionals 
921: Agricultural, fishery, and related laborers 
812: Metal−processing−plant operators 
931: Laborers in construction and maintenance, etc. 
735: Technical illustrators 
742: Wood treaters, cabinet−makers, and related trades workers 
815: Chemical−processing−plant operators 
516: Protective services workers 
112: Senior government officials 
241: Social, juridical, technical, and scientific deliberation and planning 
933: Storing and goods handling laborers 
814: Wood−processing and papermaking−plant operators 
621: Forestry workers, etc. 
744: Pelt, leather, and shoemaking trades workers 
231: College, university, and higher education teaching professionals 
345: Police officers 
825: Printing−, binding−, and paper−products machine operators 
413: Material−recording and transport clerks 
221: Life science professionals 
343: Administrative and economic associate professionals 
821: Metal− and mineral−products machine soperators 
822: Chemical−products machine operators 
254: Social science and related professionals 
831: Locomotive−engine drivers and related workers 
731: Precision workers in metal and related materials 
714: Painters, building structure cleaners, and related workers 
721: Founders, welders, sheet−metal workers, etc. 
734: Graphic artists, photographers, and related trades workers 
816: Power−production and related plant soperators 
212: Mathematicians, statisticians, and related professionals 
914: Building, vehicle, and related cleaners 
313: Optical and electronic equipment operators 
712: Building frame and related trades workers 
315: Fire and safety inspectors 
711: Stone cutters and related workers 
916: Garbage collectors and related laborers 
341: Finance and sales associate professionals 
724: Electricians, electrical, and electronic equipment mechanics and fitters 
256: Religious professionals 
114: Senior officials of interest organisations 
741: Butchers, bakers, and other related food preparers 
312: Computer associate professionals 
723: Machinery mechanics and fitters 
222: Health professionals 
631: Fish farmers, etc. 
214: Architects, engineers, and related professionals 
251: Business professionals 
713: Building finishers and related trades workers 
833: Mobile−plant operators 
342: Business services agents and employment agents 
311: Engineering science technicians 
211: Physicists, chemists, and related professionals 
811: Oil, gas, mining−, and mineral−processing−plant operators 
611: Market gardeners and crop growers 
213: Computer systems designers and computer programmers 
832: Motor−vehicle drivers 
122: Production and operations department managers 
123: Other department managers 
722: Blacksmiths, gunsmiths, locksmiths, and related trades workers 
834: Ships' deck crews and related workers 
252: Legal professionals 
314: Ship and aircraft controllers and technicians 
131: General managers of small enterprises 
111: Legislators 
612: Animal producers 
641: Fishery workers and hunters 
121: Directors and chief executives 
613: Crop and animal producers 
Min: 22 P25: 28 P50: 32 P75: 35 Max: 43
Average hours worked per week (with 95% CIs)
% of employed: 1 5 9
figure c.1.3. The predicted average actual working hours in three-digit
level occupational groups, 1997-2001.
Sources: The Norwegian Labor Force Survey, 1997-2001
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figure c.1.4. Percentage women and average actual working hours in
three-digit level occupational groups, 1997-2001.
Sources: The Norwegian Labor Force Survey, 1997-2001
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c.1.9 Results when restricting to individuals observed at t+5
table c.1.5. Regression results reporting the association between daycare us-
age and the outcomes of interest
Hours Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+5 t+1 t+5
IV
Daycare 6.5∗∗∗ 3.8∗∗ .03 .07∗∗
(2.0) (1.6) (.02) (.03)
First stage
Coverage, age 1 .27∗∗∗ .27∗∗∗ .27∗∗∗ .27∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Coverage, age 2 .03 .03 .03 .03
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Reduced form
Coverage, age 1 1.83∗∗ .88 .00 .01
(.88) (.61) (.01) (.01)
Coverage, age 2 .13 .28 .01 .01
(.65) (.49) (.01) (.01)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Controls X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome 22.3 (13) 22.3 (13) .05 (.22) .05 (.22)
Mean (SD) daycare .4 (.42) .4 (.42) .4 (.42) .4 (.42)
F-test (p-value) 5.82 (0) 2.93 (.05) 1.43 (.24) 3.97 (.02)
Kleibergen-Paap F 114.4 115.1 115.4 115.4
Hansen J (p-value) .01 (.93) .12 (.72) 1.07 (.3) 1.75 (.19)
Observations 153,622 153,931 154,039 154,039
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age,
age squared, number of children, level of education in the year prior to giving birth,
education level of the partner, whether the mother is foreign born, whether she
is married, earnings and employment in the year prior to giving birth, year fixed
effects and municipality fixed effects. See Appendix C.1.5 for variable definitions
and summary statistics.
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c.1.10 Results when using only the strongest instrument
table c.1.6. Regression results reporting the association between daycare us-
age and the outcomes of interest
Hours Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+5 t+1 t+5
IV
Daycare 2.6∗∗ 3.8∗∗ .04∗∗ .07∗∗
(1.2) (1.6) (.02) (.03)
First stage
Coverage, age 1 .32∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗ .32∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Reduced form
Coverage, age 1 .82∗∗ 1.12∗∗ .01∗∗ .02∗∗
(.35) (.47) (.01) (.01)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Controls X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome 22.3 (13) 22.3 (13) .05 (.22) .05 (.22)
Mean (SD) daycare .49 (.43) .4 (.42) .49 (.43) .4 (.42)
Kleibergen-Paap F 181.4 229.8 181 230.5
Observations 268,060 153,931 268,525 154,039
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age,
age squared, number of children, level of education in the year prior to giving birth,
education level of the partner, whether the mother is foreign born, whether she
is married, earnings and employment in the year prior to giving birth, year fixed
effects and municipality fixed effects. See Appendix C.1.5 for variable definitions
and summary statistics.
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c.1.11 Results when excluding mothers who reside in a different
municipality than at t-3 to account for selective migration
table c.1.7. Regression results reporting the association between daycare us-
age and the outcomes of interest
Hours Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+5 t+1 t+5
IV
Daycare 2.5∗ 4.9∗∗∗ .04∗∗ .08∗∗
(1.4) (1.9) (.02) (.03)
First stage
Coverage, age 1 .29∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Coverage, age 2 .05∗∗∗ .02 .05∗∗∗ .02
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Reduced form
Coverage, age 1 .63 .92 .01 .01
(.49) (.69) (.01) (.01)
Coverage, age 2 .26 .61 .01 .01
(.40) (.54) (.01) (.01)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Controls X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome 22.7 (12.7) 22.7 (12.7) .05 (.22) .05 (.22)
Mean (SD) daycare .49 (.43) .4 (.42) .49 (.43) .4 (.42)
F-test (p-value) 2.02 (.13) 3.85 (.02) 2.81 (.06) 3.46 (.03)
Kleibergen-Paap F 83.4 93 83.5 93.3
Hansen J (p-value) .11 (.74) .96 (.33) 1.26 (.26) 1.59 (.21)
Observations 206,051 118,281 206,371 118,363
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age,
age squared, number of children, level of education in the year prior to giving birth,
education level of the partner, whether the mother is foreign born, whether she
is married, earnings and employment in the year prior to giving birth, year fixed
effects and municipality fixed effects. See Appendix C.1.5 for variable definitions
and summary statistics.
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c.1.12 Results when using municipality of residence the year prior
to child birth to account for selective migration
table c.1.8. Regression results reporting the association between daycare us-
age and the outcomes of interest
Hours Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+5 t+1 t+5
IV
Daycare 2.5 5.3∗∗ .04∗∗ .08∗∗
(1.5) (2.2) (.02) (.04)
First stage
Coverage, age 1 .23∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗ .23∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Coverage, age 2 .05∗∗∗ .01 .05∗∗∗ .01
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Reduced form
Coverage, age 1 .25 .68 .00 .01
(.44) (.66) (.01) (.01)
Coverage, age 2 .50 .62 .01 .01
(.36) (.49) (.01) (.01)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Controls X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome 22.7 (12.8) 22.7 (12.8) .05 (.22) .05 (.22)
Mean (SD) daycare .49 (.43) .4 (.42) .49 (.43) .4 (.42)
F-test (p-value) 1.96 (.14) 3.82 (.02) 2.11 (.12) 2.93 (.05)
Kleibergen-Paap F 77.7 74.2 77.6 74.5
Hansen J (p-value) 1.18 (.28) 1.28 (.26) .61 (.44) 1.49 (.22)
Observations 256,780 147,870 257,233 147,970
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age,
age squared, number of children, level of education (t-3), education level of the
partner, whether the mother is foreign born, whether she is married, earnings (t-
3), employment (t-3), year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. See Appendix
C.1.5 for variable definitions and summary statistics.
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c.1.13 Placebo analyses
table c.1.9. Regression results reporting the association between our instru-
ments and the outcomes for 55 year old women.
Hours Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+5 t+1 t+5
Reduced form
Coverage, age 1 -.34 .07 .01 .00
(.47) (.70) (.01) (.01)
Coverage, age 2 .17 -.07 -.00 -.00
(.33) (.54) (.01) (.01)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Controls X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome 18.8 (14) 17.5 (14) .04 (.20) .04 (.19)
F-test (p-value) .60 (.55) .01 (.99) .53 (.59) .07 (.93)
Observations 180,245 104,213 180,436 104,256
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age,
age squared, number of children, level of education (t-3), education level of the
partner, whether the mother is foreign born, whether she is married, earnings (t-
3), employment (t-3), year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. See Appendix
C.1.5 for variable definitions and summary statistics.
C.1 appendix 268
c.1.14 Results when excluding those without an occupation
table c.1.10. Regression results reporting the association between daycare
usage and the outcomes of interest
Hours Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+5 t+1 t+5
IV
Daycare 1.6∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗ .06∗∗ .08∗∗
(.4) (.7) (.02) (.04)
First stage
Coverage, age 1 .30∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Coverage, age 2 .05∗∗ .02 .05∗∗ .02
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Reduced form
Coverage, age 1 .38∗∗ .45∗ .01 .01
(.16) (.26) (.01) (.01)
Coverage, age 2 .20 .02 .01∗ .02
(.15) (.20) (.01) (.01)
Muni. & year FEs X X X X
Controls X X X X
Mean (SD) outcome 25.9 (10.4) 29.1 (4.6) .06 (.24) .06 (.25)
Mean (SD) daycare .54 (.42) .43 (.42) .54 (.42) .43 (.42)
F-test (p-value) 6.41 (0) 2.43 (.09) 3.3 (.04) 3.84 (.02)
Kleibergen-Paap F 83.5 89.5 83.8 89.7
Hansen J (p-value) .77 (.38) 0 (.95) 2.26 (.13) 1.7 (.19)
Observations 188,838 117,847 189,303 117,955
Municipalities 395 395 395 395
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on municipalities in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age,
age squared, number of children, level of education in the year prior to giving birth,
education level of the partner, whether the mother is foreign born, whether she
is married, earnings and employment in the year prior to giving birth, year fixed
effects and municipality fixed effects. See Appendix C.1.5 for variable definitions
and summary statistics.
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